NAVY DEPARTMENT
海军部

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
海军作战部长办公室

WASHINGTON
华盛顿

November 12, 1940.
1940年11月12日

Memorandum for the Secretary.
秘书备忘录。

Referring to my very brief touch in a recent conference as to the desirability of obtaining at once some light upon the major decisions which the President may make for guiding our future naval effort in the event of war, and in further immediate preparation for war, you may recall my remarks the evening we discussed War Plans for the Navy.
在最近的一次会议上，我非常简短地谈到，希望能立即了解总统可能做出的重大决定，以便在发生战争时指导我们未来的海军努力，并进一步立即做好战争准备。

I stated then that if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere; but that if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; and, while we might not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win anywhere.
我当时指出，如果英国在对德作战中取得决定性胜利，我们就可以在所有地方获胜；但如果英国失败，我们面临的问题就会非常严重；虽然我们可能不会在所有地方失败，但我们也可能不会在任何地方获胜。

As I stated last winter on the Hill, in these circumstances we would be set back upon our haunches.
正如我去年冬天在山上所说的那样，在这种情况下，我们会被打倒在地。

Our war effort, instead of being widespread, would then have to be confined to the Western Hemisphere.
这样一来，我们的战争努力就不能广泛开展，而只能局限于西半球。

I now wish to expand my remarks, and to present to you my views concerning steps we might take to meet the situation that will exist should the United States enter war either alone or with allies.
现在，我想扩展一下我的发言，并就美国单独或与盟国参战时我们可能采取的应对措施向各位提出我的看法。

In this presentation, I have endeavored to keep in view the political realities in our own country.
在这次发言中，我努力考虑到我们国家的政治现实。

The first thing to consider is how and where we might become involved.
首先要考虑的是我们如何参与以及在哪里参与。

The immediate war alternatives seem to be:
眼下的战争选择似乎是

（a） War with Japan in which we have no allies.
（a） 与日本的战争，我们没有盟友。

This might be precipitated by Japanese armed opposition should we strongly reinforce our Asiatic Fleet or the Philippines Garrison, should we start fortifying Guam, or should we impose additional important economic sanctions; or it might be precipitated by ourselves in case of overt Japanese action against us, or by further extension of Japanese hegemony.
如果我们大力加强我们的亚洲舰队或菲律宾驻军，如果我们开始加固关岛，或者如果我们实施更多重要的经济制裁，那么日本的武装反对可能会引发这种情况；如果日本对我们采取公开行动，或者日本的霸权进一步扩大，那么我们自己也可能会引发这种情况。

（b） War with Japan in which we have the British Empire, or the British Empire and Netherlands East Indies, as allies.
（b） 以大英帝国或大英帝国和荷属东印度群岛为盟国的对日战争。

This might be precipitated by one of the causes mentioned in （a）, by our movement of a naval reinforcement to Singapore, or by Japanese attack on British or Netherlands territory.
这可能是（a）中提到的原因之一，也可能是我国向新加坡派遣海军增援部队，或者是日本对英国或荷兰领土发动进攻。

（c） War with Japan in which she is aided by Germany and Italy, and in which we are or are not aided by allies.
（c） 在与日本的战争中，日本得到德国和意大利的援助，而我们得到或没有得到盟国的援助。

To the causes of such a war, previously listed, might be added augmented American material assistance to Great Britain, our active military intervention in Britain's favor, or our active resistance to German extension of military activities to the Western Hemisphere.
除了前面列出的导致战争的原因外，还可以加上美国增加对英国的物质援助，我们积极进行有利于英国的军事干预，或者我们积极抵制德国将军事活动扩展到西半球。

（d） War with Germany and Italy in which Japan would not be initially involved, and in which we would be allied with the British.
（d） 与德国和意大利的战争，日本最初不会参与，我们将与英国结盟。

Such a war would be initiated by American decision to pintervene for the purpose of preventing the disruption of the British Empire, or German capture of the British Isles.
为了防止大英帝国遭到破坏或德国占领英伦三岛，美国决定介入这场战争。

（e） We should also consider the alternative of now remaining out of war, and devoting ourselves exclusively to building up our defense of the Western Hemisphere, plus the preservation by peaceful means of our Far Eastern interests, and plus also continued material assistance to Great Britain.
（e） 我们还应该考虑另一种选择，即现在不参战，专门致力于加强西半球的防御，同时以和平手段维护我们的远东利益，并继续向英国提供物质援助。

As I see it, our major national objectives in the immediate future might be stated as preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United States, plus that of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; the prevention of the disruption of the British Empire, with all that such a consummation implies; and the diminution of the offensive military power of Japan, with a view to the retention of our economic and political interests in the Far East.
在我看来，我们近期的主要国家目标可以表述为：维护美国以及西半球其他地区的领土、经济和意识形态的完整性；防止大英帝国的瓦解，以及这种瓦解所意味着的一切；削弱日本的进攻性军事力量，以保留我们在远东的经济和政治利益。

It is doubtful, however, that it would be in our interest to reduce Japan to the status of an inferior military and economic power.
然而，将日本降格为军事和经济劣势国家是否符合我们的利益，这一点值得怀疑。

A balance of power in the Far East is to our interest as much as is a balance of power in Europe.
远东的力量均衡与欧洲的力量均衡同样符合我们的利益。

The questions that confront me are concerned with the preparation and distribution of the naval forces of the United States, in cooperation with its military forces, for use in war in the accomplishment of all or part of these national objectives.
我所面临的问题涉及美国海军部队的准备和分配，在与美国军队的合作下，在战争中用于实现全部或部分这些国家目标。

I can only surmise as to the military, political, and economic situation that would exist in the Atlantic should the British Empire collapse.
我只能猜测，如果大英帝国解体，大西洋上将会出现怎样的军事、政治和经济形势。

Since Latin-America has rich natural resources, and is the only important area of the world not now under the practical control of strong military pourers, we can not dismiss the possibility that, sooner or later, victorious Axis nations might move firmly in that direction.
由于拉丁美洲拥有丰富的自然资源，而且是目前世界上唯一没有被强大的军事倾销者实际控制的重要地区，我们不能排除这样的可能性，即轴心国的胜利者迟早会坚定地朝这个方向前进。

For some years they might remain too weak to attack directly across the sea; their effort more likely would first be devoted to developing Latin American economic dependence, combined with strongly reinforced internal political upheavals for the purpose of establishing friendly regimes in effective military control.
在一些年里，他们可能仍然过于虚弱，无法直接渡海进攻；他们更有可能首先致力于发展对拉美的经济依赖，同时大力加强国内政治动荡，以建立友好政权，进行有效的军事控制。

The immediacy of danger to us may depend upon the security of the Axis military position in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, the degree of our own military preoccupation in the Pacific, and the disturbing influence of unsatisfied economic needs of Latin-America.
对我们的危险的直接性可能取决于轴心国在东欧和地中海的军事地位的安全性，我们自己在太平洋的军事关注程度，以及拉丁美洲未得到满足的经济需求的干扰性影响。

