Oral History Interview with General William H. Draper

与威廉·H·德雷珀将军的口述历史访谈

Jr.Chief, Economics Division, Control Council for Germany, 1945-46;
Military Government Adviser to the Secretary of State, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1947;
Under Secretary of War, 1947;
Under Secretary of the Army, 1947-49;
and United States Special Representative in Europe, with rank of Ambassador, January 1952 - June 1953.

德国管制委员会经济部负责人，1945-46年；
莫斯科外交部长会议国务卿军政府顾问，1947年；
战争部副部长，1947年；
陆军部副部长，1947-49年；
及美国驻欧洲特别代表，大使级，1952年01月-1953年06月。

Washington, D.C.

华盛顿特区，

11-Jan-72

1972年01月11日，

by Jerry N. Hess

杰里·N·赫斯撰写

Notice

注意：

This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

这是为哈里·S·杜鲁门图书馆进行的录音采访的记录。
受访者编辑了该记录的草稿，但只做了微小的修改；
因此，读者应该记住，这本质上是口头记录，而不是书面文字。

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

记录中方括号内的数字（例如[45]）表示口述历史采访原始硬拷贝版本的页码。

Oral History Interview with General William H. Draper Jr.

与威廉·H·德雷珀将军Jr.的口述历史访谈

Washington, D.C.

华盛顿特区，

11-Jan-72

1972年01月11日

by Jerry N. Hess

杰里·N·赫斯

HESS: General, for the record, will you relate a little of your personal background: Where were you born, where were you educated, and what are a few of the positions that you have held both before and since your service in the Truman administration.

赫斯：将军，为了记录在案，您能否简单介绍一下您的个人背景：您出生在哪里，在哪里接受教育，以及您在杜鲁门政府任职之前和之后担任过哪些职务。

DRAPER: My name is William H. Draper, Jr. I was born in New York City in Harlem, August 10, 1894. I went to school there and to NYU to college, where I got both a B.A. and a M.A. in economics.

德雷珀：我叫威廉·H·德雷珀Jr.。
1894年08月10日出生于纽约市哈莱姆区。
我在那里上学，然后在纽约大学上大学，获得了经济学学士和硕士学位。

My work first was in the Army, shortly after I got out of college, although even before that I had been a member of the Ford Peace Expedition to Europe which tried to stop the war at the end of 1915. I was chairman of the student delegation. There were sixty regular delegates and thirty student delegates. The expedition, with Mr. Ford aboard, went to all the neutral countries and set up a peace congress at The Hague at the Peace Palace, which lasted about six months. Contrary to the public impression at the time the peace congress came fairly close to settling the war. However, it did not. Within six months or a year, I saw a number of the student delegates in the Army.

我最早的工作是在军队，那是在我大学毕业后不久。
尽管在那之前，我已经是福特和平远征队的成员，该远征队试图在1915年底阻止战争。
我是学生代表团的主席。
代表团有60名正式代表和30名学生代表。
在福特先生的陪同下，远征队走遍了所有中立国，并在海牙和平宫召开了一次和平会议，会议持续了大约六个月。
与当时公众的印象相反，和平会议非常接近于解决战争。
然而，它并没有做到。
在六个月或一年的时间里，我在军队里见到了许多学生代表。

After the First World War, I went first with the National City Bank, then with the Bankers' Trust Company and then Dillon, Read and Company. I stayed in the Army Reserves. In 1939 and 1940 I was Chief of Staff of the 77th Division, a Reserve Division, and probably because of that I came in contact with General [George C.] Marshall. In 1940 he invited me to go on active duty in Washington on the general staff, G-1, where I stayed for about a year and a half before Pearl Harbor. During that period I worked largely with then Major [Lewis B.] Hershey, later General Hershey, in writing the Selective Service Act and putting together the administration of Selective Service.

第1次世界大战后，我先去了城市银行，然后去了信孚银行，再后来是狄龙、里德公司。
我留在了陆军预备役。
1939年至1940年，我是预备役第77师的参谋长，可能因此我结识了乔治·C·马歇尔将军。
1940年，他邀请我到华盛顿的总参谋部G-1服现役，珍珠港事件前我在那里待了大约一年半。
在此期间，我主要与当时的刘易斯·B·赫尔希少校（后来的赫尔希将军）合作起草《兵役法》并组建兵役管理机构。

After Pearl Harbor, General Marshall agreed that I should leave staff work and get a regiment. After a regimental commander's refresher course at Fort Benning, I commanded the 136th Infantry, part of the 33rd Division, a National Guard Division from Illinois. I joined them in Tennessee, then for training near Seattle, Washington, then to the California desert, then to the Pacific Theatre. I was called back after about a year out there to head up contract termination for the War Department.

珍珠港事件后，马歇尔将军同意我离开参谋部工作，去一个团任职。
在本宁堡完成团长的进修课程后，我指挥了第136步兵团，该团隶属于第33师，该师是来自伊利诺伊州的一个国民警卫队师。
我在田纳西州加入了他们，然后在华盛顿西雅图附近接受训练，之后去了加利福尼亚沙漠，最后去了太平洋战区。
大约一年后，我被召回，负责陆军部的合同终止事宜。

Then I was asked by the Secretary of War Mr. [Henry M.] Stimson and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. [James V.J Forrestal at that time, along with Admiral Lewis Strauss, to try to put the purchasing arrangements for the Army and Navy together with a common purchasing policy an action which did put some of the purchasing for both services together.

随后，时任陆军部长亨利·史汀生先生和海军部长詹姆斯·V·J·福雷斯特尔先生以及海军上将刘易斯·施特劳斯要求我尝试将陆军和海军的采购安排合并，制定一个共同的采购政策，这一举措确实将两个军种的部分采购整合在一起。

Then I went to Germany, going to France first, while the war was still on, with General [Lucius] Clay, preliminary to the occupation which he was expecting to take over in Germany under General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. I was asked by General Clay to take on the responsibility for the economic side of the occupation. Then General Eisenhower left for the United States where he became Chief of Staff of the Army. General Clay eventually became Commander in Chief for the European Theater in addition to handling occupied Germany.

随后，我去了德国，首先去了法国，当时战争仍在进行中，我和卢修斯·克莱将军一起，准备占领德国，他预计将在德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔将军的领导下接管德国。
克莱将军要求我负责占领区的经济方面。
随后，艾森豪威尔将军前往美国，担任陆军参谋长。
克莱将军最终除了负责被占领的德国事务外，还担任欧洲战区总司令。

After about two years in Berlin dealing with the German economy, its agriculture, industry, trade and general administration of its economy the German government had simply disappeared, and the occupation forces of Great Britain, Russia and the United States and eventually of France, became the German government for some period – in July of '47 I returned to the United States for a coal conference with the British about the Ruhr – the need for more coal production. While there, Secretary of War [Robert] Patterson resigned; General Kenneth Royall was made Secretary and he asked me to become Under Secretary, which after consulting General Clay for obvious reasons, I accepted.

在柏林处理德国经济、农业、工业、贸易和总体经济管理大约两年后，德国政府就此消失，英国、俄罗斯、美国以及最终法国的占领军一度成为德国政府。
1847年07月，我返回美国，与英国人就鲁尔区煤炭问题举行会议，讨论提高煤炭产量的必要性。
期间，陆军部长[罗伯特]帕特森辞职；肯尼斯·罗亚尔将军被任命为国防部长，他请我担任副国防部长。
出于显而易见的原因，在咨询了克莱将军之后，我接受了这个职位。

My duties for the next two years were primarily supervision of the three occupations: Germany, Japan and Austria, although I became Acting Secretary when Mr. Royall was away from Washington.

接下来的两年里，我的职责主要是监督三个占领区：德国、日本和奥地利，尽管罗亚尔先生不在华盛顿时，我担任代理国防部长。

After I retired in early '49 and married again (my first wife had died early in the war), I returned briefly to Dillon, Read and Company and then was invited by Governor [Thomas E.] Dewey of New York State, where I was living, to take over the Trusteeship of the Long Island Railroad after several very serious rear end collisions on that railroad, as a result of which the public had lost confidence in the safety of the road and in the management. I discharged this responsibility for about a year. We were able to find electronic safety devices that were installed over a period of about a year, and which automatically and electronically, through the rails, put the brakes on the following train if two trains got too close together. There have been no rear and collisions on the Long Island Railroad since.

1949年初我退休后再婚（我的第1任妻子在战争初期去世），之后我短暂地回到了狄龙、里德公司。
后来，我居住的纽约州州长[ThomasE.]Dewey邀请我接管长岛铁路的托管工作。
此前，该铁路发生了几起非常严重的追尾事故，公众因此对道路安全和管理层失去了信心。
我担任这个职务大约一年。
我们找到了在大约一年的时间内安装的电子安全装置，如果两列火车靠得太近，这些装置会通过铁轨自动以电子方式对后面的火车进行制动。
从那以后，长岛铁路再也没有发生过追尾事故。

About that time the Truman administration invited me to become the United States' member of the NATO Council in Paris. The Council was moving from London to Paris and being upgraded, as it became evident that it would be necessary, with the Korean war on and the threat to Western Europe from Russia, to build up the Western world's mutual defenses. The NATO Alliance had been formed on paper about a year and a half before, but it became very clear that it would be necessary to have a large and active defense force in being.

大约在那个时候，杜鲁门政府邀请我成为位于巴黎的北约理事会的美国成员国。
鉴于朝鲜战争的持续以及俄罗斯对西欧的威胁，建立西方世界的共同防御体系已变得日益重要，理事会正从伦敦迁往巴黎并进行升级。
北约联盟大约在一年半前才正式成立，但很明显，拥有一支庞大而活跃的防御力量至关重要。

Before accepting I asked for the opportunity to visit Europe briefly and talk with General Eisenhower who was there in command of NATO's military forces, such as they were, to make sure that he and I would be working in close harmony, he being the top military man in NATO, and I to be the top civilian on the U.S. side on the NATO Council.

在接受邀请之前，我请求有机会短暂访问欧洲，与当时指挥北约军事力量的艾森豪威尔将军进行交流，以确保我和他能够密切合作，因为他是北约的最高军事领导人，而我是北约理事会中美国方面的最高文职官员。

We met in Paris. He introduced me to Winston Churchill who happened to be there at the time. We talked about my possible appointment and he not only agreed that I should take it but welcomed my appointment.

我们在巴黎见面。
他把我介绍给了当时恰好在巴黎的温斯顿·丘吉尔。
我们谈到了我可能获得的任命，他不仅同意我接受，还对我的任命表示欢迎。

I returned to the United States and suggested that since I would be dealing with the defense of Europe, and since I would also be representing the Mutual Security Administration under Mr. [Averell] Harriman and dealing with the economic problems of the European countries as well at a time when France and Great Britain were practically bankrupt, and when our Mutual Security arrangements and our Marshall Plan follow up were beginning to bear fruit, but still required a great many adjustments and continued assistance, that I would need deputies with the proper authority and rank in the defense field, in the economic field, and in the political field; plus an overall deputy, since we were dealing with twenty European countries, and I would be traveling a great deal in Europe and back and forth to Washington. He would be my alter ego. These arrangements were all agreed to and the deputies appointed.

我回到美国后提出，由于我将负责欧洲的防务，同时还将代表埃夫里尔·哈里曼先生领导下的共同安全局，处理欧洲国家的经济问题。
当时，法国和英国几乎破产，我们的共同安全协议和马歇尔计划的后续工作才刚刚开始取得成果，但仍需要大量调整和持续的援助。
因此，我需要在防务、经济和政治领域拥有适当权限和级别副手；此外，由于我们要与20个欧洲国家打交道，我将在欧洲和华盛顿之间频繁出差，还需要一位总代理。
他将成为我的“另一个自我”。
这些安排都得到了同意，副手也已任命。

I went to Paris about the end of '51, spent a few weeks in close collaboration with Jean Monnet, and a prominent Britisher, whose name slips me, and who later became head of the British atomic energy commission.

1951年底，我去了巴黎，与让·莫内以及一位著名的英国人（我忘了此人的名字）密切合作了几周，此人后来成为英国原子能委员会的负责人。

The three of us, known correctly or not as the three wise men planned the recommendations that would be made to the Lisbon Conference, to which came Secretary of State [Dean] Acheson; Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett; John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, and Averell Harriman.

我们三人，无论是否被正确地称为“三位智者”，策划了将向里斯本会议提出的建议。
出席会议的有国务卿迪安·艾奇逊、国防部长罗伯特·洛维特、财政部长约翰·斯奈德和艾夫里尔·哈里曼。

The Lisbon Conference was held in February 1952. It laid the groundwork on a very constructive basis for the military buildup of NATO. The French were asked for twelve divisions, as I recall. The United States had to agree to a great deal of economic support to make that possible. There were political questions involved. The French Prime Minister, Mr. [Maurice] Faure, I believe it was at that time, at the last minute in a private conference, held in the basement of the British Embassy, in Lisbon, told us that he agreed with the principle, that he was going to agree, he thought, to what we were asking, namely twelve French divisions, for the common defense. But he said, “This is going to cost me my political head.” We adjourned this private meeting, we went into the final Lisbon Conference meeting, the agreement generally was reached, and the agreement signed. Three days later M. Faure did lose his job as Prime Minister, but the agreement held.

