1946年02月22日
乔治·凯南的《长电报》

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM
PEN-K-M
No paraphrase necessary
8963
Moscow via War
Dated February 22, 1946
Received 3:52 p.m.
SECRET
Secretary of State,
Washington.
511, February 22, 9 p.m.

国务院
来电
PEN-KM
无需解释
8963
莫斯科战争
日期：1946年02月22日
下午3：52收到
秘密
国务卿，
华盛顿。
511，02月22日晚上9点

Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:

对部门2月03日[13]第284号问题的答复，涉及的问题如此错综复杂、如此微妙，对我们的思维方式如此陌生，对分析我们的国际环境如此重要，以至于我无法将答案压缩成一封简短的信，否则我会觉得过于简化，有点危险。
因此，我希望部门能够包容我，我将以五个部分来回答这个问题，大致内容如下：

（One） Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.
（Two） Background of this outlook
（Three） Its projection in practical policy on official level.
（Four） Its projection on unofficial level.
（Five） Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

（一）战后苏联观的基本特征。
（二）本展望的背景
（三）在官方层面实际政策上的体现。
（四）非官方层面的投射。
（五）从美国政策角度进行的实际推论。

I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once.
There follows

我提前为电报渠道的负担道歉；但所涉及的问题如此紧迫重要，特别是考虑到最近发生的事件，如果我们对这些问题的回答值得关注，我认为应该立即得到重视。
以下是

Part One: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine
Are as Follows:

官方宣传机器所宣扬的战后苏联世界观的基本特征
如下：

（a） USSR still lives in antagonistic “capitalist encirclement” with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:

“In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world.”

（a）苏联仍然处于敌对的“资本主义包围圈”之中，长远来看，不可能实现永久的和平共处。
正如斯大林在1927年对美国工人代表团所说：

在国际革命进一步发展的过程中，将出现两个具有世界意义的中心：一个是社会主义中心，它将吸引那些倾向于社会主义的国家；另一个是资本主义中心，它将吸引那些倾向于资本主义的国家。
这两个中心为争夺世界经济主导权而展开的斗争，将决定全世界资本主义和共产主义的命运。

（b） Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

（b）资本主义世界充斥着内部冲突，这是资本主义社会的本质所决定的。
这些冲突无法通过和平妥协的方式解决。
其中最大的冲突是英美之间的冲突。

（c） Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

（c）资本主义的内部冲突必然引发战争。
由此引发的战争可能分为两种：两个资本主义国家之间的资本主义内部战争，以及针对社会主义世界的干涉战争。
精明的资本家们徒劳地寻求逃避资本主义内部冲突的途径，倾向于后者。

（d） Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

（d）对苏联进行干涉，虽然对进行干涉的国家来说将是灾难性的，但它将再次拖延苏联社会主义的进程，因此必须不惜一切代价予以阻止。

（e） Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

（e）资本主义国家之间的冲突虽然对苏联来说同样充满危险，但为社会主义事业的发展提供了巨大的可能性，特别是如果苏联保持军事上的强大、意识形态上的统一以及对其现任杰出领导层的忠诚。

（f） It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes
（one） certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and
（two） certain other elements （now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic） whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be “objectively” favorable to interests of USSR These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

（f）必须牢记，资本主义世界并非全是坏的。
除了那些无可救药的反动分子和资产阶级分子外，它还包括
（一）一些团结在可接受的共产党内的完全开明和积极的分子，以及
（二）另一些分子（现在出于策略原因被描述为进步或民主的分子），他们的反应、愿望和活动恰好“客观上”有利于苏联的利益。
这些分子必须得到鼓励和利用，以达到苏联的目的。

（g） Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders （in other words, non-Communist left-wing）. These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to serve interests of reactionary capital.