The present situation of the British Empire is not encouraging.
大英帝国目前的形势不容乐观。

I believe it easily possible, lacking active American military assistance, for that empire to lose this war and eventually be disrupted.
我相信，如果没有美国积极的军事援助，该帝国很容易输掉这场战争，并最终被瓦解。

It is my opinion that the British are overoptimistic as to their chances for ultimate success.
我认为，英国人对他们最终成功的机会过于乐观了。

It is not at all sure that the British Isles can hold out, and it may be that they do not realize the danger that will exist should they lose in other regions.
英伦三岛能否坚守住还不一定，也许他们还没有意识到一旦在其他地区失利将会带来的危险。

Should Britain lose the war, the military consequences to the United States would be serious.
如果英国战败，美国将面临严重的军事后果。

If we are to prevent the disruption of the British Empire, we must support its vital needs.
如果我们要防止大英帝国的瓦解，就必须支持它的重要需求。

Obviously, the British Isles, the “Heart of the Empire”, must remain intact.
显然，作为 “帝国心脏 “的不列颠群岛必须保持完整。

But even if the British Isles are held, this does not mean that Britain can win the war.
但即使守住了不列颠群岛，也并不意味着英国就能赢得战争。

To win, she must finally be able to effect the complete, or, at least, the partial collapse of the German Reich.
要想获胜，她必须最终实现德意志帝国的彻底崩溃，或者至少是部分崩溃。

This result might, conceivably, be accomplished by bombing and by economic starvation through the agency of the blockade.
可以想象，轰炸和通过封锁造成的经济饥饿都可以实现这一结果。

It surely can be accomplished only by military successes on shore, facilitated possibly by overextension and by internal antagonisms developed by the Axis conquests.
这肯定只能通过岸上的军事胜利来实现，而过度扩张和轴心国征服所形成的内部对立可能会助长这种胜利。

Alone, the British Empire lacks the man power and the material means to master Germany.
单凭大英帝国的人力和物力，是无法驾驭德国的。

Assistance by powerful allies is necessary both with respect to men and with respect to munitions and sulies.
无论是在人员方面，还是在弹药和弹药方面，都需要强大盟友的援助。

If such assistance is to function effectively, Britain must not only continue to maintain the blockade, but she must also retain intact geographical positions from which successful land action can later be launched.
如果要使这种援助有效发挥作用，英国不仅必须继续维持封锁，而且还必须保持完整的地理位置，以便日后能够成功地从这些位置发起陆地行动。

Provided England continues to sustain its present successful resistance at home, the area of next concern to the British Empire ought to be the Egyptian Theater.
如果英国继续在国内保持目前的成功抵抗，大英帝国下一个关注的地区应该是埃及战场。

Should Egypt be lost, the Eastern Mediterranean would be opened to Germany and Italy, the effectiveness of the sea blockade would be largely nullified; Turkey's military position would be fully compromised; and all hope of favorable Russian action would vanish.
如果埃及失守，东地中海就会向德国和意大利开放，海上封锁的效果就会大打折扣；土耳其的军事地位就会完全受损；俄国采取有利行动的所有希望都会破灭。

Any anti-German offensive in the Near East would then become impossible.
这样一来，在近东发动任何反德攻势都将变得不可能。

The spot next in importance to Egypt, in my opinion, is Gibraltar, combined with West and Northwest Africa.
在我看来，仅次于埃及的重要地点是直布罗陀以及西非和西北非。

From this area an ultimate offensive through Portugal, Spain,and France, with the help of populations inimical to Germany, might give results equal to those which many years ago were produced by Wellington.
从这一地区出发，通过葡萄牙、西班牙和法国的最终攻势，在与德国敌对的民众的帮助下，可能会取得与多年前威灵顿所取得的战果相同的结果。

The western gate to the Mediterranean would still be kept closed, provided Britain holds this region.
只要英国守住这一地区，通往地中海的西大门仍将关闭。

This brief discussion naturally brings into question the value to Britain of the Mediterranean relative to that of Hong Kong, Singapore and India.
这一简短的讨论自然使人们对地中海相对于香港、新加坡和印度对英国的价值产生了疑问。

Were the Mediterranean lost, Britain's strength in the Far East could be augmented without weakening home territory.
如果地中海失守，英国在远东的实力就可以在不削弱本土的情况下得到增强。

Japan probably wants the British out of Hong Kong and Singapore; and wants economic control, and ultimately military control, of Malaysia.
日本可能希望英国撤出香港和新加坡；希望对马来西亚进行经济控制，并最终进行军事控制。

It is very questionable if Japan has territorial ambitions in Australia and New Zealand.
日本是否对澳大利亚和新西兰有领土野心，这一点非常值得怀疑。

But does she now wish the British out of India, thus exposing that region and Western China to early Russian penetration or influence? I doubt it.
但她现在是否希望英国人离开印度，从而使该地区和中国西部尽早受到俄国的渗透或影响？我对此表示怀疑。

It would seem more probable that Japan, devoted to the Axis alliance only so far as her own immediate interests are involved, would prefer not to move military forces against Britain, and possibly not against the Netherlands East Indies, because, if she can obtain a high degree of economic control over Malaysia, she will then be in a position to improve her financial structure by increased trade with Britain and America.
似乎更有可能的是，日本只在涉及其自身切身利益的范围内致力于轴心国联盟，她宁愿不对英国动用军事力量，也可能不对荷属东印度群岛动用军事力量，因为如果她能获得对马来西亚的高度经济控制权，那么她就能通过增加与英国和美国的贸易来改善其财政结构。

Her economic offensive power will be increased.
她的经济攻击力将会增强。

Her military dominance will follow rapidly or slowly, as seems best at the time.
她的军事优势也将随之迅速或缓慢地增强，这在当时看来是最合适的。

The Netherlands East Indies has 60,000,000 people, under the rule of 80,000 Dutchmen, including women and children.
荷属东印度群岛拥有 6000 万人口，由 8 万荷兰人（包括妇女和儿童）统治。

This political situation can not be viewed as in permanent equilibrium.
这种政治局势不能被视为永久平衡。

The rulers are unsupported by a home country or by an alliance.
统治者没有母国或联盟的支持。

Native rebellions have occurred in the past, and may recur in the future.
过去曾发生过本土叛乱，将来也可能再次发生。

These Dutchmen will act in what they believe is their owm selfish best interests.
这些荷兰人将按照他们认为最符合自身利益的方式行事。

Will they alone resist aggression, or will they accept an accommodation with the Japanese?
他们是独自抵抗侵略，还是接受与日本人的妥协？

Will they resist, if supported only by the British Empire?p Will they firmly resist, if supported by the British Empire and the United States?
如果得到大英帝国和美国的支持，他们会坚决抵抗吗？

Will the British resist Japanese aggression directed only against the Netherlands East Indies?
英国会抵抗日本只针对荷属东印度群岛的侵略吗？