里斯本会议于1952年02月举行。
它为北约的军事建设奠定了非常建设性的基础。
我记得，法国被要求提供12个师。
美国不得不同意提供大量经济援助才能实现这一点。
这其中还涉及政治问题。
法国总理莫里斯·福尔先生，我记得当时在里斯本英国大使馆地下室举行的一次私人会议上，在最后一刻告诉我们，他同意这个原则，他认为他会同意我们的要求，即法国提供12个师用于共同防御。
但他说：“这会让我失去政治头脑。
”我们结束了这场私人会议，参加了里斯本会议的最后一次会议，协议基本达成，并签署了。
三天后，福尔先生确实丢掉了首相的职位，但协议仍然有效。

After about a year and a half the various agreements made at Lisbon were pretty well coming into force.

大约一年半后，在里斯本达成的各项协议基本开始生效。

General Eisenhower was elected President. He asked me to return to the United States before he took over as President to meet with him and with his future Cabinet members to acquaint them with the developments in NATO. He himself, of course, was quite familiar with what had gone on there. As was customary, I gave the incoming President my resignation. He asked me not to insist. I pointed out that including the war years I had been about ten years in Government service, or more perhaps, and he agreed that I could retire about the middle of '53, which I did.

艾森豪威尔将军当选总统。
他请我在他就任总统之前回美国与他以及他未来的内阁成员会面，让他们了解北约的发展情况。
他本人当然对那里的情况非常了解。
按照惯例，我向新任总统递交了辞呈。
他让我不要坚持。
我指出，算上战争年代，我在政府部门工作了大约十年，甚至更久，他同意我可以在1953年中期退休，我照做了。

Shortly after that I went to Mexico for six years to head the Mexican Light and Power Company, a most enjoyable and constructive business assignment. In 1959 I decided it was time to return to the United States. I persuaded General Maxwell Taylor, who was then retiring as Chief of Staff of the Army, to take over my job in Mexico, which he did. Mrs. Draper and I moved to California, and I formed a financing firm with General [Frederick L.] Anderson who had been my general deputy in NATO. And six or seven years later I retired from that firm, moved to Washington, and became Chairman of Combustion Engineering in New York for a few years. In 1965 I retired as Chairman, and since then I have been devoting my entire time to trying to do something about finding solutions for the population problem of the world – the so-called population explosion.

此后不久，我去了墨西哥，在墨西哥电力公司工作了六年，这是一项令人愉快且富有建设性的商业任务。
1959年，我决定是时候返回美国了。
我说服了当时即将从陆军参谋长职位上退休的马克斯韦尔·泰勒将军接替我在墨西哥的工作，他最终同意了。
我和德雷珀夫人搬到了加利福尼亚，我和曾任我在北约副手的弗雷德里克·L·安德森将军创办了一家融资公司。
六七年后，我从那家公司退休，搬到了华盛顿，并在纽约担任了几年燃烧工程公司董事长。
1965年，我卸任董事长一职，从那时起，我一直致力于为解决世界人口问题——所谓的人口爆炸——做些事情。

That's very lengthy, much more so than I anticipated making it.

这很长，比我预想的要长得多。

HESS: That's quite all right. What is the name of the particular organization that you are with now?

赫斯：没关系。
您现在所在的具体组织叫什么名字？

DRAPER: I wear several hats: I am Honorary Chairman of the Population Crisis Committee here in Washington; I'm on the Governing Body of the International Planned Parenthood Federation; and am Honorary Vice-Chairman of the Planned Parenthood movement in this country; also by President Nixon's appointment. I represent the United States each two years, or whenever meetings are held, of the United Nations Population Commission. Our last meeting was in November 1971 in Geneva, the first two weeks of November. In general, my work with the Population Crisis Committee, means dealing with our own Government, and other governments, and with private and international organizations interested and involved in the population problem. I travel a great deal.

德雷珀：我身兼数职：我是华盛顿人口危机委员会的名誉主席；我是国际计划生育联合会的管理机构成员；也是我国计划生育运动的名誉副主席；这也是尼克松总统任命的。
我每两年或每次联合国人口委员会会议召开时代表美国出席一次。
我们上次会议于1971年11月在日内瓦举行，即11月的头两周。
总的来说，我在人口危机委员会的工作意味着要与我国政府、其他国家政府以及关注和参与人口问题的私人和国际组织打交道。
我经常出差。

In addition to the above, for the last few years I have been assisting Mr. Paul Hoffman, who has been in charge of the Development Program of the United Nations, to raise the funds from governments for the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, about thirty million dollars this past year from forty six governments.

除此之外，过去几年，我还协助联合国发展计划署负责人保罗·霍夫曼先生，为联合国人口活动基金向各国政府筹集资金，去年从46个政府筹集了约3000万美元。

HESS: What are your earliest recollections of Mr. Truman?

赫斯：您对杜鲁门先生最早的记忆是什么？

DRAPER: I don't believe that I had ever met Mr. Truman personally until after he became President. At the time of President Roosevelt's death I was in Washington, on the General Staff of the Army. Shortly after that I went to Europe, on General Eisenhower's staff under General Clay.

德雷珀：我认为直到杜鲁门先生就任总统后，我才与他私下见过面。
罗斯福总统去世时，我在华盛顿陆军总参谋部任职。
此后不久，我去了欧洲，在克莱将军麾下担任艾森豪威尔将军的参谋。

HESS: What were your impressions upon the death of President Roosevelt? You mentioned that you were here in town, but what came to mind?

赫斯：罗斯福总统去世时，您有什么印象？您提到您当时在纽约，但您想到了什么？

DRAPER: We were still at war. President Roosevelt had been a great war President. I'm a Republican; he was a Democrat. I hadn't voted for him. I disagreed with many of his domestic policies, but I certainly recognized and do today that he foresaw our participation in the war, our necessary involvement, and that prepared for it in a way that the American people accepted. While it took some time it did help greatly to bolster the British during their year of fighting it out alone, under the lend-lease agreements that he made with Mr. Churchill. He began building up the forces preliminary to Pearl Harbor so that when that blow struck it was, I think, very largely due to Mr. Roosevelt's forethought and foresight, that we were able to quickly mobilize and go to war effectively.

德雷珀：当时我们还在打仗。
罗斯福总统是一位伟大的战时总统。
我是共和党人，他是民主党人。
我没有投票给他。
我不同意他的许多国内政策，但我当然承认，并且今天仍然承认，他预见到了我们会参战，预见到了我们必须参与战争，并且以美国人民能够接受的方式做好了准备。
虽然这花费了一些时间，但这确实极大地鼓舞了英国人，使他们在与丘吉尔先生签订的租借法案下孤军奋战。
在珍珠港事件之前，他就开始集结军队，所以当珍珠港事件来袭时，我认为，很大程度上要归功于罗斯福先生的深谋远虑和远见卓识，我们才能迅速动员起来，有效地投入战争。

When he died, to get to your direct question, I had known that he was not in good health, but I had no idea that he was near death. It was almost – here in Washington – almost a physical shock to the entire community, that permeated the atmosphere in a way that I've never known before or since. Even the declaration of war didn't compare, the shock waves, that seemed to be going around us everywhere with our war leader suddenly dead.

回答你的问题时，我知道他身体不好，但我不知道他已经奄奄一息。
在华盛顿，这几乎对整个社区都是一种身体上的打击，这种打击以一种我从未经历过的方式弥漫在空气中。
就连宣战也无法与之相比，我们的战争领袖突然去世，给我们带来的冲击似乎无处不在。

HESS: As you know, several historians have said that President Roosevelt had prior information that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, and he did not notify the commanders so that the Japanese would attack and get us into the war in that manner. What do you think of that?

赫斯：如您所知，一些历史学家认为罗斯福总统事先知道珍珠港将遭袭击，但他没有通知指挥官，结果日本人发动袭击，并以这种方式将我们卷入战争。
您对此有何看法？

DRAPER: I don't believe it. I don't know, but I don't believe it. I can't believe that if there was any prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor that General Marshall would have been riding horseback that Sunday morning when it happened.

德雷珀：我不相信。
我不知道，但我不相信。
我不敢相信，如果事先知道珍珠港事件，马歇尔将军会在那个星期天早上骑马，目睹事件发生。

HESS: What kind of a job did you think Mr. Truman would do as President of the United States, and just what did you know about him on April 12, 1945?

赫斯：您认为杜鲁门先生作为美国总统会做什么工作？1945年04月12日那天，您对他了解多少？

DRAPER: I had a favorable picture of Mr. Truman without knowing him personally. His work as Committee Chairman in the Senate, and his investigation of war activities which had gone on for some time before he became Vice President, had favorably impressed everyone, including myself. As Vice President he was not prominent in current goings-on, so that I didn't know too much about him; and like everyone else, I wondered what kind of a President he was going to make. I was tremendously impressed with his modesty and the way in which he took over the Presidency, indicating that he thought the size of the job was such that he only hoped he could live up to its requirements.

德雷珀：虽然我并不认识杜鲁门先生，但我对他印象不错。
他担任参议院委员会主席期间的工作，以及在就任副总统前一段时间对战争活动的调查，给包括我在内的所有人都留下了良好的印象。
作为副总统，他并没有在时事上显露头角，所以我对他了解不多；和其他人一样，我也好奇他会成为怎样的一位总统。
他的谦逊以及他接任总统职位的方式给我留下了深刻的印象，他表示，他认为这份工作的重要性，他只希望自己能够胜任。

HESS: And before moving on, as you were with Dillon, Read for a good number of years, what are your recollections of Mr. James Forrestal? When did you first meet Mr. Forrestal?

赫斯：在您离开之前，由于您在狄龙·里德律师事务所工作多年，您对詹姆斯·福雷斯特尔先生有什么印象？您第1次见到福雷斯特尔先生是什么时候？

DRAPER: When I first joined Dillon Read which was in 1926. He was already one of the senior members of the firm. I guess he was the senior member of the firm, probably, next to Mr. Clarence Dillon, the top man, and a very able financial genius, I would put it almost. He worked in a way like – by himself to some degree, but he had tremendous influence in bringing financial arrangements to fruition. He was a very fine person in every way. I knew him well, intimately, worked under him for years, so that in 1940 I went to Washington before he did, but when he was invited to Washington he was one of the so-called nine anonymous young men in the White House. He impressed everyone that he worked with here in Washington and moved up to Under Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy, and finally the first Secretary of Defense.

德雷珀：我1926年刚加入狄龙·里德律师事务所的时候，他已经是事务所的资深成员之一了。
我猜他是公司里级别最高的成员，可能仅次于最高领导人克拉伦斯·狄龙先生，他是一位非常能干的金融天才，我几乎可以这么说。
他在某种程度上像独立工作一样，但在财务安排的实现方面有着巨大的影响力。
他在各方面都是非常优秀的人。
我很了解他，和他关系密切，在他手下工作多年，所以1940年我先于他去了华盛顿，但当他被邀请去华盛顿时，他是白宫所谓的九个匿名年轻人之一。
他给在华盛顿的每一个同事都留下了深刻的印象，并晋升为海军副部长、海军部长，最后成为第1任国防部长。

The Secretary of the Navy when he came to Washington was Secretary [Frank] Knox. One of the smartest things that President Roosevelt ever did was to bring two Republicans into the Cabinet, and the timing was perfect. There had been a lot of bickering going on in the War Department between Secretary [Harry H.] Woodring and Assistant Secretary [Louis] Johnson. Nobody knew who was boss or what the policies were. When the President decided that the time had come to have the other party represented in the Cabinet in order to attract national support he appointed Mr. Stimson as Secretary of War and Mr. Knox as Secretary of the Navy. In effect he turned over our national defense to the Republicans, and so far as the individuals he selected were concerned, he made a ten strike with each.

海军部长来到华盛顿时是部长[弗兰克]诺克斯。
罗斯福总统做过的最聪明的事情之一就是将两位共和党人带入内阁，时机恰到好处。
陆军部部长[哈里·H·]·伍德林和助理部长[路易斯·]·约翰逊之间一直争吵不休。
没人知道谁是老大，也不知道双方的政策是什么。
当总统决定是时候让另一党派在内阁中拥有代表以争取国民支持时，他任命史汀生先生为陆军部长，诺克斯先生为海军部长。
实际上，他把我们的国防大权交给了共和党人，至于他挑选的人选，他可谓是各取所需。

Mr. Forrestal had been invited to serve generally in and around the White House, but settled down in the Navy. Mr. Knox must have known him or came to know him, and pretty soon he was Under Secretary of the Navy, and then became Secretary later on.

福雷斯特尔先生曾受邀在白宫内外任职，但他最终在海军安顿下来。
诺克斯先生肯定认识他，或者说是后来认识他，不久之后，他就担任了海军副部长，后来又担任了海军部长。

During the period after Pearl Harbor the man who was responsible for the rebuilding of our Navy after the attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed so much of it, and who built it to levels we'd never dreamed of before, and which made it possible to fight in two oceans, and gradually to move across the Pacific, island after island, until we had conquered the Japanese, was James Forrestal.

珍珠港事件后，负责重建海军的人——珍珠港事件后，海军遭到严重破坏，而他将其提升到我们从未梦想过的水平，使我们得以在两大洋作战，并逐渐跨越太平洋，逐岛作战，直至战胜日本——就是詹姆斯·福雷斯特尔。

HESS: In your opinion, what was his view of the unification of the services?