（g）在资产阶级资本主义社会的负面因素中，最危险的是那些被列宁称为“人民的假朋友”的人，即温和的社会主义者或社会民主党领袖（换句话说，非共产主义左翼）。
这些人比彻头彻尾的反动派更危险，因为后者至少是打着真面目的，而温和的左翼领袖则利用社会主义的伎俩来迷惑民众，为反动资本的利益服务。

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

关于前提就说这么多。
从苏联政策的角度来看，这些前提能得出什么结论呢？结论如下：

（a） Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity most be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

（a）必须竭尽全力提升苏联在国际社会中的相对实力。
反过来，也必须抓住一切机会削弱资本主义强国的实力和影响力，无论是集体的还是个别的。

（b） Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an “imperialist” war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

（b）苏联及其海外盟友的努力必须致力于深化和利用资本主义列强之间的分歧和冲突。
如果这些分歧和冲突最终发展成为一场“帝国主义”战争，那么这场战争就必须转化为各资本主义国家内部的革命动乱。

（c） “Democratic-progressive” elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

（c）应最大限度地利用国外的“民主进步”分子，按照符合苏联利益的路线，对资本主义政府施加压力。

（d） Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

（d）必须对国外的社会主义和社会民主主义领导人进行不懈的斗争。

Part Two: Background of Outlook

展望背景

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

在研究这条党的路线在实践中的影响之前，我想先提请注意它的某些方面。

First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power–party, secret police and Government–and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

首先，它并不代表俄罗斯人民的本性。
俄罗斯人民总体上对外部世界友好，渴望体验外部世界，渴望以此衡量自己自知拥有的才能，尤其渴望和平生活，享受自身劳动成果。
党的路线只不过是官方宣传机器以高超的技巧和坚持不懈的态度，向内心深处往往充满强烈抵抗的公众灌输的论调。
但党的路线对构成权力机器——政党、秘密警察和政府——的人们的观点和行为具有约束力，而我们正是要应对这些人。

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion “capitalist” world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.

其次，请注意，本党路线所依据的前提大多根本不成立。
经验表明，资本主义国家和社会主义国家之间完全可以和平共处、互利共赢。
发达国家内部的基本冲突不再主要源于资本主义生产资料所有制，而是源于发达的城市化和工业化本身，而俄罗斯迄今为止之所以幸免于此，并非因为社会主义，而是因为其自身的落后。
资本主义内部的竞争并不总是引发战争；并非所有战争都归咎于此。
在消灭了德国和日本，并经历了最近的战争之后，谈论对苏联进行干预的可能性，纯属无稽之谈。
如果不是受到不宽容和颠覆势力的挑衅，当今的“资本主义”世界完全能够与自身以及与俄罗斯和平共处。
最后，任何理智的人都没有理由怀疑西方国家温和社会主义领导人的诚意。
当他们有机会展示自己的能力时，否认他们在改善劳动人口条件方面所取得的成功也是不公平的，就像在斯堪的纳维亚半岛一样。

Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aims.

这些前提的谬误，每一个都早于最近的战争，而这场冲突本身充分证明了英美之间的分歧并未成为西方世界的主要分歧。
除轴心国以外的资本主义国家，并未表现出通过联合起来对抗苏联来解决彼此分歧的意愿。
帝国主义战争非但没有演变成内战和革命，反而迫使苏联不得不与资本主义列强并肩作战，以实现其宣称的共同目标。

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.

然而，所有这些论点，无论多么毫无根据、多么不成立，今天都又被大胆地提出来。
这说明什么？这表明，苏联党的路线并非基于对俄罗斯境外局势的任何客观分析；它实际上与俄罗斯境外的情况几乎没有关系；它主要源于俄罗斯内部的基本需求，这种需求在最近的战争之前就已存在，并且至今仍然存在。

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

克里姆林宫对世界事务神经质的看法，其根源在于俄罗斯人传统而本能的不安全感。
最初，这种不安全感源于一个爱好和平的农业民族，他们试图在广袤的平原上与凶猛的游牧民族为邻。
随着俄罗斯与经济发达的西方接触，这种不安全感进一步加深，他们害怕该地区更有能力、更强大、组织更完善的社会。
但后一种不安全感困扰的更多是俄罗斯统治者而非俄罗斯人民；因为俄罗斯统治者始终感到，他们的统治形式相对陈旧，心理基础脆弱而人为，无法与西方国家的政治体系相提并论或接触。
因此，他们始终惧怕外国的渗透，惧怕西方世界与自身直接接触，惧怕如果俄罗斯人了解外部世界的真相，或者如果外国人了解内部世界的真相，将会发生什么。
他们学会了只通过耐心而殊死的斗争来彻底摧毁对手的力量，而不是通过与对手达成协议或妥协来寻求安全。

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final Coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