Should both firmly resist, what local military assistance will they require from the United States to ensure success?
如果双方都坚决抵抗，他们需要美国提供哪些当地军事援助才能确保成功？

No light on these questions has been thrown by the report of the proceedings of the recent Singapore Conference.
最近新加坡会议的会议记录报告没有对这些问题作出说明。

The basic character of a war against Japan by the British and Dutch would be the fixed defense of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and Java.
英国和荷兰对日战争的基本特征将是对马来半岛、苏门答腊岛和爪哇岛的固定防御。

The allied army, naval, and air forces now in position are considerable, and some future reenforcement may be expected from Australia and New Zealand.
目前，盟国的陆军、海军和空军都已就位，兵力相当可观，预计澳大利亚和新西兰将来也会增援。

Borneo and the islands to the East are vulnerable.
婆罗洲和东面的岛屿易受攻击。

There is little chance for an allied offensive.
盟军发动进攻的机会渺茫。

Without Dutch assistance, the external effectiveness of the British bases at Hong Kong and Singapore would soon disappear.
没有荷兰的援助，英国在香港和新加坡基地的对外效力很快就会消失。

The Japanese deployment in Manchukuo and China requires much of their Army, large supplies and merchant tonnage, and some naval force.
日本在满洲国和中国的部署需要大部分陆军、大量补给和商船吨位，以及一些海军力量。

It is doubtful if Japan will feel secure in withdrawing much strength from in front of Russia, regardless of nonaggression agreements.
无论是否有互不侵犯协议，日本是否会放心地从俄罗斯面前撤出大量兵力都是个问题。

The winter lull in China will probably permit the withdrawal of the forces they need for a campaign against Malaysia.
中国冬季的萧条可能会允许他们撤回对马来西亚作战所需的兵力。

The availability of ample supplies for such a campaign is problematical.
但能否为这场战役提供充足的补给是个问题。

Provided the British and Dutch cooperate in a vigorous and efficient defense of Malaysia, Japan will need to make a major effort with all categories of military force to capture the entire area.
如果英国和荷兰合作，对马来西亚进行有力而有效的防御，日本将需要动用各种军事力量，大举占领整个地区。

The campaign might even last several months.
这场战役甚至可能持续数月。

Whether Japan would concurrently be able successfully to attack Hong Kong and the Philippines, and also strongly to support the fixed positions in the Mid-Pacific, seems doubtful.
日本能否同时成功地进攻香港和菲律宾，并有力地支持中太平洋的固定阵地，这一点似乎值得怀疑。

During such a campaign, due to her wide dispersion of effort, Japan would, unquestionably, be more vulnerable to attack by the United States （or by Russia） than she would be once Malaysia is in her possession.
在这样一场战役中，由于日本的力量过于分散，毫无疑问，日本在面对美国（或俄国）的攻击时，会比一旦马来西亚落入日本手中时更加脆弱。

This brings us to a consideration of the strategy of an American war against Japan, that is, either the socalled “Orange Plan”, or a modification.
这使我们不得不考虑美国对日战争的战略，即所谓的 “橙色计划 “或其修改版。

It must be understood that the Orange Plan was drawn up to govern our operations when the United States and Japan are at war, and no other nations are involved.
我们必须明白，”橙色计划 “是在美国和日本交战而没有其他国家参与的情况下制定的。

You have heard enough of the Orange Plan to know that, in a nutshell, it envisages our Fleet's proceeding westward through the Marshalls and the Carolines, consolidating as it goes, and then on to the recapture of the Philippines.
你们已经对 “橙色计划 “有了足够的了解，因此知道，概括地说，”橙色计划 “设想我们的舰队向西通过马绍尔群岛和加罗林群岛，边走边巩固，然后夺回菲律宾。

Once there, the Orange Plan contemplates the eventual economic starvation of Japan, and, finally, the complete destruction of her external military power.
一旦到达那里，”橙色计划 “设想最终使日本陷入经济饥饿，最后彻底摧毁其外部军事力量。

Its accomplislnnent would require several years, and the absorption of the full military, naval, and economic energy of the American people.
完成这一计划需要数年时间，并需要美国人民投入全部的军事、海军和经济力量。

In proceeding through these Mid-Pacific islands, we have several subsidiary objectives in mind.
在通过这些中太平洋岛屿时，我们有几个次要目标。

First, we hope that our attack will induce the Japanese to expose their fleet in action against our fleet, and lead to their naval defeat.
首先，我们希望我们的攻击能诱使日本人暴露他们的舰队来对付我们的舰队，从而导致他们在海上的失败。

Second, we wish to destroy the ability of the Japanese to use these positions as air and submarine bases from which project attacks on our lines of communication to the mainland and Hawaii.
其次，我们希望摧毁日军利用这些阵地作为空军和潜艇基地的能力，以便从这些基地攻击我们通往本土和夏威夷的交通线。

Third, we would use the captured positions for supporting our further advance westward.
第3，我们将利用夺取的阵地支持我们进一步西进。

Most of the island positions are atolls.
大部分岛屿阵地都是环礁。

These atolls, devoid of natural, sources of water other than rainfall, and devoid of all supplies, are merely narrow coral and sand fringes around large shallow areas where vessels may anchor.
这些环礁除降雨外没有天然水源，也没有任何补给，只是大片浅滩周围狭窄的珊瑚和沙地边缘，船只可以在此停泊。

Alone, they are undefendable against serious attack, either by one side or the other.
单凭这一点，它们是无法抵御任何一方的猛烈攻击的。

They do, however, afford weak positions for basing submarines and seaplanes.
不过，它们确实是潜艇和水上飞机的薄弱据点。

Our Fleet should have no difficulty in capturing atolls, provided we have enough troops, but we could not hold then indefinitely unless the Fleet were nearby.
只要我们有足够的兵力，我们的舰队应该不难夺取环礁，但除非舰队就在附近，否则我们不可能无限期地守住环礁。

We know little about the Japanese defenses in the Mid-Pacific.
我们对日本在中太平洋的防御情况知之甚少。

We believe the real islands of Truk and Ponape in the Carolines are defended with guns and troops, and we believe that some of the atolls of the Marshalls may be equipped as submarine and air bases, and be garrisoned with relatively small detachments of troops.
我们相信，加罗林群岛中真正的特鲁克岛和波纳佩岛是有火炮和军队保卫的，我们相信，马绍尔群岛的一些环礁可能被装备成潜艇和空军基地，并有相对较小的部队分队驻守。

The Marshalls contain no sites suitable for bases in tbe absence of the Fleet, though there are numerous good anchorages.
在没有舰队的情况下，马绍尔群岛没有适合作为基地的地点，尽管有许多良好的锚地。

With the Fleet at hand, they can be developed for use as seaplane and submarine bases for the support of an attack on real islands such as Ponape and Truk.
如果有舰队在，可以将其开发为水上飞机和潜艇基地，以支援对诸如波纳佩和特鲁克等真实岛屿的攻击。