赫斯：您认为他对军种统一有何看法？

DRAPER: My impression of Jim Forrestal's views on unification are that he was resisting a great deal of pressure from the admirals who were almost all opposed to the idea, while himself believing that it was the right solution for American defense organization. His thinking was probably affected by his close association with Bob Patterson, the then Secretary of War, and probably also by President Truman's own views.

德雷珀：：我对吉姆·福雷斯特尔关于军种统一的观点的印象是，他顶住了几乎所有反对这一想法的海军上将的巨大压力，而他自己却认为这是美国国防组织的正确解决方案。
他的想法可能受到他与时任战争部长鲍勃·帕特森密切交往的影响，也可能受到杜鲁门总统自身观点的影响。

HESS: In your opinion, why was he selected to be the first Secretary of Defense?

赫斯：您认为他为什么会被选为第1任国防部长？

DRAPER: Simply for that reason. I don't say it was to bribe the Navy admirals but his appointment did certainly take into account their point of view. The Navy had always been on its own. The Captain was supreme on his ship. The Navy had that overall point of view – a good one indeed for fighting battles on the sea. I'm sure the President said to himself, “We'll just take the Navy along by putting him in charge.” And it worked.

德雷珀：：原因很简单。
我并不是说是为了贿赂海军上将，但他的任命确实考虑到了他们的观点。
海军一直以来都是独立自主的。
舰长在自己的舰船上拥有至高无上的地位。
海军秉持着这种整体观念——这对于海上作战来说确实很有益处。
我敢肯定总统当时心里想：“让他负责，我们就能带动海军一起行动。
”而且这招奏效了。

HESS: What is your general opinion of his effectiveness both as the Secretary of the Navy, which you've fairly well covered, but as Secretary of Defense, too? Just how effective was he in the job?

赫斯：您总体上如何评价他担任海军部长（您对此已经相当详细地报道过）和国防部长时的效率？他在工作中究竟有多高效？

DRAPER: The first Secretary of Defense had a hard job, obviously. He had to bring together the War Department, which became the Department of the Army, and the new Air Force, which had been a part of the Army, and the Navy as well. For the Air Force it meant a greater degree of autonomy. But both the Navy and the Army and the War Department had been supreme and independent in their own right, and it was not an easy thing to knock their heads together and for both to have a single boss. I think he did that job very well indeed.

德雷珀：：第1任国防部长的工作显然很艰巨。
他必须整合陆军部（后来成为陆军部）和新成立的空军（曾是陆军的一部分）以及海军。
对空军来说，这意味着更大程度的自主权。
但海军、陆军和战争部本身都拥有至高无上的权力和独立性，要让他们齐心协力，并让他们都归于同一主管，并非易事。
我认为他在这方面做得非常好。

I worked very closely with him for about three months. He asked Secretary Royall to let me spend a few months directly with the Secretary of Defense to build up and put forward the first defense budget for the three services. So I worked day in and day out on that job and saw a great deal of him during that period. It really meant that I was dealing back and forth and compromising with the three services to try to find a budget that the President would approve and that still took care of each of the three services to the extent possible within that limit.

我与他密切合作了大约三个月。
他请求罗亚尔部长允许我花几个月时间直接与国防部长会面，共同制定并提交三个军种的首份国防预算。
因此，我日复01日地投入这项工作，在此期间与他见了很多面。
实际上，我与三个军种反复沟通、妥协，试图找到一个总统能够批准的预算，同时又能在预算限额内尽可能地兼顾三个军种的利益。

HESS: In his Memoirs Mr. Truman makes the comment that in working on military budgets, sometimes the Navy was the most difficult to satisfy and to get along with. What would be your view?

赫斯：杜鲁门先生在回忆录中提到，在制定军事预算时，海军有时是最难满足、最难相处的。
您怎么看？

DRAPER: I found that true, too.

德雷珀：我也这么认为。

HESS: Why would that be true? Why was that true?

赫斯：为什么会这样？为什么是这样？

DRAPER: Their tradition had always been one of independent action and the Navy considered it simply had to have what it needed. The admirals were good proponents and didn't take no for an answer easily. A lot of my good Navy friends were in there fighting all the way. They are still good friends of mine, those that are still living. But when they're arguing the question of the Navy's rights, they're very strong protagonists.

德雷珀：海军一直以来都有独立行动的传统，他们认为自己只需要拥有所需的一切。
海军上将们是坚定的支持者，不会轻易接受否定的答案。
我的许多海军好友都曾在那里战斗。
他们现在仍然健在，仍然是我的好朋友。
但当他们争论海军权利问题时，他们是非常坚定的支持者。

Actually, to get back to that first budget for just a minute, I'm afraid that I would consider that first budget one of President Truman's real mistakes. At that time – what year would that have been, 1948, I guess – the three budgets were put together at three levels: One, if I remember the figures, the minimum budget of thirteen and a half billion dollars for the three services, which sounds picayune today; the middle budget was about seventeen billion and the third was what the three services asked for, and which was the way we first started to put the figures together, it was about twenty-one billion dollars. Mr. Forrestal felt very strongly, as did I, that while he could justify reducing the twenty-one billion, he felt strongly that the middle ground of seventeen billion was the irreducible minimum from the point of view of the national defense of this country.

实际上，让我们暂时回到第一份预算上来，恐怕我会认为第一份预算是杜鲁门总统真正的错误之一。
当时——应该是哪一年，我猜是1948年——三项预算按三个层次汇总：第1，如果我没记错的话，三个军种的最低预算是135亿美元，这在今天听起来微不足道；中间预算约为170亿美元；第3是三个军种各自要求的预算，也就是我们最初汇总这些数字的方式，约为210亿美元。
福雷斯特尔先生和我都强烈地认为，虽然他有理由削减210亿美元，但他强烈地认为，从国家国防的角度来看，170亿美元的中间值是不可削减的最低限度。

I prepared these three budgets. The thirteen and a half budget was only made because the President had set that as the figure, although it wasn't supposedly the final figure. But that was the figure he hoped to reach.

我负责准备这三份预算。
之所以制定135亿美元的预算，是因为总统设定了这个数字，尽管这并非最终数字。
但这是他希望达到的数字。

So we had to make a budget there, but to get the three services to agree on the figures for that, just meant they had to be rammed down their throats. But the seventeen billion budget took care reasonably at least, of what each of the three felt their really irreducible requirements actually were, although they all three badly wanted the twenty-one billion budget.

所以我们必须在那里制定预算，但要让三个军种就预算数字达成一致，就意味着必须强迫他们接受。
不过，170亿美元的预算至少合理地满足了三个军种各自认为的真正无法削减的需求，尽管他们三个军种都迫切想要210亿美元的预算。

I sat in the meeting when Mr. Forrestal presented the three budgets to the President, and Mr. Forrestal was more concerned than I had ever seen him in my life. He was very, very seriously troubled. After the presentation the President said very little except to ask a few questions. Then the President said, “I'll let you know, Jim.” And a day or two later he did let him know that it was thirteen and a half billion – the President's original budget. I think that may have helped to bring on the Korean war. I think that may have helped to bring on Jim's death. That's something I'd like to put off the record until after the President dies.

我当时在场，福雷斯特尔先生向总统汇报了三个军种的预算，福雷斯特尔先生比我这辈子见过的任何时候都更加担心。
他非常非常焦虑。
汇报结束后，总统除了问了几个问题外，几乎没说什么。
然后总统说：“我会告诉你的，吉姆。
”一两天后，总统才告诉他，预算是135亿美元——这是总统最初的预算。
我认为这可能促成了朝鲜战争。
我认为这可能促成了吉姆的去世。
我想等总统去世后再谈这件事。

HESS: Now, a further question on this same matter: Was Frank Pace the Director of the Bureau of the Budget at this time? Harold Smith, of course, was the first director and he was replaced by James Webb. I believe at this time Frank Pace was Director of the Bureau of the Budget. In drawing up these very important budgets, the most important – the budgets that take most of the money – are the military budgets. In drawing these up, did you work with the Bureau of the Budget?

赫斯：现在，关于同一问题，还有一个问题：弗兰克·佩斯当时是预算局局长吗？哈罗德·史密斯当然是第1任局长，后来被詹姆斯·韦伯接替。
我记得当时弗兰克·佩斯是预算局局长。
在制定这些非常重要的预算时，最重要的——也是耗费最多资金的——是军事预算。
在制定这些预算时，您和预算局合作过吗？德雷珀

DRAPER: I must have. I guess it was Frank Pace, but whoever it was I certainly must have worked with him, but not nearly as closely as I did with the three services. My job, really, was – as outlined to me by Mr. Forrestal – although I guess I evolved the idea of the three budgets, was to take into account the three requests from the services and then to get a reasonable budget together – one that he could recommend. This turned out to be the seventeen billion one. And then he also asked me, against his better judgment, to prepare a budget at the lower level, set by the President, and when the lower level was approved, I know that it was a great shock. It meant to him that his country was not going to get what it needed for its defense for that period. </color>

：肯定合作过。
我猜是弗兰克·佩斯，但无论是谁，我肯定和他合作过，但远不如和三个军种合作那么密切。
我的工作实际上是——正如福雷斯特尔先生向我概述的那样——虽然我猜想三个预算的想法是我提出的——我的工作是考虑三个军种的要求，然后整理出一个合理的预算——一个他可以推荐的预算。
最终，这个预算就是那个170亿美元的预算。
然后，他还违背他的意愿，要求我编制一份由总统制定的较低预算。
我知道，当这份较低预算获得批准时，他震惊了。
这意味着他的国家在那段时期将无法获得国防所需的资金。

HESS: 1948 was a very important year, that was a political year, the year Mr. Truman ran and was elected, to many peoples' surprise. In your opinion, do you think he had political considerations in mind when he wanted a balanced budget that year? Was that his reason for the lower budget?

赫斯：1948年是非常重要的一年，那是一个政治年，杜鲁门先生参选并当选，这让很多人感到惊讶。
您认为，他当年想要平衡预算时，是否有政治方面的考虑？这是他降低预算的原因吗？

DRAPER: I wouldn't want to express an opinion on that. He felt that a balanced budget, now that we were out of the war, was the necessity, the need for the country, I'm sure. Whether there were political overtones, too, I can't say.

德雷珀：：我不想对此发表意见。
他觉得，既然我们已经结束战争，平衡预算是必要的，是国家的需要，我敢肯定。
至于是否也包含政治色彩，我说不上来。

HESS: All right. As you have mentioned, the cutting back of the armed forces at this time left us somewhat unprepared at the advent of the Korean war. We were unprepared to meet the situation that arose. Where should the blame lie?

赫斯：好的。
正如您所说，当时裁减军队让我们在朝鲜战争爆发时措手不及。
我们毫无准备去应对随之而来的局面。
这应该怪谁呢？

DRAPER: Those decisions are a matter of judgment. The President has to make the final decisions. He doesn't have anybody to lay the blame on. I think one of the great tributes to Mr. Truman, and I would be the first to make it, was his power of decision. Throughout the time that I was Under Secretary, and sometimes acting as Secretary, I would go to the President from time to time, with particular problems of the Department of the Army that had taken us weeks or months in some cases to evaluate and decide what we should recommend or what course we thought the country should pursue. I have never been impressed by anyone more in my life than by the way in which he would receive the problem; I would describe it briefly, for five or ten minutes; he would ask a few questions; I would give him the two or possibly three alternative decisions that could be made; he would make one of them, and that would be that. He would go on to something else. That's the way he ran the Presidency. He constantly carried out the little motto on his desk, “The Buck Stops Here.” Now, to get back to your question. He had to decide on whether a balanced budget at that time was more important to the country than a little more money from his point of view in defense, and he made the decision. I wouldn't criticize it.

德雷珀：这些决定都关乎判断。
总统必须做出最终决定。
他不能被任何人责怪。
我认为杜鲁门先生最值得称道的一点，我首先要说的是，就是他的决断力。
在我担任副部长，有时甚至代理部长期间，我会不时地去见总统，讨论陆军部的一些具体问题。
这些问题有时需要数周甚至数月的评估才能最终确定我们应该提出什么建议，或者我们认为国家应该采取什么行动。
我一生中从未对任何人留下过比他处理问题的方式更深刻的印象；我会用五到十分钟的时间简要地描述一下；他会问几个问题；我会给他提供两到三个可能的替代方案；他会做出其中之一，然后就此结束。
之后他会去做其他事情。
这就是他管理总统的方式。
他始终践行着办公桌上的那句座右铭：“责任止于此”。
现在，回到你的问题。
他必须决定，在当时，平衡预算是否比从他的角度来看国防开支多一点对国家更重要，然后他做出了决定。
我不会批评他的决定。

HESS: How often did you meet with the President during the time that you were Under Secretary of the Army, approximately?

赫斯：在您担任陆军副部长期间，您大约和总统见过几次面？

DRAPER: I suppose twenty times, I don't know. I was there about two years – twenty or thirty times.

德雷珀：：我想是二十次，我也不知道。
我在那里待了大约两年——二三十次。

HESS: Did you work with any of the White House staff members at the time?

赫斯：您当时和白宫的任何工作人员一起工作过吗？

DRAPER: Yes, yes.