马克思主义在西欧半个世纪以来一直徒劳无功，却在俄国扎根并首次燃起熊熊烈火，这绝非偶然。
只有在这片从未有过友好邻邦，也从未有过任何内部或国际上各势力之间相互容忍的均衡的土地上，一种认为社会经济冲突无法通过和平手段解决的学说才能蓬勃发展。
布尔什维克政权建立后，马克思主义教条在列宁的解读下变得更加残暴和不宽容，成为布尔什维克比以往的俄国统治者更加深陷的不安全感的完美载体。
在这种以利他主义为基本目的的教条中，布尔什维克为他们对外部世界的本能恐惧、为没有了他们就不知如何统治的独裁、为不敢不施加的残酷行径、为不得不要求牺牲找到了正当理由。
以马克思主义的名义，他们牺牲了其方法和策略中的每一条伦理价值。
如今，他们已无法摆脱这种道德价值。
这是他们道德和思想尊严的遮羞布。
如果没有它，他们在历史面前充其量也只是那一长串残酷而挥霍的俄罗斯统治者中的最后一个。
这些统治者为了保障其内部虚弱政权的外部安全，无情地将国家推向军事力量的新高度。
正因如此，苏联的目标必须始终庄严地披上马克思主义的外衣，也正因如此，任何人都不应低估教条在苏联事务中的重要性。
因此，苏联领导人[受自身过去和现在处境的驱使]，将外部世界[明显遗漏]描绘成邪恶、充满敌意和威胁的，但其内部却潜藏着蔓延的疾病病菌，注定要遭受日益严重的内部动荡的折磨，直到它被新兴的社会主义力量给予最后的致命一击，屈服于新的、更美好的世界。
这一论点为俄罗斯国家军事和警察力量的扩张、俄罗斯民众与外界的隔绝以及不断扩大俄罗斯警察权力范围的压力提供了正当理由，而这些正是俄罗斯统治者的本能冲动。
从根本上说，这只是不安的俄罗斯民族主义的稳步推进，这场运动已有数百年历史，其中进攻和防御的概念难以区分。
然而，在国际马克思主义的新伪装下，凭借其对绝望和饱受战争蹂躏的外部世界的甜言蜜语，它比以往任何时候都更加危险和阴险。

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth–indeed, their disbelief in its existence–leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers–extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisors whom they never see and cannot influence–this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

不应自以为是地认为苏联党的路线必然是虚伪的，所有提出这条路线的人都是如此。
他们中的许多人对外部世界一无所知，精神上过于依赖，以至于无法质疑[明显遗漏]自我催眠，他们很容易就相信那些让他们感到安慰和方便相信的东西。
最后，我们还有一个未解之谜：在这片伟大的土地上，究竟有谁（如果有的话）真正获得了关于外部世界的准确和公正的信息。
在这个政府弥漫着东方神秘和阴谋的氛围中，歪曲或毒害信息来源和潮流的可能性是无穷无尽的。
俄罗斯人对客观真理的不尊重——事实上，他们不相信客观真理的存在——导致他们将所有陈述的事实视为实现某个不可告人的目的的工具。
有充分的理由怀疑这个政府实际上是一个阴谋中的阴谋；我个人不愿相信斯大林本人对外部世界有任何客观的了解。
在这方面，俄罗斯人过去擅长的那种微妙的阴谋诡计，大有可为。
外国政府无法坦诚地向俄罗斯决策者陈述自己的立场——在与俄罗斯的关系中，他们在很大程度上被蒙蔽了双眼，甚至屈从于那些他们从未谋面、也无法影响的默默无闻的顾问——在我看来，这是莫斯科外交中最令人不安的一个特点，西方政治家如果能够理解这里所遭遇的困难的性质，就最好牢记这一点。

Part Three: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level

苏联视角在官方实际政策中的体现

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes:
（1） official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and （2） subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies （a） to （d） outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.

On official plane we must look for following:

我们已经了解了苏联计划的性质和背景。
那么，我们对其实际实施情况有何期待呢？

正如该部门在所提及的询问中所暗示的那样，苏联政策是在两个层面上实施的：
（1）官方层面，即以苏联政府名义正式采取的行动；
（2）地下层面，即苏联政府不承认负责的机构采取的行动。

两个层面出台的政策都将服务于第1部分（a）至（d）的基本政策。
不同层面采取的行动会有很大差异，但在目的、时机和效果上会相互契合。

在官方层面上我们必须寻找以下内容：

（a） Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.