With the Fleet permanently absent, they will succumb to any serious thrust.
如果舰队长期缺席，这些岛屿将屈服于任何猛烈的进攻。

Our first real Marshall-Caroline objective is Truk, a magnificent harbor, relatively easily defended against raids, and capable of conversion into an admirable advanced base.
我们第1个真正的 “马歇尔-卡罗琳 “目标是特鲁克，这是一个宏伟的港口，相对容易抵御空袭，而且能够改建成一个令人钦佩的先进基地。

When we get this far in the accomplishment of the “Orange Plan”, we have the site for a base where we can begin to assemble our ships, stores, and troops, for further advance toward the Philippines.
当我们完成 “橙色计划 “到这一步时，我们就有了一个基地，可以开始集结船只、物资和部队，进一步向菲律宾推进。

It would also become the center of the defense system for the lines of communications against flank attack from Japan.
该基地还将成为通信线路防御系统的中心，以抵御来自日本的侧翼攻击。

Getting to Truk involves a strong effort.
前往特鲁克需要付出巨大的努力。

We would incur losses from aircraft, mines and submarines, particularly as the latter could be spared from the operations in Malaysia.
我们将在飞机、水雷和潜艇方面蒙受损失，特别是后者可以从马来西亚的行动中幸免。

We would lose many troops in assaulting the islands.
在进攻这些岛屿时，我们会损失许多部队。

Going beyond Truk initiates the most difficult part of the Orange Plan, would take a long time, and would require the maximum effort which the United States could sustain.
越过特鲁克是 “橙色计划 “中最困难的部分，需要很长时间，而且需要美国付出最大的努力。

Truk is not looked upon as a satisfactory final geographical objective.
特鲁克被认为不是一个令人满意的最终地理目标。

It is too far away to support useful operations in the China Sea.
它太遥远，无法支持在中国海的有效行动。

It can not be held in the absence of fairly continuous Fleet support.
如果没有舰队持续不断的支援，特鲁克是守不住的。

No matter what gains are made in the Mid-Pacific, they would undoubtedly be lost were the Fleet to be withdrawn to the Atlantic.
无论在中太平洋取得什么成果，如果舰队撤回大西洋，这些成果无疑都将丧失。

We would have then to choose between a lengthy evacuation process, and a major loss of men, material and prestige.
到那时，我们将不得不在漫长的撤离过程与人员、物资和声望的重大损失之间做出选择。

In advancing to the capture of Penape and Truk, the Orange Plan contemplates proceeding promptly, delaying in the Marshalls only long enough to destroy Japanese shore bases, to capture the atolls neccessary to support the advance, and to deny future bases to Japan.
在推进攻占佩纳佩和特鲁克的过程中，”橙色计划 “考虑迅速推进，在马绍尔群岛只拖延足够长的时间，以摧毁日本的海岸基地，攻占支持推进所必需的环礁，并使日本无法获得未来的基地。

We have little knowledge as to the present defensive strength of the Marshall and Caroline groups, considered as a whole.
我们对整个马绍尔群岛和加罗林群岛目前的防御力量知之甚少。

If they are well defended, to capture them we estimate initial needs at 25,000 thoroughly trained troops, with another 50,000 in immediate reserve.
如果马绍尔群岛和加罗林群岛防御良好，要夺取它们，我们估计最初需要 25000 名训练有素的士兵，另有 50000 名士兵作为后备。

If they are not well defended, an early advance with fewer troops might be very profitable.
如果防守不力，那么以较少的兵力提前推进可能会非常有利。

Several months must elapse from the present date before 75, 000 troops could be made ready, considering the defense require- ments of Alaska, Hawaii, and Samoa, and our commitments with respect to the internal political stability of the Latin- American countries.
考虑到阿拉斯加、夏威夷和萨摩亚的防御需要，以及我们对拉美国家国内政治稳定的承诺，从现在开始必须经过几个月才能准备好 75000 名士兵。

We should consider carefully the chances of failure as well as of success.
我们应该仔细考虑失败和成功的可能性。

An immediate success would be most important morally, while a failure would be costly from the moral viewpoint.
立即取得成功在道义上是最重要的，而从道义的角度来看，失败则代价高昂。

Before invading Norway, Germany trained for three months the veterans of the Polish campaign.
在入侵挪威之前，德国对波兰战役的老兵进行了三个月的训练。

Remembering Norway, we have the example of two methods of overseas adventure.
回忆挪威，我们有两种海外进军方法的例子。

One is the British method; the other is the German method.
一种是英国的方法，另一种是德国的方法。

The question of jumping directly from Hawaii to the Philippines has often been debated, but, so far as I know, this plan has always been ruled out by responsible authorities as unsound from a military viewpoint.
从夏威夷直接跳到菲律宾的问题经常引起争论，但是，据我所知，从军事角度来看，这个计划一直被负责任的当局排除在外，因为它是不健全的。

Truk is 1900 miles from Yokohama, 5300 miles from San Francisco, 3200 miles from Honelulu, and 2000 miles from Manila.
特鲁克距离横滨 1900 英里，距离旧金山 5300 英里，距离火奴鲁鲁 3200 英里，距离马尼拉 2000 英里。

I mention this to compare the logistic problem with that of the Noway incident.
我提到这一点是为了将后勤问题与诺维事件的后勤问题进行比较。

An enormous amount of shipping would be required.
这需要大量的航运。

Its availability under present world conditions would be doubtful.
在当今世界条件下，它的可用性值得怀疑。

Of course the foregoing, （the Orange Plan）, is a major commitment in the Pacific, and does not envisage the cooperation of allies.
当然，上述（橙色计划}是对太平洋的重大承诺，并没有考虑盟国的合作。

Once started the abandonment of the offensive required by the plan, to meet a threat in the Atlantic, would involve abandoning the objectives of the war, and also great loss of prestige.
一旦开始放弃计划所要求的进攻，以应对大西洋的威胁，就意味着放弃战争目标，而且威望也将受到巨大损失。

A totally different situation would exist were the Philippines and Guam rendered secure against attack by adequate troops, aircraft, and fortifications.
如果菲律宾和关岛能够抵御足够的军队、飞机和防御工事的攻击，情况就会完全不同。

The movement of the Fleet across th Pacific for the purpose of a lying direct pressure upon Japan, and its support when in position, would be less difficult than in the existing situation.
舰队跨越太平洋对日本施加直接压力的行动以及在就位后的支援将比现有情况更容易。

Should we adopt the present Orange Plan today, or any modification of that plan which involves the movement of very strong naval and army contingents to the Far East, we would have to accept considerable danger in the Atlantic, and would probably be unable to augment our material assistance to Great Britain.
如果我们今天通过目前的橙色计划，或者对该计划进行任何修改，其中涉及向远东派遣非常强大的海军和陆军特遣队，我们将不得不在大西洋面临相当大的危险，并且可能无法增强我们的能力。向英国提供物质援助。