德雷珀：：是的，是的。

HESS: Who comes to mind? Did you work with Clark Clifford?

赫斯：您能想到谁？您和克拉克·克利福德一起工作过吗？

Clifford was Special Counsel at that time.

克利福德当时是特别顾问。

DRAPER: Yes, yes, very often with Clark Clifford.

德雷珀：：是的，是的，经常和克拉克·克利福德一起工作。

HESS: Did he provide you with any particular help? Anything that you and he worked on that might help illustrate his functions in this field? Is there anything that comes to mind?

赫斯：他有没有给您提供什么特别的帮助？您和他合作过的任何事情可以帮助说明他在这个领域的职能？您能想到什么吗？

DRAPER: No, we talked about the problems as they came along and he'd give me the President's answers. As a rule, of course, Secretary Royall had these conversations. It was when either he delegated me to do something in particular or when he'd be away on a trip that I would have the direct contact.

德雷珀：不，我们会在问题出现时进行讨论，他会给我总统的答复。
当然，通常情况下，罗亚尔部长会进行这些对话。
只有当他授权我做某件事，或者他出差时，我才会直接与他联系。

HESS: Did you have any contact with the Military Aide, General Harry Vaughan?

赫斯：你和军事助理哈里·沃恩将军有过接触吗？

DRAPER: I certainly met him a few times, but remember nothing in particular.

德雷珀：我确实见过他几次，但记不太清楚了。

HESS: You have mentioned a meeting at the White House in which Mr. Forrestal presented the budget and mentioned his attitude at that time. What are the earliest signs that you can recall of the unfortunate mental breakdown that overtook Mr. Forrestal? Was this the first time that you noticed that something might be wrong?

赫斯：你提到过在白宫的一次会议上，福雷斯特尔先生提交了预算，并提到了他当时的态度。
你还记得福雷斯特尔先生不幸精神崩溃的最早迹象是什么吗？这是你第1次注意到事情可能不对劲吗？

DRAPER: Well, I didn't notice any mental breakdown or anything of that kind. He was simply greatly shocked that the President's decision was so low. No, I think that was much later on I retired. I saw Jim several times before that. I retired, around March of '49. I had been wanting to return to private life before that but Jim had persuaded me to stay just as the President had persuaded him to stay over the election into the new year. He and Mr. Royall and the President permitted me to go in March of '49.

德雷珀：嗯，我没有注意到他精神崩溃之类的。
他只是对总统如此低调的决定感到非常震惊。
不，我想那是在我退休之后很久的事了。
在那之前我见过吉姆几次。
我退休的时候，大约是1949年03月。
在那之前我一直想回归私人生活，但吉姆说服我留下来，就像总统说服他留任到明年大选之后一样。
他和罗亚尔先生以及总统在1949年03月允许我离开。

HESS: The same month that Mr. Forrestal left.

赫斯：福雷斯特尔先生离开的同一个月。

DRAPER: He left after I did. I saw him before I left to say goodbye, and I noticed then that he was very distraught.

德雷珀：他在我之后离开。
在我离开之前我见过他，向他道别，当时我注意到他非常心烦意乱。

I returned to Washington about ten days later, after my wedding and a short honeymoon, and had breakfast with Jim, and then I could hardly get his attention on anything. He was obviously worried, distraught . . .

大约十天后，我结婚并度过了短暂的蜜月，回到了华盛顿，和吉姆一起吃了早餐，之后我几乎无法引起他的注意。
他显然很担心，心烦意乱……

HESS: Early in April.

赫斯：04月初。

DRAPER: No, this was still in March, I think. He was soon going to leave – I knew then he was going to leave. He was going to leave and I ascribed his distraught condition to the fact that he was leaving, and perhaps to not being happy about his successor going to take over.

德雷珀：：不，我想那时还是03月。
他很快就要离开了——我当时就知道他要离开了。
他要离开了，我把他心烦意乱的状态归咎于他即将离开的事实，或许也是因为他对即将接任的继任者感到不满。

HESS: In March Louis Johnson replaced him.

赫斯：03月份，路易斯·约翰逊接替了他。

DRAPER: That's correct.

德雷珀：：没错。

HESS: Why was that change made? You mentioned that Mr. Forrestal had wanted to leave.

赫斯：为什么会有这样的变化？你提到福雷斯特尔先生想离开。

DRAPER: He had wanted to leave, but this was in the fall or winter before, but the President persuaded him that he needed him and wanted him to stay, and he agreed to stay, and then apparently very suddenly the President decided to appoint Mr. Johnson. My information at the time, which was rumor largely, was that Mr. Johnson had raised the money for the election and was told that he could have any job he wanted after the election, if the President were elected, which you can understand. Then Mr. Johnson asked for the Defense job, and the President gave it to him.

德雷珀：：他确实想离开，但那是在之前的秋天或冬天，但总统说服了他，说他需要他，希望他留下，他同意留下，然后显然总统突然决定任命约翰逊先生。
我当时得到的信息（大部分都是谣言）是，约翰逊先生为选举筹集了资金，并被告知如果总统当选，他可以在选举后获得任何他想要的工作，这你可以理解。
然后约翰逊先生申请了国防部的工作，总统给了他。

I was present when Johnson was sworn in at the Pentagon. They had a full dress affair in the encircled area inside the Pentagon Square or Pentagon, and the President pinned a medal on Jim, and then swore in Johnson. Everybody from the Pentagon had been invited to flock inside the enclosure and see the show. Jim went back to his office and a friend of his from New York took him by plane to Hobe Sound where he stayed at Douglas Dillon's house. That's where the tragedy started.

约翰逊在五角大楼宣誓就职时我在场。
他们在五角大楼广场或五角大楼内的圆圈区域举行了盛大的礼服仪式，总统为吉姆佩戴了一枚勋章，然后为约翰逊举行了宣誓就职仪式。
五角大楼的所有人都被邀请到围场内观看这场盛会。
吉姆回到办公室，他的一位纽约朋友带他乘飞机去了霍比桑德，他住在道格拉斯·狄龙的家里。
悲剧就是从这里开始的。

HESS: Do you think that Mr. Forrestal had changed his mind in March and would liked to have remained?

赫斯：你认为福雷斯特尔先生在03月份改变了主意，想继续留在五角大楼吗？

DRAPER: I don't know, but my guess is at that time he didn't like to be suddenly replaced. He perhaps would voluntarily have offered to go in another month or two, but I don't think he felt happy at all about the President, after urging him so hard to stay, deciding that somebody else should take the job. That's a personal impression only.

德雷珀：我不知道，但我猜他当时并不喜欢突然被替换。
他或许会主动提出再过一两个月就走，但我认为他对总统——在极力劝说他留下之后——决定让别人接任——一点也不高兴。
这只是我的个人看法。

HESS: Some people say that Mr. Forrestal's lack of support of the President in the election might have influenced that. Would he reasonably have expected support from Mr. Forrestal?

赫斯：有人说，福雷斯特尔先生在选举中缺乏对总统的支持可能影响了这一点。
他是否合理地期望得到福雷斯特尔先生的支持？

DRAPER: It's been a pretty regular rule in our Government that people involved in defense should not get into politics. I certainly agree with that rule personally, and I think that was Jim's point of view, and I wouldn't expect that the President thought anything else. No, I think it was just because Johnson had put the President under a real obligation and he was paying his debt.

德雷珀：我们政府有一条相当普遍的规定，即国防人员不得涉足政治。
我个人当然同意这条规定，我认为这也是吉姆的观点，我认为总统不会有其他想法。
不，我认为这只是因为约翰逊确实让总统承担了义务，而总统正在偿还债务。

HESS: We discussed the reduced budget, and not too long after Mr. Johnson came in, I believe one of his first actions was to stop work on the super carrier, the U.S.S. United States, and that was when Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan resigned, shortly after you left.

赫斯：我们讨论了削减预算的问题。
约翰逊先生上任后不久，我相信他的首要行动之一就是停止超级航母“美国”号的建造。
就在那时，海军部长约翰·L·沙利文辞职了，就在你离开后不久。

DRAPER: That's right, but I'm not familiar with that incident.

德雷珀：：没错，但我对那件事不太了解。

HESS: Back on General Marshall. You had mentioned that General Marshall asked you to come back into the Army in 1940. What were your early associations with General Marshall? When did you first meet him?

赫斯：回到马歇尔将军的话题。
你提到马歇尔将军在1940年邀请你重返陆军。
你早期与马歇尔将军有何关联？你们是什么时候第1次见到他的？

DRAPER: As Chief of Staff of the 77th Division, which was then a part-time job, that was when I was in the Reserves. We could see war looming ahead. I had for some months, maybe for a year, been working with other officers of the Division, and with General Vanderbilt who was the commanding general at that time, preparing war plans so far as the Division was concerned, and looking forward at the right time to calling in the enlisted men and also piecing out the training of the officers. We had had occasion two or three times to take some of these plans to Washington for consultation. And General Marshall had sat in on some of these consultations. I had met with him to discuss these plans and problems with him on behalf of our Division.

德雷珀：：当时我在预备役部队担任第77师的参谋长，这还是一份兼职工作。
我们预见到了战争即将来临。
几个月，甚至一年来，我一直与该师的其他军官以及当时的指挥官范德比尔特将军一起工作，制定该师的作战计划，并期待着在适当的时候召集士兵，并制定军官的训练计划。
我们曾两三次将其中一些计划带到华盛顿进行磋商。
马歇尔将军也参加了其中一些磋商。
我曾代表我们师与他会面，讨论这些计划和问题。

One day I got a personal phone call from him asking if I'd come down and go on active duty for six months – it turned out to be nine years – but I can't blame General Marshall for that. I really think that he wanted to have some Reserve officer down there to give him whatever benefit there might be in the Reserve thinking, and also to reflect perhaps, through that Reserve officer, to some of the Reserve Divisions, the War Department thinking about the future of the Reserves. But it didn't turn out that way. I became almost immediately involved in the Selective Service and in the G-1 operation and was absorbed with that, working with General – then Major – Lewis Hershey. The President appointed me – President Roosevelt – to the Army and Navy Recreation Board and some of the other boards and committees that dealt with the enlargement of the strength of the Army and the Navy.

有一天，我接到他打来的私人电话，问我是否愿意去那里服六个月的现役——结果一服就是九年——但我不能责怪马歇尔将军。
我真心觉得他想派一些预备役军官去那里，让他在预备役思想方面有所裨益，或许还能通过这名预备役军官，向一些预备役师和陆军部反映关于预备役未来的想法。
但事与愿违。
我几乎立刻就参与了义务兵役制和G-1行动，并全身心投入其中，与时任少校的刘易斯·赫尔希将军共事。
罗斯福总统任命我为陆军和海军娱乐委员会委员，以及其他一些负责扩充陆军和海军兵力的委员会委员。

HESS: You were with General Marshall at the Moscow conference, but that was in 1947, so we have another subject before we come to that. We will come back to General Marshall.

赫斯：您和马歇尔将军一起参加了莫斯科会议，但那是1947年的事了，所以在讨论这个问题之前，我们还有另一个话题。
我们以后再谈马歇尔将军。

But we should cover your experiences in Germany at the end of World War II. I believe that you were Chief of the Economics Division of the Control Council for Germany from '45 to '47. Just what were your general impressions at that time and what were your duties?

但我们应该谈谈您在二战末期在德国的经历。
我记得您从1945年到1947年担任德国统筹委员会经济部主任。
当时您的总体印象是什么？您的职责是什么？

DRAPER: As I've said before, the occupation became the actual Government of Germany. When we moved up from Versailles, our offices were first in Frankfurt, and then in July of 1945 we moved to Berlin.

德雷珀：正如我之前所说，占领区实际上成为了德国的政府。
我们从凡尔赛迁往别处时，办公室最初在法兰克福，然后在1945年07月搬到了柏林。

First the tripartite Control Council, then when the French joined us, the quadripartite Control Council was the Government of Germany. It was simply that. Each of our national army organizations in our own zones of Germany were supreme, subject only to the quadripartite policy decisions. So my job, under those general policies and in line with the Morgenthau doctrine that had been directed to us from Washington as the U.S. economic policy for Germany, was to run the economy of our zone of Germany. That meant the agriculture, the industry, and the trade (in or out of Germany although there was no trade outside of Germany at that time), and to try to keep the country from starving and from going berserk.

最初是三方统筹委员会，后来法国加入我们，四方统筹委员会就成了德国政府。
就是这样。
我们在各自德国控制区内的各个国家军队组织都拥有最高权力，只服从四方统筹委员会的政策决定。
因此，在这些总体政策下，并根据华盛顿指示我们作为美国对德经济政策的摩根索主义，我的工作就是管理我们德国控制区的经济。
这意味着农业、工业和贸易（无论是在德国境内还是境外，尽管当时德国境外没有贸易），并试图防止国家陷入饥荒和陷入疯狂。

The crops that year were quite good, and there was also considerable food we found that the Wehrmacht had stored, which we took over. So there was no immediate danger of starvation that particular fall or even that winter. The winter was not too cold, but there was great concern whether the crop could be gathered that summer and fall. There were some eight million Germans in prison camps. The crop had to be brought in by the old men and the boys and the women, but they did it. Industry was at a complete standstill; the coalmines in the Ruhr had been flooded before the Germans gave up that area; there was no coal production; and no coal on hand; no factory was turning a wheel hardly anywhere in Germany. The destruction of the air bombing had made all of the factories or most of them look as if they never would run again. It turned out a year later that after the debris was cleared away, there was more of the machinery and the going parts of the factories able to be revived than we had expected. But at the beginning there was no production of coal or of anything else, except food on the farms, and the factories and the industrial production of the country was practically nil. So, except for what food was being grown, Germany had to start from a standing start to again make its way.