（a）致力于全面提升苏联国家实力和威望的内部政策：密集的军事工业化；最大限度地发展武装力量；大肆炫耀以给外界留下深刻印象；继续对内部事务保密，旨在掩盖弱点并让对手一无所知。

（b） Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a “friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

（b）只要时机合适且前景光明，就将努力推进苏联权力的官方界限。
目前，这些努力仅限于某些邻近地区，这些地区被认为具有迫切的战略需要，例如伊朗北部、土耳其，可能还有博恩霍尔姆。
然而，如果苏联隐蔽的政治力量扩张到新的地区，其他地区随时可能受到质疑。
例如，一个“友好的波斯政府”可能会被要求授予俄罗斯一个波斯湾港口。
如果西班牙落入共产党控制，苏联在直布罗陀海峡设立基地的问题可能会被触发。
但只有在非正式准备完成后，此类主张才会在官方层面上体现。

（c） Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

（c）俄罗斯人将正式参与他们认为有机会扩张苏联权力或抑制或削弱其他国家权力的国际组织。
莫斯科认为联合国并非建立在所有国家共同利益和目标之上的永久稳定世界社会的机制，而是一个能够有利地实现上述目标的舞台。
只要联合国被认为能够服务于这一目的，苏联人就会继续留在联合国。
但如果他们任何时候得出结论，认为联合国正在使他们扩张权力的目标陷入困境或受阻，并且他们发现通过其他途径实现这些目标的更好前景，他们就会毫不犹豫地退出联合国。
然而，这意味着他们认为自己足够强大，可以通过退出联合国来分裂其他国家的团结，使联合国不再对其目标或安全构成威胁，并用他们认为更有效的国际武器取而代之。
因此，苏联对联合国的态度很大程度上取决于其他国家对联合国的忠诚度，以及这些国家在联合国捍卫和平与充满希望的国际生活理念的力度、果断性和凝聚力，而联合国正是我们思维方式中所体现的。
我重申，莫斯科对联合国的理想没有抽象的忠诚。
它对该组织的态度本质上仍将是务实和策略性的。

（d） Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.

（d）对于殖民地和落后或附属民族，苏联的政策，即使在官方层面，也将致力于削弱西方发达国家的权力、影响力和联系。
其理论是，只要这项政策取得成功，就会创造出有利于苏联共产主义渗透的真空。
因此，在我看来，苏联施压要求参与托管安排，与其说是为苏联权力的发挥提供主要渠道，不如说是希望在这些地区使西方影响力的发挥变得复杂和受到阻碍。
后者的动机并非没有，但为此，苏联人更愿意依赖官方托管安排以外的其他渠道。
因此，我们可以预见，苏联人将在各地要求加入托管或类似的安排，并利用由此获得的手段削弱西方在这些民族中的影响力。

（e） Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

（e）俄罗斯人将积极争取在那些他们认为极有可能反对西方权力中心的国家中发展苏联的代表权并建立官方联系。
这适用于那些相距遥远的国家，例如德国、阿根廷、中东国家等等。

（f） In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930's to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

（f）在国际经济事务中，苏联的政策实际上将以追求苏联及其主导的邻近地区的专制统治为主导。
然而，这将是基本政策。
就官方立场而言，其立场尚不明确。
自停战以来，苏联政府在对外贸易方面表现出了奇怪的沉默。
如果苏联政府能够获得大规模的长期贷款，我相信它最终可能会再次口头上表示希望建立普遍的国际经济交流，就像它在20世纪30年代那样。
否则，我认为苏联的对外贸易可能会主要局限于苏联自身的安全领域，包括德国的占领区，官方可能会对国家间普遍经济合作的原则采取冷淡态度。

（g） With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

（g）在文化合作方面，苏联同样会在口头上强调深化各国人民之间文化交流的愿望，但在实践中绝不会将其解读为任何可能削弱苏联各民族安全地位的举动。
苏联在这方面的政策实际体现将仅限于一些枯燥乏味的渠道，例如精心策划的官方访问和各种活动，充斥着伏特加和演讲，却缺乏持久的影响力。

（h） Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called “correct” course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good manners.

（h）除此之外，苏联与各个外国政府的官方关系将采取所谓的“正确”路线，高度重视苏联及其代表的威望，并一丝不苟地注意礼仪，而不是礼貌。

Part Four: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility

以下是我们对苏联基本政策在非官方或地下层面（即苏联政府不承担任何责任的层面）实施情况的预期。

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

用于颁布该层面政策的机构如下：

One. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.