We should, therefore, examine other plans which involve a war having a more limited objective than the complete defeat of Japan, and in which we would undertake hostilities only in cooperation with the British and Dutch, and in which these undertake to provide an effective and continued resistance in Malaysia.
因此，我们应该审查其他计划，这些计划涉及的战争目标比彻底击败日本更有限，并且我们只会与英国和荷兰合作进行敌对行动，并且采取这些行动是为了提供有效和可靠的支持。马来西亚的持续抵抗。

Our involvement in war in the Pacific might well make us also an ally of Britain in the Atlantic.
我们参与太平洋战争很可能使我们成为英国在大西洋的盟友。

The naval forces remaining in the Atlantic, for helping our ally and for defending ourselves, would, byjust so much, reduce the power which the United States Fleet could put forth in the Pacific.
留在大西洋的海军力量，为了帮助我们的盟友和保卫我们自己，将大大削弱美国舰队在太平洋的力量。

The objective in a limited war against Japan would be the reduction of Japanese offensive power chiefly through economic blockade.
对日有限战争的目标是主要通过经济封锁来削弱日本的进攻力量。

Under one concept, allied strategy would comprise holding the Malay Barrier, denying access to other sources of supply in Malaysia, severing her lines of communication with the Western Hemisphere, and raiding communications to the Mid-Pacific, the Philippines, China, and Indo-China.
根据一种构想，盟军的战略将包括守住马来屏障，切断马来西亚的其他补给来源，切断其与西半球的交通线，以及袭击通往中太平洋、菲律宾、中国和印度支那的交通线。

United States defensive strategy would also require army reenforcement of Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands, the establishment of naval bases in the Fiji - Samoan and Gilbert Islands areas, and denial to Japan/of the use of the Marshalls as light force bases.
美国的防御战略还要求增援阿拉斯加和夏威夷群岛的军队，在斐济-萨摩亚和吉尔伯特群岛地区建立海军基地，并拒绝日本使用马绍尔群岛作为轻型部队基地。

We might be able to reenforce the Philippine garrison, particularly with aircraft.
我们也许能够加强菲律宾驻军，特别是使用飞机。

I do not believe that the British and Dutch alone could hold the Malay Barrier without direct military assistance by the United States.
我不认为如果没有美国的直接军事援助，英国和荷兰人无法独自守住马来屏障。

In addition to help from our Asiatic Fleet, I am convinced that they would need further reenforcement by ships and aircraft drawn from our Fleet in Hawaii, and possibly even by troops.
除了我们亚洲舰队的帮助外，我确信他们还需要从我们夏威夷舰队抽调的舰艇和飞机，甚至可能需要军队来进一步增援。

Besides military aid for the allied defense forces, our intervention would bring them a tremendous moral stimulus.
除了对盟军国防军的军事援助外，我们的介入也会给他们带来巨大的道德刺激。

An alternative concept of the suggested limited war would be to provide additional support from the main body of the Fleet either by capturing the Marshalls, or by capturing both the Marshalls and Carolines.
建议的有限战争的另一个概念是，通过俘获马歇尔号或同时俘获马绍尔号和卡罗琳号，从舰队主力提供额外支持。

This, or a similar fleet activity, would be for the purpose of diverting away from Malaysia important Japanese forces to oppose it, and thus reducing the strength of their assault against the Dutch and British.
这次或类似的舰队活动，目的是从马来西亚转移重要的日本军队来反对它，从而减少他们对荷兰和英国的攻击强度。

But we should consider the prospect that the losses which we would incur in such operations might not be fruitful of compensating results.
但我们应该考虑到这样的前景：我们在此类行动中遭受的损失可能无法得到补偿。

Furthermore, withdrawal of the Fleet from captured positions for transfer to the Atlantic would be more difficult.
此外，将舰队从占领地撤出并转移到大西洋将更加困难。

It is out of the question to consider sending our entire Fleet at once to Singapore.
考虑一下子把我们整个舰队派往新加坡是不可能的。

Base facilities are far too limited, the supply problem would be very great, and Hawaii, Alaska, and our coasts would be greatly exposed to raids.
基地设施太有限，供应问题将非常严重，夏威夷、阿拉斯加和我们的海岸将极大地遭受袭击。

One point to remember, in connection with a decision to adopt a limited offensive role, as in both of the alternative plans just mentioned, is that, in case of reverses, public opinion may require a stronger effort.
在决定采取有限的进攻性作用（如刚才提到的两个备选计划）时，需要记住的一点是，如果出现逆转，公众舆论可能会要求做出更大的努力。

For example, should Japanese success in the Far East seem imminent, there would be great pressure brought to bear to support our force there, instead of leaving it hanging in the air.
例如，如果日本在远东的胜利似乎迫在眉睫，那么就会有巨大的压力来支持我们在那里的军队，而不是让它悬而未决。

Thus, what we might originally plan as a limited war with Japan might well become an unlimited war; our entire strength would then be required in the Far East, and little force would remain for eventualities in the Atlantic and for the support British Isles.
因此，我们最初计划与日本进行的有限战争很可能会变成一场无限战争；我们的全部兵力都将用于远东，而在大西洋的不测事件和支援不列颠群岛上所剩下的兵力就所剩无几了。

Let us now look eastward, and examine our possible action in the Atlantic.
现在让我们把目光转向东方，审视我们在大西洋可能采取的行动。

In the first place, if we avoid serious commitment in the Pacific, the purely American Atlantic problem, envisaging defense of our coasts, the Caribbean, Canada, and South America, plus giving strong naval assistance to Britain, is not difficult so long as the British are able to maintain their present naval activity.
首先，如果我们避免在太平洋地区作出认真的承诺，那么纯粹的美国大西洋问题，设想保卫我们的海岸、加勒比海、加拿大和南美洲，再加上向英国提供海军强有力的援助，只要英国能够维持目前的海军活动。

Should the British Isles then fall we would find ourselves acting alone, and at war with the world.
如果不列颠群岛陷落，我们将发现自己独自行动，并与世界交战。

To repeat, we would be thrown back on our haunches.
再说一遍，我们会被扔回原地。

Should we enter the war as an ally of Great Britain, and not then be at war with Japan, we envisage the British asking us for widespread naval assistance.
如果我们作为英国的盟友参战，而不是与日本交战，我们预计英国会要求我们提供广泛的海军援助。

Roughly, they would want us, in the Western Atlantic Ocean from Cape Sable to Cape Horn, to protect shipping against raiders and submarine activities.
粗略地说，他们希望我们在西大西洋从萨博角到合恩角的海域，保护航运不受袭击者和潜艇活动的影响。

They would also need strong reenforcements for their escort and minesweeping forces in their home waters; and strong flying boat reconnaissance from Scotland, the Atlantic Islands, and Capetown.
他们还需要在本国水域提供强大的护航和扫雷部队增援；以及来自苏格兰、大西洋群岛和开普敦的强大飞艇侦察。