那一年的收成相当不错，我们还找到了国防军储存的大量粮食，并接管了这些粮食。
所以，那年秋天，甚至冬天，都没有立即出现饥荒的危险。
冬天并不太冷，但人们非常担心那年夏天和秋天能否收割庄稼。
当时大约有八百万德国人被关在战俘营里。
庄稼必须由老人、男孩和妇女们运送过来，但他们还是完成了任务。
工业完全停滞；在德国人放弃鲁尔区之前，该地区的煤矿就被洪水淹没了；煤炭产量停滞不前；几乎没有煤炭库存；在德国，几乎没有任何工厂在运转。
空袭的破坏使得所有或大多数工厂看起来都无法再运转。
一年后，废墟被清理干净后，工厂能够恢复运转的机器和部件比我们预想的要多。
但一开始，除了农场的粮食，煤炭和其他任何东西都不生产，全国的工厂和工业生产几乎为零。
所以，除了正在种植的粮食之外，德国必须从零开始，重新走上正轨。

We found after a few months that we were going to have to import food. Western Germany, the part where we were, had not been the breadbasket; that had been Eastern Germany largely, and we were getting no supplies of food or anything else from the Russian zone, so that we had to look the situation in the face and come to a decision. General Clay first had to be persuaded and then he had to help me persuade them back in Washington that we in this country – even though we had conquered Germany – that we were going to have to help feed them. That was an idea that no one at that time had even envisaged. We had to get appropriations; I had to come back to appear before the Congress, and . . .

几个月后，我们发现必须进口粮食。
我们所在的西德地区并非粮仓，粮仓主要集中在东德，而且我们没有从俄占区获得任何粮食或其他任何物资供应，所以我们必须直面形势，做出决定。
首先，我必须说服克莱将军，然后他必须帮助我说服华盛顿的人们，让他们相信，即使我们征服了德国，我们也必须帮助养活他们。
当时没有人能想到这一点。
我们必须获得拨款；我必须回来出席国会，然后……

HESS: Was it difficult putting that view over?

赫斯：让大家接受这个观点很难吗？

DRAPER: Very. And I think probably it was only made possible because the crisis was delayed about a year. Actually we managed to wiggle through during the first eight or ten months because our own Army had been bringing with it a food reserve to avoid feeding troubles for our allies or our enemies during the fighting, and we had as well as the food that we found in the warehouses that the Germans had husbanded as their stock and their reserve. Those things helped that first six or eight or ten months.

德雷珀：：非常难。
我想这很可能是因为危机推迟了大约一年才得以实现。
实际上，我们设法在最初的八到十个月里渡过了难关，因为我们自己的军队一直带着粮食储备，以避免在战斗中给我们的盟友或敌人带来粮食问题，而且我们还有从德国人仓库里找到的、作为库存和储备的粮食。
这些因素在最初的六到十个月里起到了作用。

But as those months went by, we could see that in our area of Germany we had to have more food, and the British concluded similarly, particularly in the Ruhr.

但随着时间的推移，我们发现在德国我们所在的地区，我们需要更多的粮食，英国人也得出了类似的结论，尤其是在鲁尔区。

The one thing that saved the day, in my judgment, was the action taken by one who is now a very close friend of mine, Mr. Tracy Voorhees. He was the adviser to the President on food. I don't know at what stage that appointment was made, but that's how it turned out. He clearly saw these problems, both for Japan and Germany, and he had the great good fortune, and the imagination, to suggest to President Truman that the one man in this country who could help solve this problem and help persuade the Republican Congress that action should be taken, was former President Hoover. He first suggested this to the President, then he went to see Mr. Hoover, and the President then talked to Mr. Hoover.

在我看来，唯一挽救局面的是一位如今已成为我密友的特雷西·沃希斯先生的行动。
他曾担任总统的食品顾问。
我不知道这项任命是在哪个阶段做出的，但结果就是这样。
他清楚地看到了日本和德国面临的这些问题，并且凭借着巨大的运气和想象力，向杜鲁门总统建议，在这个国家，唯一能够帮助解决这个问题、并说服共和党控制的国会采取行动的人，就是前总统胡佛。
他首先向总统提出了这个建议，然后他去拜访了胡佛先生，总统随后又与胡佛先生进行了交谈。

As you recall, after the First World War, Mr. Hoover had made his famous journey to Belgium and to Europe. He still found alive and was able to collect, half a dozen of the top people who had gone with him in 1919 on that first relief mission, when President Truman asked him to repeat, on a much more serious scale, his visit to Belgium after the First World War that had prevented that country from starving.

你们还记得，第1次世界大战后，胡佛先生进行了他著名的比利时和欧洲之旅。
他仍然找到并召集了6名曾在1919年与他一起执行第1次救援任务的高层人士。
当时杜鲁门总统要求他以更严肃的方式再次访问比利时，防止该国陷入饥荒。

So, I guess it was early in '46, or the winter of '45-‘46, that General Clay and I got word from Washington that the former President was coming with Mr. Voorhees and a group of those that he had collected together, to make a survey, not only of Germany but of the food situation in our allies' territory as well; France, Belgium, and so on. So they came first to Germany, and I remember the occasion very well, when they came in by train. General Clay and I met them, Mr. Hoover and Tracy Voorhees and the others.

所以，我猜想是在1846年初，或者1845-1846年冬天，克莱将军和我从华盛顿得到消息，前总统将带着沃希斯先生和他召集的一群人来调查德国和我们盟国领土上的粮食状况，这些盟国包括法国、比利时等。
所以他们首先来到德国，我清楚地记得他们乘火车来的情景。
克莱将军和我迎接了他们，还有胡佛先生、特蕾西·沃希斯和其他人。

Mr. Hoover understood the situation very quickly because of his past experiences, and he came to realize that if the Germans weren't fed (I don't care who fed them), but if they weren't fed, we couldn't stay there even with bayonets, that that was not a tolerable situation in modern times, and that if we wanted a peaceful occupation, if we wanted to bring the Germans back into the community of nations, first they had to be fed, not too much, but they had to have enough to live. The ration in Berlin was 1560 calories a day, just about half of what you and I eat now, or then, as well. They got along on it. It wasn't a good solid three meals by any means.

胡佛先生凭借过去的经验，很快就理解了当时的形势。
他意识到，如果德国人没有食物（我不在乎谁给他们吃的），如果他们没有食物，即使有刺刀，我们也留不住。
这在现代社会是无法容忍的。
如果我们想要和平占领，如果我们想要让德国人重返国际社会，首先就必须给他们提供食物，不能太多，但必须足够他们生存。
柏林的配给量是每天1560卡路里，大约相当于你我现在，或者说当时，每天食物摄入量的一半。
他们靠着这笔钱勉强维持生活。
无论如何，这都算不上一顿丰盛的三餐。

One of the first steps we had to take was because we needed coal worse than anything else, except food, and we didn't have any coal. The Ruhr mines had to be mined if we were going to get the factories started, and we found that the miners couldn't mine coal on 1560 calories or even 1800, so one of the first steps we took was to raise the calorie level for the miners to 4000 calories, against great protest, obviously. Then the next step we had to take was to search the miners when they went home every night, because they were dividing their 4000 calories with their families. Well, from the humanitarian point of view that's fine, but it couldn't work, and so we had to strip them of food and they had to eat it themselves. So it was that kind of decisions we had to face.

我们不得不采取的首要措施之一是，除了食物，我们比什么都更需要煤炭，而我们却没有煤炭。
如果我们要开工，就必须开采鲁尔区的煤矿。
我们发现，矿工们每天只摄入1560卡路里，甚至1800卡路里都无法采煤，所以我们采取的首要措施之一就是将矿工的每日摄入量提高到4000卡路里，这显然遭到了强烈抗议。
接下来，我们必须采取的措施是，每天晚上矿工回家时对他们进行搜查，因为他们要把4000卡路里的食物分给家人。
从人道主义的角度来看，这当然没问题，但根本行不通，所以我们不得不剥夺他们的食物，让他们自己吃。
我们不得不面对的就是这样的抉择。

So Mr. Hoover made his survey, went over the findings with me, and then he went to three or four of these other countries which were pleading that they wanted the food. The worst thing in the world from their point of view was to feed their former enemies. And so the decision had to be made, and was made, that the allies, most of them, while not well off with food, weren't starving. We did furnish some food to them, and certainly later under the Marshall plan they got food, but the basic decision was made that we had to feed the Germans, that they were the worst off, and we had to send food to them. And it was Mr. Hoover and his influence with the Republican Congress and his report to them, privately as well as his published report, that did the trick. He and I saw the head of the appropriations committee, and things like that, and he appeared before them, I believe; I certainly did.

于是，胡佛先生进行了调查，并与我一起讨论了调查结果，然后他去了其他三四个恳求获得这些食物的国家。
在他们看来，世界上最糟糕的事情就是给他们昔日的敌人提供食物。
因此，我们必须做出决定，而且我们也确实做出了决定：盟军，其中大多数，虽然食物匮乏，但不会挨饿。
我们确实给他们提供了一些食物，后来在马歇尔计划下，他们当然也得到了食物，但基本的决定是我们必须给德国人提供食物，因为他们境况最差，所以我们必须给他们提供食物。
正是胡佛先生在共和党国会的影响力，以及他私下向国会提交的报告和公开报告，才起了作用。
他和我见了拨款委员会的负责人，诸如此类的事情，我相信他也出现在他们面前；我当然也见过。

And that was the one part of the appropriation, as I remember it, that the Senator from New Hampshire, who was chairman of the appropriations committee, accepted in its entirety, with Mr. Hoover's word for it – and then it was appropriated by the House of Representatives, too, and we got every dollar of the request we made.

我记得，这是拨款委员会主席、新罕布什尔州参议员全盘接受的拨款部分，胡佛先生也同意了。
之后，众议院也批准了拨款，我们得到了我们请求的每一分钱。

Then the food had to be bought. It turned out in '46-'47, that year, worldwide, including the United States, that the crops were very poor, and Tracy Voorhees did the buying for the Government for the food, or directed it, and had great difficulty to find the food, to find wheat and corn and the other basic things, and he finally shipped one crop which was in surplus, potatoes, and we got a good many shiploads of potatoes. Those you had to get over in a hurry and use in a hurry or they'd spoil. But I give Mr. Hoover and Tracy Voorhees very high marks – and Mr. Truman the President, who backed us to the limit – for the fact that we were able to prevent most of the threatened starvation, although there were plenty of deaths from hunger and cold because there was no coal for heating, and comparatively little food, so that disease took the old people off pretty easily. So while there were many deaths that undoubtedly had to do with lack of food, there wasn't rampant starvation. The fact that they got fed reasonably, small rations, but reasonably; and then the fact that we took their part in Berlin, against the Russians' willingness to starve them out at the time of the airlift, and at the time of the blockade, those two things together, in my judgment have now made the Germans among our most trusted allies.

然后就得买食物。
结果在1946-1947年，包括美国在内的世界各地，农作物都歉收。
特蕾西·沃希斯负责政府的粮食采购，或者说是指挥采购，却费了好大劲才找到粮食，小麦、玉米和其他基本粮食。
最后，他运来了一种过剩的作物——土豆，我们得到了好几船土豆。
这些土豆必须赶紧运过来，赶紧用，不然就会坏掉。
不过，我对胡佛先生和特蕾西·沃希斯——以及全力支持我们的杜鲁门总统——给予了高度评价，因为我们能够避免大部分饥荒的威胁，尽管由于没有煤炭取暖，食物相对匮乏，很多人死于饥饿和寒冷，疾病很容易夺走老年人的生命。
所以，虽然许多人的死亡无疑与食物短缺有关，但饥荒并没有蔓延开来。
他们得到了合理的食物，少量的口粮，但还算合理；而且我们在柏林支持他们，不顾俄国人在空运和封锁期间试图让他们挨饿的意愿。
在我看来，这两件事加在一起，使德国人现在成为我们最值得信赖的盟友之一。

HESS: What was the nature of the experiences that you had at that time working with the Soviet representatives that were in Germany? Were they difficult people to work with? Did they live up to agreements that were made?

赫斯：当时您与驻德国的苏联代表共事的经历如何？他们难相处吗？他们履行了达成的协议吗？

DRAPER: They were difficult people to work with, they didn't always live up to their agreements, but I greatly admired those that I worked with during the first year, particularly General Shabalin, who was my opposite member as the Russian member of the economic directorate. He had been a schoolteacher before World War I, had joined the army in World War I, stayed in the Army, became a general but was still a schoolteacher and a peasant at heart, and with it all, a fine person. I met him first about ten days after we got to Berlin. I was in General Clay's staff meeting – Saturday morning was our staff meeting – and he came to my office, I learned later, storming around because the day before he had had a pass to go to Frankfurt on one of our planes to see the city, and he had gone back this Saturday morning because the weather had been bad Friday, and they told him the pass had been rescinded by my order, which didn't happen to be true, but that's what they told him. And he came storming into my office to complain and to give me hell. When I came out of the staff meeting, he'd gone, but I learned all about his visit.