一、其他国家共产党的内核心。
虽然构成这一类别的许多人可能表面上和实际上担任着不相关的公共职务，但他们实际上紧密合作，构成了世界共产主义的地下行动指挥部，一个隐蔽的共产国际，由莫斯科严密协调和指挥。
重要的是要记住，尽管与其关联的政党具有合法性，但这个内核心实际上是在地下运作。

Two. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn between these and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist Parties represented a curious （and from Moscow's standpoint often inconvenient） mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file–no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement–are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

二、共产党的基层成员。
请注意，这些成员与第1段定义的人员之间存在区别。
近年来，这种区别变得更加明显。
过去，外国共产党代表着一种奇特的（从莫斯科的角度来看，这往往令人不快的）阴谋与合法活动的混合体，而如今，阴谋分子被巧妙地集中在核心圈子里，并被安排在地下进行，而基层成员——甚至不再对运动的真相心知肚明——则被推选为各自国家某些政治倾向的真正内部党派，与外国之间确实存在阴谋联系。
只有在某些共产党员人数众多的国家，他们才会定期出现并作为一个整体行动。
通常，他们被用来渗透、影响或控制其他不太可能被怀疑为苏联政府工具的组织，以期通过[明显遗漏]组织而不是作为一个独立政党直接行动来实现其目的。

Three. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

三、各种各样的全国性协会或团体，都可能受到这种渗透的支配或影响。
这些组织包括：工会、青年联盟、妇女组织、种族社团、宗教社团、社会组织、文化团体、自由派杂志、出版社等等。

Four. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women's organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR

四、同样可以通过影响不同国家成分而渗透的国际组织。
其中，劳工、青年和妇女组织尤为突出。
国际劳工运动尤其被赋予了几乎至关重要的地位。
莫斯科认为，国际劳工运动可以转移西方政府在世界事务中的注意力，并建立国际游说团体，迫使各国政府采取有利于苏联利益的行动，并瘫痪那些与苏联不相符的行动。

Five. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

五、俄罗斯东正教及其海外分支，以及通过俄罗斯东正教传播的东正教。

Six. Pan-Slav movement and other movements （Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.） based on racial groups within Soviet Union.

六、泛斯拉夫运动以及苏联境内其他以民族为基础的运动（阿塞拜疆、亚美尼亚、土库曼等）。

Seven. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR

七、愿意在某种程度上为苏联目的服务的政府或统治集团，例如现保加利亚和南斯拉夫政府、北波斯政权、中国共产党等等。
这些政权的宣传机器，甚至实际政策，都可以被苏联广泛利用。

It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

可以预期，这个遥远的装置的组成部分将根据其各自的适用性进行使用，如下所示：

（a） To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.

（a）破坏西方主要大国的总体政治和战略潜力。
在这些国家，将努力破坏民族自信心，削弱国防措施，加剧社会和工业动荡，激发各种形式的分裂。
所有心怀不满的人，无论是经济上的还是种族上的，都将被敦促寻求解决方案，不是通过调解和妥协，而是通过挑衅性的暴力斗争来摧毁社会的其他要素。
在这里，穷人将与富人对抗，黑人将与白人对抗，年轻人将与老年人对抗，新移民将与定居者对抗，等等。

（b） On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

（b）在非官方层面，西方列强将采取尤为猛烈的行动，削弱其在落后殖民地或附属国人民的权力和影响力。
在这一层面上，西方列强将不择手段。
西方殖民政府的错误和弱点将被无情地揭露和利用。
西方国家的自由主义舆论将被动员起来，削弱殖民政策。
附属国人民的怨恨情绪将被激起。
在鼓励这些附属国寻求脱离西方列强独立的同时，苏联控制的傀儡政治机器也将做好准备，在各自殖民地实现独立后接管其国内政权。

（c） Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims （Turkey, Iran）, where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration （Switzerland, Portugal）, or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate.
（Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage. [）]

（c）如果个别政府阻碍苏联实现其目标，就会面临被罢免的压力。
这种情况可能发生在以下几个方面：政府直接反对苏联的外交政策目标（土耳其、伊朗）；封锁领土以阻止共产党渗透（瑞士、葡萄牙）；或者政府之间过于激烈地争夺道德主导权，就像英国工党政府一样，而共产党必须控制这些因素。
（有时，两种因素同时出现。这时，共产党的反对就会变得尤为尖锐和野蛮。）

（d） In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent–such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.