They might ask us to capture the Azores the Cape Verde Islands.
他们可能会要求我们占领亚速尔群岛和佛得角群岛。

To their home waters they would have us send submarines and small craft, and to the Mediterranean assistance of any character which we may be able to provide.
他们会让我们向他们的家乡水域派遣潜艇和小型船只，并向地中海派遣我们可能提供的任何性质的援助。

They would expect us to take charge of allied interests in the Pacific, and to send a naval detachment to Singapore.
他们希望我们负责太平洋地区的盟军利益，并向新加坡派遣一支海军分遣队。

This purely naval assistance, would not, in my opinion, assure final victory for Great Britain.
在我看来，这种纯粹的海军援助并不能确保英国的最终胜利。

Victory would probably depend upon her ability ultimately to make a land offensive against the Axis powers.
胜利可能取决于她最终对轴心国发动陆地进攻的能力。

For making a successful land offensive, British man power is insufficient.
为了成功发动陆地攻势，英国人手不足。

Offensive troops from other nations will be required.
将需要其他国家的进攻部队。

I believe that the United States, in addition to sending naval assistance, would also need to send large air and land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, and to participate strongly in this land offensive.
我认为，美国除了派遣海军援助外，还需要向欧洲或非洲或两者派遣大量强大的空中和地面部队，并参与这次陆地攻势。

The naval task of transporting an army abroad would be large.
将军队运送到国外的海军任务将是艰巨的。

To carry out such tasks we would have to exert a major naval and military effort in the Atlantic.
为了执行这些任务，我们必须在大西洋上投入大量的海军和军事力量。

We would then be able to do little more in the Pacific than remain on a strict defensive.
这样一来，我们在太平洋地区除了保持严格防御之外就无能为力了。

Were we to enter the war against Germany and Italy as an ally of Great Britain, I do not necessarily anticipate immediate hostile action by Japan, whatever may be her Axis obligation.
如果我们作为英国的盟友参加对德国和意大利的战争，我不一定会预见到日本会立即采取敌对行动，无论她的轴心国义务如何。

She may fear eventual consequences and do nothing.
她可能担心最终的后果而什么也不做。

We might be faced with demands for concessions as the price of her neutrality.
我们可能会面临让步的要求，作为她保持中立的代价。

She might agree to defer her aggressions in the Netherlands East Indies for the time being by a guarantee of ample economic access to the Western Hemisphere and to British and Dutch possessions.
她可能会同意暂时捍卫其对荷属东印度群岛的侵略，并保证提供进入西半球以及英国和荷兰属地的充足经济准入。

But she might even demand complete cessation of British and American assistance to China.
但她甚至可能要求英国和美国完全停止对中国的援助。

The strong wish of the American government and people at present seems to be to remain at peace.
目前美国政府和人民的强烈愿望似乎是保持和平。

In spite of this, we must face the possibility that we may at any moment become involved in war.
尽管如此，我们也必须面对随时可能卷入战争的可能性。

With war in prospect, I believe our every effort should be directed toward the prosecution of a national policy with mutually supporting diplomatic and military aspects, and having as its guiding feature a determination that any intervention we may undertake shall be such as will ultimately best promote our own national interests.
面对战争的前景，我相信我们的一切努力都应该致力于执行外交和军事方面相互支持的国家政策，并以我们可能采取的任何干预措施最终最好地促进其发展为指导特征。我们自己的国家利益。

We should see the best answer to the question: “Where should we fight the war, and for what objective?”
我们应该看到这个问题的最佳答案：“我们应该在哪里打仗，为了什么目的？”

With the answer to this question to guide me, I can make amore logical plan, can more appropriately distribute the naval forces, can better coordinate the future material preparation of the Navy, and can more usefully advise as to whether or not proposed diplomatic measures can adequately be supported by available naval strength.
有了这个问题的答案，我就可以制定更合理的计划，可以更合理地分配海军力量，可以更好地协调海军未来的物资准备，可以更有效地就外交措施能否充分发挥作用提出建议。得到现有海军力量的支持。

That is to say, until the question concerning our final military objective is authoritatively answered, I can not determine the scale and the nature of the effort which the Navy may be called upon to exert in the Far East, the Pacific, and the Atlantic.
也就是说，在有关我们最终军事目标的问题得到权威性的回答之前，我无法确定海军可能被要求在远东、太平洋和大西洋进行的努力的规模和性质。

It is a fundamental requirement of our military position that our homeland remain secure against successful attack.
我们的祖国保持安全，免受成功的攻击，这是我们军事地位的基本要求。

Directly concerned in this security is the safety of other parts of the Western Hemisphere.
这种安全直接关系到西半球其他地区的安全。

A very strong pillar of the defense structure of the Americas has, for many years, been the balance of power existing in Europe.
多年来，欧洲现有的力量平衡一直是美洲国防结构的一个非常强大的支柱。

The collapse of Great Britain or the destruction or surrender of the British Fleet will destroy this balance and will free European military power for possible encroachment in this hemisphere.
英国的崩溃或英国舰队的毁灭或投降将破坏这种平衡，并使欧洲军事力量免于可能侵犯这个半球。

I believe that we should recognize as the foundation of adequate armed strength the possession of a profitable foreign trade, both in raw materials and in finished goods.
我认为，我们应该认识到，拥有有利可图的原材料和制成品对外贸易是充足武装力量的基础。

Without such a trade, our economy can scarcely support heavy armaments.
如果没有这样的贸易，我们的经济就几乎无法支持重型军备。

The restoration of foreign trade, particularly with Europe, may depend upon the continued integrity of the British Empire.
对外贸易（特别是与欧洲的贸易）的恢复可能取决于大英帝国的持续完整性。

It may be possible for us to prevent a British collapse by military intervention.
我们或许可以通过军事干预来防止英国崩溃。

Our interests in the Far East are very important.
我们在远东的利益非常重要。

The economic effect of a complete Japanese hegemony in that region is conjectural.
日本在该地区的完全霸权所产生的经济影响是可以推测的。

But regardless of economic considerations, we have heretofore strongly opposed the further expansion of Japan.
但无论出于经济考虑，我们迄今为止都强烈反对日本的进一步扩张。

We might temporarily check Japanese expansion by defeating her in a war in the Far East,
我们可以通过在远东战争中击败日本来暂时阻止日本的扩张，

but to check her permanently would require that we retain possession of, and militarily develop, an extensive and strategically located Asiatic base area having reasonably secure lines of communication with the United States.
但是，要想永久地遏制她，我们就必须继续拥有并在军事上发展一个面积广阔、战略位置重要、与美国有相当安全的交通线的亚洲基地。

Retaining, and adequately developing, an Asiatic base area would mean the reversal of longstanding American policy.
保留并充分发展亚洲根据地将意味着美国长期政策的逆转。