德雷珀：：他们很难共事，他们并不总是履行协议，但我非常钦佩第1年共事的那些人，尤其是沙巴林将军，他是经济理事会的俄罗斯成员，与我意见相左。
他在第1次世界大战前曾是一名教师，第1次世界大战期间参军，留在军队，后来成为一名将军，但他内心仍然是一名教师和农民，尽管如此，他仍然是一位优秀的人。
我第1次见到他是在我们抵达柏林大约十天后。
当时我参加了克莱将军的参谋会议——周六上午是我们的参谋会议——后来我才知道，他气冲冲地来到我的办公室，因为前一天他有一张去法兰克福的通行证，可以乘坐我们的飞机去那里观光，而他周六早上就回去了，因为周五天气不好。
他们告诉他，通行证已被我的命令吊销了。
虽然这并非事实，但他们就是这么告诉他的。
然后他气冲冲地冲进我的办公室抱怨，还把我骂了一顿。
我开完参谋会议出来时，他已经走了，但我了解了他来访的经过。

So after I had lunch I got my jeep and my Russian interpreter and went over to his headquarters. He wasn't there but I found his house, and I called there. At first he wouldn't let me in, he was so mad, but finally my interpreter made him understand that he could go to Frankfurt every day of the week as far as I was concerned, and I would see that he got there. So then he went a hundred percent the other way and said, “Kamerad,” put his arms around me, and said we had to celebrate this meeting of the two armies by my staying and having lunch with him. Well, I'd just finished a big lunch, but I figured in the interest of international camaraderie, I had to eat another lunch.

于是，吃完午饭后，我开着吉普车，带着俄语翻译去了他的指挥部。
他不在家，但我找到了他家，并打了电话给他。
起初他不让我进，气得不行，但最终我的翻译让他明白，只要我愿意，他一周七天都可以去法兰克福，我会确保他准时到达。
结果他却百分百地改变了主意，叫我“老友记”（Kamerad），然后搂住我，说为了庆祝两军会师，我必须留下来和他一起吃午饭。
我刚吃完一顿丰盛的午餐，但为了维护国际友谊，我想还是得再吃一顿。

I never suffered so much in my life for my country. Lunch started with a great big bowl of cabbage soup, and I thought maybe that was the lunch, but the next course was a big steak with four eggs on it.

我这辈子从未为国承受过这么多苦难。
午餐以一大碗卷心菜汤开始，我以为这顿饭就结束了，但下一道菜却是一大块牛排，上面放着四个鸡蛋。

Anyway, we made up, and we were good friends ever since. We didn't always agree, obviously. He'd get instructions one way and I'd get them another, but we always remained friends and I'm sure that he, and I think all of the other Russian generals that I dealt with, including even Marshal Zhukov and General (later Marshal) Sokolovsky, were looking forward to a peaceful solution, just as we were, and hoping to build a permanent peace, in contrast to the two world wars in thirty years, which we had just experienced.

不管怎样，我们和好了，从那以后我们一直是好朋友。
显然，我们并非总是意见一致。
他得到指示的方式不同，我得到指示的方式也不同，但我们始终是朋友。
我相信他，以及我认为所有我打过交道的俄罗斯将军，甚至包括朱可夫元帅和索科洛夫斯基将军（后来的元帅），都和我们一样，期待着和平解决，并希望建立永久和平，与我们刚刚经历的三十年两次世界大战形成鲜明对比。

But as our system of rapidly bringing the troops back home went on, the Russian attitude in Moscow, hardened steadily. Our so-called point system meant that the oldest ones in service, whether officers or enlisted men, unless they volunteered to stay, were railroaded home first.

但随着我们快速撤军回国的制度推行，莫斯科的俄罗斯态度却日益强硬。
我们所谓的积分制意味着，服役时间最长的士兵，无论是军官还是士兵，除非他们自愿留下，否则都会被优先送回国。

HESS: We lost our most experienced men first?

赫斯：我们最先失去的是经验最丰富的士兵？

DRAPER: Yes. As a result of that policy we were losing them pretty fast, and our equipment was being loaded and taken out and driven out, and taken out on ships, as fast as it could go.

德雷珀：是的。
由于这项政策，我们损失得相当快，我们的装备被尽可能快地装运、运出、运出，甚至装上船。

When the war ended I suppose that our military strength in Europe and Germany was greater than any similar military strength that had ever been concentrated in one spot before in the history of the world. Within six or eight or ten months as this point system operated, our military strength was – I won't say nil – but certainly not very great.

战争结束时，我认为我们在欧洲和德国的军事实力比世界历史上任何集中在同一地点的军事实力都要强大。
在积分制实施后的六个月、八个月或十个月内，我们的军事实力——我不会说是零——但肯定不是很强。

HESS: Greatly reduced.

赫斯：大幅削弱。

DRAPER: Tremendously reduced, and the Russians could see that as well as we could.

德雷珀：大幅削弱，俄国人和我们一样都看到了这一点。

HESS: Could you see a change in their attitude?

赫斯：你觉得他们的态度有什么变化吗？

DRAPER: Without any question. After about a year, instead of being fairly reasonable – they never were truly reasonable, but at least you could get along with them – but then it became nyet instead of saglasin, no instead of yes, almost invariably. They undoubtedly thought back in Moscow at that time that they were going to conquer Europe, move across the rest of Europe to the channel. And I think that when the Korean war started that's what they had in mind doing as soon as they could.

德雷珀：毫无疑问。
大约一年后，他们不再相当通情达理——他们从来都不是真正通情达理的，但至少你还能和他们相处——但后来几乎总是用“nyet”（不）而不是“saglasin”（萨格拉辛），用“no”（不）而不是“yes”（是）。
当时在莫斯科，他们无疑想征服欧洲，横跨欧洲其他地区直抵英吉利海峡。
我认为，朝鲜战争爆发时，他们也想尽快实现这个目标。

A map had been put out by our State Department that showed the perimeter that we were going to defend, and it did not include Korea. I think we fooled the Russians as well as ourselves. And when Truman made perhaps the greatest decision of his life, to go back and fight in Korea, which he did within twenty-four hours of their attack, the United Nations soon endorsed his decision and our Congress came along later. But it was President Truman personally that made that decision. He acted, and fooled the Russians. We weren't too ready for it ourselves, but we prevented Europe being taken over – or rather he did – by that action.

我们国务院公布了一张地图，标出了我们要防守的边界，但不包括朝鲜半岛。
我认为我们欺骗了我们自己，也欺骗了俄罗斯人。
杜鲁门做出了或许是他一生中最重要的决定——回朝鲜作战——他在朝鲜战争爆发后的24小时内就这么做了。
联合国很快批准了他的决定，我们的国会随后也加入了进来。
但做出这个决定的是杜鲁门总统本人。
他采取了行动，欺骗了俄罗斯人。
我们自己对此并没有做好充分的准备，但我们阻止了欧洲被占领——或者更确切地说，是他阻止了欧洲被占领。

HESS: You have mentioned the Morgenthau plan. I also understand there was a Draper plan, and it was your belief that the German economy could not be restored under the agriculture and light industry plan of Henry Morgenthau. Tell me about your plan.

赫斯：您提到了摩根索计划。
我还了解到还有一个德雷珀计划，而您认为在亨利·摩根索的农业和轻工业计划下，德国经济无法恢复。
请跟我讲讲您的计划。

DRAPER: I never heard of a Draper plan in Germany. Later on there was one that was called that in Japan.

德雷珀：：我从未听说过德国有德雷珀计划。
后来日本有了一个叫这个名字的计划。

The Morgenthau plan was unfortunate; it was based on vengeance plus the theory that the Germans had started World War I; perhaps they had, but they were paying for it anyway, and they had certainly started World War II. And Mr. Morgenthau was of the opinion that Germany should be prevented from having the where withal to ever start another war, and he persuaded President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill to agree to his proposals. He believed that if the Germans were limited to growing food and to light industry and were not permitted any substantial amount of steel production or other basic industrial production, and not permitted to build ships or any of the other things that are required for war, even when on a peacetime basis, that they would be kept perpetually and forever in a condition impossible for them to wage war.

摩根索计划很不幸；它建立在复仇心理的基础上，还认为是德国人发动了第1次世界大战；也许他们确实发动了，但他们无论如何都要为此付出代价，而且他们肯定发动了第2次世界大战。
摩根索先生认为应该阻止德国拥有发动另一场战争的财力，他说服了罗斯福总统和丘吉尔先生同意他的建议。
他认为，如果德国人被限制在粮食种植和轻工业领域，而不允许进行大量的钢铁生产或其他基础工业生产，也不允许建造船舶或任何其他战争所需的东西，即使是在和平时期，他们也会永远处于无法发动战争的状态。

That also would be in a condition which would become impossible for the Germans to exist unless somebody helped them and provided the necessities of life. It became evident to us very quickly that this was the case, and that if we carried out literally the terms of the very famous Morgenthau directive, the United States would have to support Germany for the rest of time or as long as that policy stayed in effect. And so, we had to wiggle here and waggle there and do the best we could without openly breaking our directive to permit the German economy to begin to function. We argued with this one and argued with that one here in Washington and in Germany, wherever we had the chance, and bit by bit, we recouped or revised the situation so that it became possible.

这也意味着，除非有人帮助他们，提供生活必需品，否则德国人将无法生存。
我们很快就意识到了这一点，如果我们完全按照著名的摩根索指令执行，美国就必须在剩余时间内，或者只要该政策仍然有效，就必须支持德国。
因此，我们不得不东拉西扯，尽力而为，但又不公开违反允许德国经济开始运转的指令。
我们在华盛顿和德国，只要有机会，我们就与各方争论不休，一点一点地扭转或修正了局面，使之成为可能。

A Dr. Calvin Hoover from Duke University came over. He was a very fine international economist, who is still alive. Although he only had a limited period of service, a few months, we asked him under the directive to draft up a potential possible level of industry plan. He did that very effectively, but from the point of view of the directive, and so under duress, under pressure. And it was his plan that with some modifications was finally adopted by the quadripartite government for Germany. The levels were changed some.

杜克大学的卡尔文·胡佛博士来访。
他是一位非常优秀的国际经济学家，至今仍在世。
尽管他的任期有限，只有几个月，但我们根据指令请他起草一份潜在的工业水平计划。
他的做法非常有效，但从指令的角度来看，他是在胁迫和压力之下做出的。
他的计划经过一些修改后，最终被德国四国政府采纳。
水平也做了一些调整。

We were more hardboiled than anybody except the Russians. The British were the most sensible. The French were even better than we were, although they were pretty severe, too. The Russians went even beyond the Morgenthau plan. They were basing their tough attitude on the fact that their whole country had been ravaged and millions of their people killed. They had been invaded, and you have a certain point of view when that happens. They were there to take it out on Germany, I guess, and we were pretty near as bad, although we hadn't been invaded.

除了俄国人，我们比任何人都强硬。
英国人最理智。
法国人甚至比我们强硬，尽管他们也相当严厉。
俄国人甚至超越了摩根索的计划。
他们之所以采取强硬态度，是因为他们整个国家都遭到蹂躏，数百万人丧生。
他们被入侵了，当这种情况发生时，你会有某种特定的看法。
我想，他们来这里是为了把气撒在德国身上，我们的情况也差不多一样糟糕，尽管我们没有被入侵。

Anyway, the level of industry was finally determined on a level that didn't last long; it wasn't realistic. It took about two years to change. It was after I was back in Washington as Under Secretary before that directive was finally officially revoked.

无论如何，工业水平最终确定在一个不会持续太久的水平上；这不现实。
大约花了两年时间才改变。
直到我回到华盛顿担任副国务卿后，这项指令才最终正式撤销。

In the meantime, we didn't pay as much attention to it as perhaps we should from the point of view of military discipline. There were several efforts to pull me back and have me charged with not carrying out the directive.

与此同时，从军纪的角度来看，我们对此并没有给予应有的重视。
有人多次试图将我拉回来，并指控我未执行指令。

General Clay always defended me. He knew perfectly well that such a policy couldn't last just as well as I did. We fought it out and finally persuaded Washington. General Marshall himself defended me in testimony before a Congressional Committee. So, it finally worked out. The real turning point came when the currency was devalued or revalued in 1948. At that time we gave the Russians the opportunity to do the same to revalue the mark in their sector, in their zone; they refused. I was back in Washington before this – when they walked out of the four power council meeting – the Kommanditura. A few days later they declared the blockade of Berlin.

克莱将军总是为我辩护。
他非常清楚，像我一样，这样的政策不可能持久。
我们进行了一番斗争，最终说服了华盛顿。
马歇尔将军亲自在国会委员会作证时为我辩护。
所以，最终成功了。
真正的转折点出现在1948年货币贬值或升值的时候。
当时，我们给了俄国人同样的机会，让他们也在他们的防区、他们的区域重新评估马克；但他们拒绝了。
在此之前，我回到了华盛顿——当时他们退出了四大国理事会会议——“Kommanditura”。
几天后，他们宣布封锁柏林。

HESS: Which we will get to in just a minute. Did you ever discuss the Morgenthau plan with its author, with Henry Morgenthau?