（d）在外国，共产党人通常会致力于摧毁一切形式的个人独立，无论是经济、政治还是道德层面的。
他们的体制只能处理那些完全依赖上级权力的人。
因此，经济独立的人——例如个体工商户、庄园主、成功的农民、工匠，以及所有在当地担任领导职务或在当地享有声望的人，例如受人尊敬的地方神职人员或政治人物——都是令人厌恶的。
即使在苏联，地方官员也经常被调动，以防止他们扎根，这并非偶然。

（e） Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].

（e）将竭尽所能挑拨西方主要列强相互对立。
美国将散布反英言论，英国也将散布反美言论。
包括德国在内的欧洲大陆人将被教导憎恶这两个盎格鲁-撒克逊列强。
凡有疑虑的，就煽动；凡无疑虑的，就点燃。
将不遗余力地抹黑和打击一切可能导致其他国家（[明显遗漏]）形成任何形式的团结或凝聚力，并将俄罗斯排除在外的努力。
因此，所有不受共产主义渗透和控制的国际组织，无论是天主教（明显遗漏）的国际经济组织，还是皇室贵族组成的国际组织，都将面临来自多方，甚至经常（明显遗漏）的攻击。

（f） In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is dominant. But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in gauging Soviet motives.

（f）总体而言，苏联在非官方国际层面上的所有努力都将是消极和破坏性的，旨在摧毁苏联无法掌控的力量源泉。
这完全符合苏联的基本本能：与敌对势力绝不妥协，建设性工作只有在共产党政权占据主导地位时才能启动。
但在这一切的背后，苏联将持续不断地施加压力，以渗透和掌控外国政府，尤其是警察机构的关键职位。
苏联政权是一个典型的警察政权，在沙皇时期暗藏的警察阴谋中成长起来，习惯于主要从警察权力的角度思考问题。
在衡量苏联的动机时，绝不能忽视这一点。

Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]

[从美国政策角度进行的实际推论]

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve–and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

总而言之，我们这里存在着一股政治力量，它狂热地坚信，与美国之间不可能存在永久的妥协方案，如果要巩固苏维埃政权，就必须且必要地破坏我们社会的内部和谐，摧毁我们传统的生活方式，摧毁我们国家的国际权威。
这股政治力量完全掌控着世界上最伟大的民族之一的精力和世界上最富饶的国土的资源，并且受到俄罗斯民族主义深厚而强大的思潮的推动。
此外，它拥有一个复杂而广泛的机构，用于在其他国家施加影响，这个机构具有惊人的灵活性和多功能性，其管理者的经验和地下手段的技巧想必是史无前例的。
最后，它的基本反应似乎无法考虑到现实。
对它来说，人类社会的大量客观事实并非像我们一样，用来不断检验和重塑观点的尺度，而是一个大杂烩，从中任意且带有倾向性地挑选个别事物来支持一种早已成见的观点。
诚然，这并非一幅令人愉快的画面。
如何应对这股力量无疑是我们外交史上面临的最大挑战，或许也是未来将要面临的最大挑战。
它应该成为我们当前政治总参谋部工作的出发点。
它应该像解决战争中的重大战略问题一样，以同样的彻底和谨慎来处理，如有必要，在规划工作上也投入不小的资金。
我无法试图在此提出所有答案。
但我谨此表明我的信念：我们有能力解决这个问题——而且无需诉诸任何全面的军事冲突。
为了支持这一信念，我想提出一些更令人鼓舞的观点：

（One） Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw–and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

（一）
苏联政权与希特勒统治下的德国不同，它既不墨守成规，也不爱冒险。
它不按既定计划行事，不冒不必要的风险。
它不受理性逻辑的影响，却对武力逻辑高度敏感。
正因如此，它很容易撤退——而且通常在任何时候遇到强大抵抗时都会这样做。
因此，如果对手拥有足够的武力，并明确表示准备使用它，他很少需要动用武力。
如果处理得当，就无需进行声望至上的摊牌。

（Two） Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

（二）
与西方世界整体相比，苏联的力量仍然远远弱于西方世界。
因此，他们的成功实际上取决于西方世界能够凝聚的程度、坚定性和活力。
而这正是我们能够影响的因素。

（Three） Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and–for the moment–highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