Whether we could ensure the continued existence of a strong British Empire by soundly defeating Japan in the Far East is questionable, though continuing to hold on there for the present is a definite contribution to British strength.
我们能否通过在远东彻底击败日本来确保强大的大英帝国的继续存在是值得怀疑的，尽管目前继续坚守那里对英国的实力确实有贡献。

Lacking possession of an Asiatic base area of our own, continued British strength in the Far East would doubtless prove advantageous to us in checking Japan permanently.
由于缺乏我们自己的亚洲根据地，英国在远东的持续实力无疑将有利于我们永久遏制日本。

The military matters discussed in this memorandum may properly receive consideration in arriving at a decision on the course that we should adopt in the diplomatic field.
在就我们在外交领域应采取的方针做出决定时，可以适当考虑本备忘录中讨论的军事问题。

An early decision in this field will facilitate a naval preparation which will best promote the adopted course.
在这一领域的早期决定将有助于海军的准备工作，从而最好地促进所采取的方针。

As I see affairs today, answers to the following broad questions will be most useful to the Navy:
正如我今天所看到的，以下广泛问题的答案将对海军最有用：

（A） Shall our principal military effort be directed toward hemisphere defense, and include chiefly those activities within the Western Hemisphere which contribute directly to security against attack in either or both oceans? （A）我们的主要军事努力是否应该针对西半球防御，并主要包括那些直接有助于安全免受任一海洋或两个海洋攻击的活动？

An affirmative answer would indicate that the United States, as seems now to be the hope of this country, would remain out of war unless pushed into it.
一个肯定的答案将表明，美国，就像现在这个国家所希望的那样，除非被推入战争，否则将置身战争之外。

If and when forced into war, the greater portion of our Fleet could remain for the time being in its threatening position in the Pacific, but no major effort would be exerted overseas either to the east or the west; the most that would be done for allies, besides providing material help, would be to send detachments to assist in their defense.
如果被迫卷入战争，我们舰队的大部分力量可能暂时仍处于太平洋的威胁地位，但不会在东部或西部的海外做出重大努力；盟友除了提供物质帮助外，还将派出分遣队协助防御。

It should be noted here that, were minor help to be given in one direction, public opinion might soon push us into giving it major support, as was the case in the World War.
这里需要注意的是，如果在某个方向上给予较小的帮助，舆论可能很快就会促使我们给予大力支持，就像二战时的情况一样。

Under this plan, our influence upon the outcome of the European War would be small.
根据这个计划，我们对欧洲战争结果的影响将会很小。

（B） Shall we prepare for a full offensive against Japan, premised on assistance from the British and Dutch forces in the Far East, and remain on the strict defensive in the Atlantic? （B）我们是否应该以远东的英国和荷兰军队的援助为前提，准备对日本进行全面进攻，并在大西洋上保持严密的防御？

If this course is selected, we would be placing full trust in the British to hold their own indefinitely in the Atlantic, or, at least, until after we should have defeated Japan decisively, and thus had fully curbed her offensive power for the time being.
如果选择这个路线，我们将充分信任英国必须无限期地在大西洋上坚守阵地，或者至少要等到我们彻底击败日本，从而暂时完全遏制了她的进攻力量之后。

Plans for augmenting the scale of our present material assistance to Great Britain would be adversely affected until Japan had been decisively defeated.
在日本被彻底击败之前，扩大我们目前对英国物质援助规模的计划将受到不利影响。

The length of time required to defeat Japan would be very considerable.
击败日本所需的时间将是相当长的。

If we enter the war against Japan and then if Great Britain loses, we probably would in any case have to reorient towards the Atlantic.
如果我们对日本发动战争，然后如果英国失败，我们可能无论如何都必须重新转向大西洋。

There is no dissenting view on this point.
对于这一点，没有异议。

（C） Shall we plan for sending the strongest possible military assistance both to the British in Europe, and to the British, Dutch and Chinese in the Far East?
（C） 我们是否应该计划向欧洲的英国以及远东的英国、荷兰和中国提供尽可能强大的军事援助？

The naval and air detachments we would send to the British Isles would possibly ensure their continued resistance, but would not increase British power to conduct a land offensive.
我们派往不列颠群岛的海军和空军分遣队可能会确保他们的持续抵抗，但不会增强英国进行陆地进攻的力量。

The strength we could send to the Far East might be enough to check the southward spread of Japanese rule for the duration of the war.
我们可以向远东派遣的力量可能足以在战争期间阻止日本统治向南蔓延。

The strength of naval forces remaining in Hawaii for the defense of the Eastern Pacific, and the strength of the forces in the Western Atlantic for the defense of that area, would be reduced to that barely sufficient for executing their tasks.
留在夏威夷保卫东太平洋的海军兵力和留在西大西洋保卫该地区的海军兵力将被削减到仅仅足以执行任务。

Should Great Britain finally lose, or should Malaysia fall to Japan, our naval strength might then be found to have been seriously reduced, relative to that of the Axis powers.
如果英国最终失败，或者马来西亚落入日本之手，我们的海军力量相对于轴心国来说可能会严重削弱。

It should be understood that, under this plan, we would be operating under the handicap of fighting major wars on two fronts.
应该理解的是，根据这个计划，我们将在两条战线上进行重大战争的不利条件下行动。

Should we adopt Plan （C）, we must face the consequences that would ensue were we to start a war with one plan, and then, after becoming heavily engaged, be forced greatly to modify it or discard it altogether, as, for example, in case of a British fold up.
如果我们采用计划（C），我们必须面对随之而来的后果，如果我们用一个计划发动战争，然后在激烈地参与之后，被迫大幅修改它或完全放弃它，例如，如果英国折叠起来。

On neither off.these distant fronts would it be possible to execute a really major offensive.
在这些遥远的战线上，都不可能发动真正的大规模进攻。

Strategically, the situation might become disastrous should our effort on either front fail.
从战略上讲，如果我们在任一方面的努力失败，情况可能会变得灾难性。

（D） Shall we direct our efforts toward an eventual strong offensive in the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific?
（D） 我们是否应该作为英国的盟友，最终在大西洋发起强力进攻，并在太平洋进行防御？

Any strength that we might send to the Far East would, by just so much, reduce the force of our blows against Germany and Italy.
我们向远东派遣的任何兵力都会大大削弱我们对德国和意大利的打击力量。

About the least that we would do for our ally would be to send strong naval light forces and aircraft to Great Britain and the Mediterranean.
我们至少能为我们的盟友做的就是向英国和地中海派遣强大的海军轻装部队和飞机。

Probably we could not stop with a purely naval effort.
也许我们不能仅仅停留在纯粹的海军努力上。

The plan might ultimately require capture of the Portuguese and Spanish Islands and military and naval bases in Africa and possibly Europe; and thereafter even involve undertaking a full scale land offensive.
该计划最终可能需要占领葡萄牙和西班牙群岛以及非洲甚至欧洲的军事和海军基地，然后甚至涉及发动全面的陆地攻势。