赫斯：我们马上就会谈到。
你和摩根索计划的作者亨利·摩根索讨论过吗？

DRAPER: Yes, I had a session with him before I went to Germany and he gave me his views. At that time I didn't have any very clear cut views myself, one way or the other. I hadn't been in Germany except on that Ford Peace Expedition I spoke of many years before. I had gone through Germany from Sweden to Holland in a locked car with all the other peace seeking delegates, guarded by German bayonets and with signs saying that we were spies and the soldiers shouldn't talk to us. So that was my only former visit to Germany. So I didn't, at that time, do anything but listen. I don't think I ever talked to him about it during the period of the occupation, but I did since, before his death, and he and I didn't agree.

德雷珀：是的，我去德国之前和他谈过，他向我表达了他的观点。
当时我自己并没有什么非常明确的观点。
除了多年前我提到的福特和平远征队之外，我没去过德国。
我和其他寻求和平的代表们一起，坐上一辆上锁的车，从瑞典穿过德国到了荷兰，一路上德军用刺刀把守，还挂着牌子说我们是间谍，士兵不得与我们交谈。
那是我之前唯一一次访问德国。
所以当时我什么也没做，只是听着。
德国占领期间我好像没跟他谈过这件事，但自从他去世前我就谈过了，而且我们意见不合。

HESS: What did he say? Did he realize that you were there in Germany and not really going along with his plan?

赫斯：他说了什么？他意识到你当时在德国，而且并没有真正按照他的计划行事吗？

DRAPER: Oh, I'm sure he did.

德雷珀：：哦，我肯定他意识到了。

HESS: Did he say anything of that nature when you spoke to him later?

赫斯：后来你和他谈话的时候，他有没有说过类似的话？

DRAPER: Yes, in a more or less friendly fashion we agreed that we had been in complete disagreement. By that time the whole situation had changed, of course. He was no longer in office either.

德雷珀：：是的，我们以差不多友好的方式承认了我们之间完全没有达成一致。
当然，到那时整个局势已经发生了变化。
他当时也已经卸任了。

HESS: That's right. What were his views? Did he think his plans should have been adhered to, that things would have been better off if Germany had been turned into an agricultural nation?

赫斯：没错。
他当时是怎么想的？他是否认为他的计划应该坚持下去，如果德国变成一个农业国，情况会更好？

DRAPER: I would think probably so. He certainly wasn't giving any ground, but it was a friendly conversation. But it was past history by that time.

德雷珀：：我想可能是这样。
他当然没有做出任何让步，但那是一次友好的谈话。
不过那已经是过去的事情了。

HESS: Anything else before we move on to the period of time that you were military government adviser to General Marshall in Moscow?

赫斯：在我们继续谈您在莫斯科担任马歇尔将军军事政府顾问的那段时间之前，还有什么要问的吗？

DRAPER: No, that was while I was still in Germany. I think we went to Moscow in December 1946 and were there about eight weeks. The conference ended earlier than this memo would indicate.

德雷珀：：不，那时我还在德国。
我记得我们是在1946年12月去的莫斯科，在那里待了大约八周。
会议结束的时间比这份备忘录上写的要早。

HESS: Oh, I see. I had the wrong dates down here.

赫斯：哦，我明白了。
我记错日期了。

DRAPER: I figure the conference ended in February.

德雷珀：：我估计会议是在02月份结束的。

HESS: December through February.

赫斯：12月到02月。

DRAPER: February, maybe March.

德雷珀：：02月，也许03月。

HESS: Tell me about the conference. What comes to mind when you look back on that conference, and the Russians' attitude?

赫斯：跟我说说那次会议吧。
回想起那次会议，以及俄国人的态度，你会想到什么？

DRAPER: It was one of the most interesting experiences of my life.

德雷珀：那是我一生中最有趣的经历之一。

We were there in Moscow for seven or eight weeks. We expected it to be much shorter, and it dragged out. They were most hospitable as far as the physical facilities went. They cleaned all their top people out of a hotel before we came and repainted it and, in effect, turned the hotel over to us. Nobody in Russia owned an automobile, of course, but they had assigned automobiles to all their top people, generals and government officials, but they took them away from many of them for us. Each one of us had a car and a driver assigned to us. Food was scarce for the population but not for us. We had everything we could ask for including very scarce fresh eggs. They did everything they could to be hospitable.

我们在莫斯科待了七八周。
我们原以为时间会短得多，结果却拖延了很久。
就物质条件而言，他们热情好客。
在我们来之前，他们把酒店里的所有高层人员都清理了出去，重新粉刷了酒店，实际上就是把酒店交给了我们。
当然，俄国人没有人拥有汽车，但他们为所有高层、将军和政府官员都配备了汽车，而他们把其中许多人的汽车都从我们这里拿走了。
我们每个人都配备了一辆车和一名司机。
当地民众食物匮乏，但我们却很方便。
我们什么都有，包括非常稀缺的新鲜鸡蛋。
他们竭尽所能地热情好客。

General Marshall was our representative. Molotov was usually speaking for the Russian. [Aneurin] Bevin, the British coalminer who became Foreign Secretary, was British representative and the star performer, I would say, of the whole show. The Frenchman was good, too. It was a battle of wits and a battle of nations for several weeks.

马歇尔将军是我们的代表。
莫洛托夫通常代表俄国人发言。
[安奈林]贝文，这位后来成为外交大臣的英国煤矿工人，是英国代表，我想说，他是整场会议的明星。
法国人也表现得不错。
这是一场持续数周的智慧较量和国家间的较量。

The basic differences, of course, were obvious between the Russians and the other three. Bevin told them off several times. He was the only one, he said, of all of them, in spite of what the Russians were saying, that ever really worked at a job such as the mines. He knew what the working man's needs were better than they did, and yet he saw it from a democratic point of view and not a dictator's – but he was absolutely frank. The differences of opinion were very, very real, and not very much agreement was reached. In spite of putting out statements from time to time that looked reasonably favorable, there wasn't much really accomplished. About half way through the conference, the question of our supporting the Greeks and the Turks came up when it was announced by President Truman. General Marshall, of course, was our Secretary of State and was there with us. He was involved very definitely in the new Truman Doctrine and the Russians were supporting the other side. So it was a very open split. General Marshall handled himself beautifully.

当然，俄国人与其他三人之间的根本分歧显而易见。
贝文多次斥责他们。
他说，尽管俄国人嘴上说着什么，但他是唯一一个真正在矿井这样的工作上付出过努力的人。
他比工人更了解他们的需求，但他是从民主的角度而不是独裁者的角度看待问题——但他绝对坦诚。
意见分歧非常非常真实，最终并没有达成多少共识。
尽管各方不时发表一些看似有利的声明，但实际上并没有取得多少成果。
会议进行到一半左右时，杜鲁门总统宣布我们支持希腊和土耳其的问题被提了出来。
当然，马歇尔将军当时是我们的国务卿，他和我们在一起。
他肯定参与了新的杜鲁门主义，而苏联则支持另一方。
所以这是一次非常公开的分裂。
马歇尔将军处理得非常好。

I often got to see Averell Harriman who was our Ambassador in Moscow then. He had also been our Ambassador in 1945, when I had gone to Moscow the first time in the fall of '45 as Acting Chairman of the Reparations Commission. At that time I really had the chance to really know Mr. Harriman. I had met him a few times before. He had the picture of the Russians' real ambition and real lack of desire to come to friendly terms, of peaceful friendly relations with the United States. Earlier, I think, than any other of our diplomats or officials. I had certainly gotten from him in September of 1945, a picture of Russia as it's turned out to really be, far better than from anyone else. At that time, General Clay and I had tended to discount his point of view, because in Germany we both were hoping and thinking and wishing that we were going to reach a peaceful solution between our two countries. I don't think Harriman thought that at all, because he had seen the Russians operating from behind the scenes through a good part of the war.

我经常见到当时担任我国驻莫斯科大使的埃夫里尔·哈里曼。
1945年秋天，我第1次以赔偿委员会代理主席的身份前往莫斯科，他也是当时的我国大使。
那时我才真正有机会了解哈里曼先生。
我之前见过他几次。
他了解俄国人的真正野心，以及他们真正缺乏与美国达成友好协议、建立和平友好关系的意愿。
我想，他比我们其他任何外交官或官员都更早地了解了这一点。
1945年09月，我从他那里了解到了一幅关于俄罗斯的真实画面，后来证明，这比任何其他人都更清晰。
当时，克莱将军和我倾向于轻视他的观点，因为在德国，我们都希望、思考并期盼着我们两国能够达成和平解决方案。
我认为哈里曼根本不这么想，因为他亲眼目睹了苏联人在战争的大部分时间里在幕后操纵。

To go back to the foreign ministers' meeting, we discussed the whole future of Europe, and indirectly how the United States and Russia would be living together after the war. We didn't get very far, in fact it was at the Moscow Conference that the Cold War really started. So the foreign ministers had to have another meeting in Paris a year later, as I remember, to try to patch things up. So we just went on, each side going their own way more and more.

回到外交部长会议，我们讨论了整个欧洲的未来，并间接地讨论了战后美国和俄罗斯将如何共存。
我们并没有取得多大进展，事实上，冷战的真正开始是在莫斯科会议上。
所以，我记得，外交部长们不得不在一年后在巴黎再次举行会议，试图弥合分歧。
就这样，双方各行其是，越来越各行其是。

HESS: Not too long after General Marshall's return was the date of his speech at Harvard University. It was on June 5th, the famous Marshall Plan speech. At the time that the foreign ministers' meeting was going on, was there very much discussion about the necessity for a massive aid plan in all of Europe, such as the Marshall Plan came to be?

赫斯：马歇尔将军回国后不久，就在哈佛大学发表了演讲。
那是06月05日，他发表了著名的马歇尔计划演讲。
在外交部长会议期间，是否讨论过是否有必要在整个欧洲实施一项大规模援助计划，就像后来的马歇尔计划一样？

DRAPER: No, there were some off-the-record backroom discussions, many of those, as to what was going to happen in Western Europe including Germany. But I was surprised when the Marshall Plan was announced. I remember being at a garden party on a Sunday in Germany when someone came and handed me the press release that had just come off the wire of General Marshall's speech at Harvard. It was something that I knew very little about until that happened. Later on, of course I participated a great deal as the Plan developed.

德雷珀：不，确实有一些非正式的幕后讨论，其中很多是关于西欧（包括德国）未来走向的。
但马歇尔计划宣布时，我还是感到很惊讶。
我记得在德国的一个周日花园派对上，有人递给我一份刚刚发布的新闻稿，内容是马歇尔将军在哈佛大学的演讲。
在那之前，我对这件事知之甚少。
后来，我当然积极参与了该计划的制定。

HESS: Which we will get to. I believe your last duty as a military government official was in connection with the British-American conference on the Ruhr coal production which was held here in town in August of 1947. We've mentioned that earlier this morning, but could you expand on that? What do you recall about that particular conference? Why was it called, what was its importance, and what was its outcome?

赫斯：这个我们稍后会谈到。
我记得您作为军政府官员的最后一次工作是参与了1947年08月在鲁尔区举行的英美煤炭生产会议。
我们今天上午早些时候提到过，您能详细谈谈吗？您对那次会议有什么印象？它为什么叫这个名字？它的重要性是什么？它的结果是什么？

DRAPER: There were over the months many discussions of what should happen to the Ruhr coal. There were claims on it from almost every one of our allies. The need for more coal was very evident, and there was more coal there than anywhere else in Europe. Why the meeting was called in Washington rather than in Germany I didn't know at the time, and don't know now. I suppose our own Government officials including the Under Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, wanted to find out why the coal production wasn't rising quicker, and why we weren't able to meet the requests of our allies. One of the things that we had a specific directive on in the early days, and I think it was signed by Churchill and Roosevelt personally, was that a very large part of the coal in the Ruhr (and this was before much was being mined) had to go to Belgium and France, and we couldn't carry it out. Germany simply couldn't have existed if some of that coal, or even the bulk of that coal, which was very little, very much less than the requirements, didn't go into German industry. We fought that battle out with Washington and finally won it. But at the time of the coal conference this was still simmering and still a problem, and I presume that's why this meeting was held in Washington.

德雷珀：几个月来，关于如何处理鲁尔区煤炭资源的讨论一直不断。
几乎我们所有的盟友都对那里的煤炭资源提出了要求。
对更多煤炭的需求显而易见，而那里的煤炭储量比欧洲其他任何地方都多。
为什么会议在华盛顿而不是德国召开，我当时并不清楚，现在也不清楚。
我想，包括陆军部副部长肯尼斯·罗亚尔在内的我们自己的政府官员都想知道，为什么煤炭产量没有更快地增长，以及为什么我们无法满足盟友的要求。
早期我们接到过一项具体的指令，我记得这项指令是由丘吉尔和罗斯福亲自签署的，那就是鲁尔区的大部分煤炭（当时还没有大量开采）必须运往比利时和法国，而我们无法执行这项指令。
如果部分煤炭，甚至大部分（数量极少，远低于需求）没有进入德国工业，德国根本就不可能存在。
我们与华盛顿进行了这场斗争，并最终赢得了胜利。
但在煤炭会议召开时，这个问题仍然悬而未决，仍然是一个问题，我想这就是这次会议在华盛顿举行的原因。

The meeting was going very well. We had settled all the various issues, and just about the time we were coming to a conclusion, Mr. Royall called me one morning and said that Mr. Robert Patterson, the Secretary of War, had just called him to tell him that he had just resigned, and was leaving Washington that day. His money had run out completely, he had borrowed all he could on his life insurance policies, and he had to go back to work in order to be able to support his family. He didn't put it that way publicly, obviously.