（三）
作为内部权力形式，苏联体制的成功尚未得到最终证实。
它能否经受住权力从一个个人或团体向另一个个人或团体连续转移这一严峻考验，尚待证明。
列宁去世是第1次权力交接，其影响使苏联国家遭受了长达15年的重创。
斯大林去世或退休后将是第2次权力交接。
但即便如此，这也不会是最终的考验。
由于近期领土扩张，苏联内部体制现在将面临一系列额外的压力，这些压力曾对沙皇政权造成过沉重的负担。
我们确信，自内战结束以来，俄罗斯民众在情感上从未像今天这样疏远过共产党的信条。
在俄罗斯，政党如今已成为一个强大的、——就目前而言——极其成功的独裁统治机构，但它已不再是情感激励的源泉。
因此，内部的稳固性和运动的持久性尚无定论。

（Four） All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

（四）
苏联在安全领域之外的所有宣传，基本上都是负面和破坏性的。
因此，任何明智且真正具有建设性的计划都应该相对容易地与之抗衡。

For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

基于这些原因，我认为我们可以冷静而坦诚地处理如何应对俄罗斯的问题。
至于如何应对，我只想在结论部分提出以下几点：

（One） Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

（一）
我们的第1步必须是理解并认清我们正在应对的这场运动的本质。
我们必须以医生研究不守规矩、不讲道理的人时所用的勇气、超然、客观的态度和决心来研究它，不被它所激怒或影响。

（Two） We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.

（二）
我们必须确保公众了解俄罗斯的现实情况。
这一点的重要性无论怎么强调都不为过。
单靠媒体无法做到这一点。
这主要必须由政府来做，政府必然更有经验，对所涉及的实际问题也更了解。
在这方面，我们不必被（丑陋的？）情况所吓倒。
我坚信，如果我们的人民能够更好地理解俄罗斯的现实情况，那么今天我国歇斯底里的反苏情绪就会少得多。
没有什么比未知更危险、更可怕。
或许有人会说，透露更多关于我们与俄罗斯之间困难的信息，会对俄美关系产生不利影响。
我认为，如果这其中存在任何真正的风险，我们应该勇敢面对，而且越快越好。
但我看不出我们会冒什么风险。
即使在我们大力宣扬对俄罗斯人民的友谊之后，我们在这个国家的利益也微乎其微。
我们在这里没有投资需要守护，没有实际贸易损失，几乎没有公民需要保护，也几乎没有文化联系需要维护。
我们唯一的利益在于我们所希望的，而不是我们所拥有的；我相信，如果我们的公众能够开明，如果我们与俄罗斯人的交往完全建立在现实和实事求是的基础上，我们就更有可能实现这些希望。

（Three） Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit–Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

（三）
我们自身社会的健康和活力至关重要。
世界共产主义就像恶性寄生虫，只以病态组织为食。
这正是国内政策和外交政策的交汇点。
每一项旨在解决我们社会内部问题，增强我们人民的自信心、纪律性、士气和集体精神的勇敢而果断的举措，都是对莫斯科的外交胜利，其价值堪比千份外交照会和联合公报。
如果我们不能摒弃宿命论和对自身社会缺陷的漠不关心，莫斯科将从中受益——莫斯科在其外交政策中必然会从中受益。

（Four） We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

（四）
我们必须为其他国家描绘并提出一幅比我们过去描绘的更加积极、更具建设性的世界图景。
仅仅敦促人们发展与我们类似的政治进程是不够的。
许多外国人民，至少在欧洲，对过去的经历感到厌倦和恐惧，他们对安全的兴趣远大于对抽象自由的兴趣。
他们寻求的是指导，而不是责任。
我们应该比俄罗斯人更有能力给予他们这种指导。
如果我们不这样做，俄罗斯人肯定会这样做。

（Five） Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

（五）
最后，我们必须有勇气和自信，坚持我们自己的方法和人类社会观念。
毕竟，在应对苏联共产主义问题时，我们可能面临的最大危险，就是让自己变得像我们正在应对的那些人一样。

KENNAN

凯南

George F. Kennan writes to the Secretary of State with a lengthy analysis of Soviet policy in an attempt to explain their recent uncooperative behavior. This message would later become famous as the “long telegram.”

乔治·F·凯南致信美国国务卿，对苏联政策进行了长篇分析，试图解释其近期的不合作行为。
这封信后来被称为著名的“长电报”。