In consideration of a course that would require landing large numbers oi' troops abroad,
考虑到需要在国外登陆大量部队的做法，

account must be taken of the possible unwillingness of the people of the United States to support land operations of this character, and to incur the risk of heavy loss should Great Britain collapse.
必须考虑到美国人民可能不愿意支持这种性质的地面行动，并且如果英国崩溃，他们将面临遭受重大损失的风险。

Under Plan （D） we would be unable to exert strong ressure against Japan, and would necessarily gradually reorient our policy in the Far East.
根据（D）计划，我们将无法对日本施加强大压力，并且必然会逐步调整我们的远东政策。

The full national offensive strength would be exerted in a single direction, rather than be expended in areas far distant from each other.
国家的全部进攻力量将集中在一个方向，而不是消耗在相距较远的地区。

At the conclusion of the war, even if Britain should finally collapse, we might still find ourselves possessed of bases in Africa suitable for assisting in the defense of South America.
战争结束时，即使英国最终垮台，我们仍然可能发现自己在非洲拥有适合协助保卫南美的基地。

Under any of these plans, we must recognize the possibility of the involvement of France as an ally of Germany,
根据任何这些计划，我们都必须认识到法国作为德国盟友参与的可能性，

I believe that the continued existence of the British Empire, combined with building up a strong protection in our home areas, will do most to ensure the status quo in the Western Hemisphere, and to promote our principal national interests.
我相信，大英帝国的继续存在，加上在我们本土建立强有力的保护，将最大限度地确保西半球的现状，并促进我们的主要国家利益。

As I have previously stated, I also believe that Great Britain requires from us very great help in the Atlantic, and possibly even on the continents of Europe or Africa, if she is to be enabled to survive.
正如我之前所说，我也相信英国需要我们在大西洋，甚至可能在欧洲或非洲大陆上提供非常大的帮助，才能使其生存。

In my opinion Alternatives （A）, （B）, and （C） will most probably not provide the necessary degree of assistance, and, therefore, if we undertake war, that Alternative （D） is likely to be the most fruitful for the United States, particularly if we enter the war at an early date.
我认为备选方案（A）、（B）和（C）很可能不会提供必要程度的援助。因此，如果我们发动战争，备选方案（D）可能是最有成效的。对美国来说可能是最有成效的，尤其是如果我们尽早参战的话。

Initially, the offensive measures adopted would, necessarily, be purely naval.
最初，采取的进攻措施必然是纯粹的海军措施。

Even should we intervene, final victory in Europe is not certain.
即使我们进行干预，欧洲的最终胜利也不确定。

I believe that the chances for success are in our favor, particularly if we insist upon full equality in the political and military direction of the war.
我相信，成功的机会对我们有利，特别是如果我们坚持在战争的政治和军事方向上完全平等的话。

The odds seem against our being able under Plan （D） to check Japanese expansion unless we win the war in Europe.
除非我们赢得欧洲战争，否则我们似乎不可能根据计划（D）阻止日本的扩张。

We might not long retain possession of the Philippines.
我们可能不会长期保留对菲律宾的控制权。

Our political and military influence in the Far East might largely disappear, so long as we were fully engaged in the Atlantic.
只要我们全力参与大西洋事务，我们在远东的政治和军事影响力就可能很大程度上消失。

A preliminary to a war in this category would be a positive effort to avoid war with Japan, and to endeavor to prevent war between Japan and the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies.
此类战争的第1步是积极努力避免与日本发生战争，并努力防止日本与大英帝国和荷属东印度群岛之间发生战争。

The possible cost of avoiding a war with Japan has been referred to previously.
前面已经提到过避免与日本发生战争的可能成本。

I would add that Plan （D） does not mean the immediate movement of the Fleet into the Atlantic.
我想补充一点，计划（D）并不意味着舰队立即进入大西洋。

I would make no further moves until war should become imminent, and then I would recommend redistribution of our naval forces as the situation then demanded.
在战争迫在眉睫之前，我不会采取任何进一步的行动，然后我会根据当时的形势需要，建议重新分配我们的海军力量。

I fully recognize the value of retaining strong forces in the Pacific as long as they can profitably be kept there.
我完全认识到在太平洋地区保留强大部队的价值，只要他们能够在那里获利。

Until such time as the United States should decide to engage its full forces in war, I recommend that we pursue a course that will most rapidly increase the military strength of both the Army and the Navy, that is to say, adopt Alternative （A） without hostilities.
在美国决定出动全部兵力参战之前，我建议我们采取一种能最迅速地增强陆海军兵力的办法，即采取替代方案（A）不采取敌对行动。

Under any decision that the President may tentatively make, we should at once prepare a complete Joint Plan for guiding Army and Navy activities.
根据总统可能暂时做出的任何决定，我们应该立即制定一份完整的联合计划来指导陆军和海军的活动。

We should also prepare at least the skeletons of alternative plans to fit possible alternative situation which may eventuate.
我们还应该至少准备好替代计划的骨架，以适应可能出现的其他情况。

I make the specific recommendation that, should we be forced into a war with Japan, we should, because of the prospect of war in the Atlantic also, definitely plan to avoid operations in the Far East or the Mid- Pacific that will prevent the Navy from promptly moving to the Atlantic forces fully adequate to safeguard our interests and policies in the event of a British collapse.
我提出的具体建议是，如果我们被迫与日本开战，考虑到大西洋也可能发生战争，我们应该明确计划避免在远东或中太平洋采取行动，因为这会阻止海军的行动。在英国崩溃的情况下，我们不能立即向大西洋派遣足够的部队来维护我们的利益和政策。

We ought not now willingly engage in any war against Japan unless we are certain of aid from Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies.
除非我们确信能得到英国和荷属东印度群岛的援助，否则我们现在不应该心甘情愿地对日本发动任何战争。

No important allied military decision should be reached without clear undertanding between the nations involved as to the strength and extent of the participation which may be expected in any particular theater, and as to a proposed skeleton plan of operations.
如果有关国家之间没有明确了解任何特定战区可能参与的强度和程度，以及拟议的行动框架计划，则任何重要的盟军军事决定都不应达成。

Accordingly, I make the recommendation that, as a preliminary to possible entry of the United States into the conflict, the United States Army and Navy at once undertake secret staff talks on technical matters with the British military and naval authorities in London, with Canadian military authorities in Washington, and with British and Dutch authorities in Singapore and Batavia.
因此，我建议，作为美国可能介入冲突的初步措施，美国陆军和海军立即与伦敦的英国陆军和海军当局以及加拿大军方就技术问题进行秘密参谋会谈。华盛顿当局以及新加坡和巴达维亚的英国和荷兰当局。

The purpose would be to reach agreements and lay down plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find it necessary to enter the war under any of the alternative eventualities considered in this memorandum.
目的是达成协议并制定计划，以便在美国认为有必要根据本备忘录中考虑的任何一种可能情况参战时，促进盟国的统一行动。

/s/ H.R.Stark.
/s/ H.R.斯塔克。