会议进展顺利。
我们解决了所有问题，就在我们即将得出结论的时候，一天早上，罗亚尔先生打电话给我，说战争部长罗伯特·帕特森先生刚刚打电话告诉他，他刚刚辞职，当天就要离开华盛顿。
他的钱已经花光了，他的人寿保险已经借光了所有钱，为了养家糊口，他必须回去工作。
显然，他没有公开这么说。

Judge Patterson had come to this conclusion that very morning when his secretary brought in the figures. He called the President and said, “I'd like to come over and see you.” And when he dial he told him that he was retiring, resigning, and leaving Washington the same day. Before he saw the President, he told Mr. Royall about this, who was his Under Secretary. He also had told him that if the President asked him for a recommendation he was going to recommend Mr. Royall as Secretary.

帕特森法官当天早上秘书带来数据时就得出了这个结论。
他打电话给总统说：“我想过来看看你。
”拨通电话后，总统告诉他，他将于当天退休、辞职并离开华盛顿。
在见到总统之前，他把这件事告诉了副国务卿罗亚尔先生。
他还告诉总统，如果总统请他推荐，他会推荐罗亚尔先生担任国务卿。

Kenneth Royall called me to tell me this and to say that if this happened that same day, he was going to have to move over to the Secretary's office, and would I be good enough for three or four days to just cover his desk and handle what papers I could and those that I couldn't, come and see him about. I said I shouldn't really do this because I was in uniform and this was a civilian job. “Well,” he said, “you'll be just doing this on my behalf, so don't worry about that.” This all did happen, and he became Secretary. Three or four days later he asked me to stay at the desk and take over and become Under Secretary, provided the President approved, and if I was confirmed by the Senate. I said I would have to talk to General Clay first, who was my commander. I was reporting to him, and this was going to twist the relationship all the way around. So I did talk to General Clay on the long distance telephone and he said, “Sure, go ahead.” So I did become Under Secretary.

肯尼斯·罗亚尔打电话告诉我这件事，说如果这件事当天就发生，他就得去部长办公室了，问我能不能帮他三四天，帮他守着办公桌，处理我能处理的文件，不能处理的文件，都去找他。
我说我不应该这么做，因为我穿的是制服，这是一份文职工作。
“好吧，”他说，“你只是代表我处理这件事，所以不用担心。
”事情果然发生了，他成了部长。
三四天后，他让我继续待在办公桌旁，接任副部长，前提是总统批准，并且得到参议院的确认。
我说我必须先和我的指挥官克莱将军谈谈。
我向他汇报，这件事会彻底改变我们之间的关系。
所以我通过长途电话和克莱将军谈了，他说：“好的，请便。
”就这样，我就成了副部长。

HESS: This was in August of 1947?

赫斯：那是1947年08月吗？

DRAPER: I guess so. I don't remember the exact date.

德雷珀：：我想是的。
我不记得具体日期了。

HESS: As a Republican, what are your views on Mr. Truman's understanding of the political importance of having members of the opposition party represented in high Government office?

赫斯：作为一名共和党人，您如何看待杜鲁门先生对反对党成员在政府高级职位中任职的政治重要性的理解？

DRAPER: I don't think I ever discussed the question with him. He certainly knew what benefit President Roosevelt had derived from appointing Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox. But I wasn't appointed as a Republican, I'm sure, as far as Mr. Truman was concerned, nor General Royall either.

德雷珀：：我想我从未与他讨论过这个问题。
他当然知道罗斯福总统任命史汀生先生和诺克斯先生有什么好处。
但我确信，就杜鲁门先生而言，我和罗亚尔将军并非以共和党人的身份被任命的。

General Royall and I had worked closely together when he and I were serving together, during the year or more that I had been in Washington before I went to Germany, working on contract termination, and when he was working on various matters on the staff. So we had gotten to be rather close friends. I was back there and working under his jurisdiction on this coal conference. He was participating in that, and he simply thought, “Here is a fellow that I have confidence in; he knows the situation in Germany; he hasn't been to Japan, but those are our two big occupation problems, and why wouldn't he be the right fellow to have here.” It had nothing to do with whether I was a Republican or a Socialist or a Democrat.

罗亚尔将军和我曾密切合作，在我去德国之前在华盛顿的一年多时间里，我们一起处理合同终止事宜，而他则负责参谋部的各种事务。
所以我们成为了相当亲密的朋友。
我当时回到那里，在他的管辖下处理这次煤炭会议。
他参与了其中，他只是想，“这是我信任的人；他了解德国的情况；他没去过日本，但这是我们占领时期面临的两个重大问题，他为什么不适合来这里呢？”这与我是共和党人、社会主义者还是民主党人无关。

HESS: And I understand that shortly after your appointment you went over to Japan, is that correct?

赫斯：据我了解，您上任后不久就去了日本，对吗？

DRAPER: That's right. I had never met General MacArthur, but I had heard fantastic tales about him, and I figured that he would think, “Here's this fellow who's been in Germany and Germany's going to get a good deal of the favors if he's going to be the Under Secretary.” I thought the best thing for me to do if I was going to be evenhanded and have any influence in Japan on the occupation there, was to go to Japan right away. Mr. Royall had delegated to me under his basic responsibility, the operation of the three occupations. So I felt I'd better get right over there and come to terms with General MacArthur and let him know that I was ready to assist in any reasonable way to make the Japanese occupation a success. I think it was the right thing to have done.

德雷珀：没错。
我从未见过麦克阿瑟将军，但我听说过一些关于他的奇闻轶事，我猜他会想：“这家伙去过德国，如果他当副部长，德国会得到很多好处。
”我认为，如果我要公平地对待日本，并在占领日本的事务上发挥影响力，最好的办法就是立即前往日本。
罗亚尔先生把三处占领行动的执行委托给我，这是他的基本职责。
所以我觉得我最好马上去那里，和麦克阿瑟将军谈好，让他知道我愿意以任何合理的方式协助他，确保占领日本的行动取得成功。
我认为这是正确的做法。

I arrived there. I informed him that I was coming. He was at the airport to meet me, which I believe was the first time he'd met any official from Washington. He took me right to lunch and I said, “What can I do to help?” Almost the first question he asked me was, “Could you find me somebody that knows something about running the economy of Japan, because I don't. And my military officers who are responsible for it don't either,” which was obvious and natural.

我到了那里，告诉他我要去。
他到机场接我，我想这是他第1次见到来自华盛顿的官员。
他直接带我去吃午饭，我问：“有什么我可以帮忙的吗？”他几乎第1个问题就是：“你能帮我找个懂日本经济管理的人吗？因为我不懂，负责日本经济的军官也不懂。
”这显而易见也很自然。

So my quest back here was to find such a man, and it took some months. Before I was able to solve that one, I took Paul Hoffman who was then president of Studebaker this was before the Marshall Plan – and Percy Johnston, the head of the Chemical Bank in New York, and three or four other businessmen as a group to Japan to make a report on just the kind of thing that I'd been up against in Germany. While it wasn't called the Morgenthau Plan, the economic order to MacArthur very closely paralleled those that went to Germany.

所以我回来后就一直想找到这样一个人，花了好几个月的时间。
在找到答案之前，我带着时任斯图贝克公司总裁的保罗·霍夫曼（那时是马歇尔计划之前）和纽约化学银行行长珀西·约翰斯顿以及其他三四位商人一起去日本，就我在德国遇到的类似情况做报告。
虽然当时没有叫摩根索计划，但交给麦克阿瑟的经济命令与交给德国的命令非常相似。

There was one big exception, a difference, and that was that contrary to the situation in Germany, there was a Japanese government. The fact that the Emperor had been permitted to stay and that the Japanese government continued in office, made it easier in many ways in Japan than in Germany to bring about a stable situation. But of course, General MacArthur was Emperor No. 1 and the other one was Emperor No. 2, actually General justified that position and that confidence in the eyes of the Japanese people, who had expected a cutthroat dictator; and instead they found a great administrator who fed them when there was no food, who was just but severe, and who merited and received their adulation. I guess that is the right word, and certainly he gained their great respect. Every morning when he, at a certain minute, would appear in his car to enter the Dai-Ichi Building where his headquarters were, there were hundreds of people gathered there. This went on for months and months, just to see him come in; and it was the same at night when he left.

有一个很大的例外，一个不同之处，那就是与德国的情况相反，当时有日本政府。
天皇获准留任，日本政府得以继续执政，这在许多方面使得日本比德国更容易实现稳定。
当然，麦克阿瑟将军是第1代天皇，另一位是第2代天皇。
实际上，这位将军在日本人民眼中证明了这一地位和信心的合理性。
他们原本期待着一位残酷的独裁者；然而，他们却找到了一位伟大的行政官，在粮食短缺时为他们提供食物，他公正而严厉，值得并得到了他们的崇拜。
我想，这词用得恰到好处，他无疑赢得了他们的崇敬。
每天早晨，当他准时出现在他的总部所在的第1大厦时，总会有数百人聚集在那里。
这种情况持续了数月，只为目睹他入职；而当他晚上离开时，也是如此。

I took this group of businessmen over, because I had become convinced from what I'd known in Germany and what I had learned in Japan in two or three visits, that the orders concerning the economy of Japan had to be changed. I took this group of businessmen there to buttress my own recommendations to the President and the Secretary of State and the Congress to change the instructions to MacArthur in Japan. There wasn't a wheel turning, they didn't have a pound of cotton to spin in their textile mills, arid while they had coal of a poor quality and water power, those were about their two assets. There are very few resources in Japan, natural resources, except the people themselves. Their whole economy is based on taking in raw materials and fashioning them and then selling them to the world. They do it pretty well, as you know. But then they had no raw material. They had no credit; they had no money; they had no way to buy raw materials, unless we provided them, and we weren't providing them. The place was, so far as industry was concerned, a morgue.

我带这群商人去日本，是因为我从德国的经历以及两三次日本之行中了解到的情况，确信有关日本经济的指令必须改变。
我带这群商人去日本，是为了向总统、国务卿和国会提出建议，要求他们修改对麦克阿瑟的指示。
当时日本经济停滞不前，纺织厂连一磅棉花都纺不出来，虽然他们有劣质煤和水力发电，但这几乎是他们的两大资产。
日本的资源，尤其是自然资源，除了人本身之外，非常匮乏。
他们的整个经济都建立在吸收原材料、加工制造，然后销往世界各地的基础上。
正如你们所知，他们在这方面做得很好。
但是他们当时没有原材料。
他们没有信贷；他们没有资金；他们没有办法购买原材料，除非我们提供，而我们并没有提供。
就工业而言，那里就像一座停尸房。

The orders were that General MacArthur was not responsible for the economy, that he had the authority, of course, but the real responsibility was that of the Japanese government, but they had no authority; they had no assets, no capital; so the thing was just falling between two stools. The Japanese yen was depreciating six or seven percent a month. The whole country was being fed and largely fed by us, but that's all you could say.

命令是麦克阿瑟将军不负责经济，当然他有权力，但真正的责任在于日本政府，但他们没有权力；他们没有资产，没有资本；所以事情只能两头不讨好。
日元每月贬值6%到7%。
整个国家都在养活，而且大部分是由我们养活的，但你只能说这些。

You spoke of the Draper plan, this plan, or this report that we made, that Paul Hoffman and Percy Johnston and the rest of the businessmen made after we spent had a month in Japan. The report we made resulted in the President changing the policy, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder was the first one to understand it, and the President also soon understood it fully. And it was then that I recommended to the President that Joe [Joseph M.] Dodge, who had been in charge of the finance division in Germany, and who had then had gone back to his Detroit bank, and became president of the American Banker's Association, be invited to go to Japan as a kind of economic czar. I had asked him but he wouldn't go before. Now the rules were changed, there was a chance to win, for the economy to recover but it took somebody with a lot of knowledge and a lot of guts to do it. General MacArthur had promised his complete support, which he always gave. So the President invited Dodge to come to Washington. He told me that morning before seeing the President that he wasn't going to take the job. The President saw him and Dodge had lunch with me and by that time he had taken the job.

你提到了德雷珀计划，这个计划，或者说是我们做的报告，是保罗·霍夫曼、珀西·约翰斯顿和其他商人在我们在日本待了一个月后做的。
我们做的报告导致总统根据国务卿的建议改变了政策。
财政部长约翰·斯奈德是第1个理解这个报告的人，总统很快也完全理解了。
正是那时，我向总统推荐，邀请乔·[约瑟夫·M·]·道奇（Joe[JosephM.]Dodge）前往日本，扮演经济沙皇的角色。
道奇曾在德国负责财务部门，后来回到底特律的银行，担任美国银行家协会会长。
我之前邀请过他，但他之前拒绝了。
现在规则变了，经济复苏有了胜算，但这需要一个拥有丰富知识和勇气的人来做。
麦克阿瑟将军承诺会全力支持，他也确实做到了。
于是总统邀请道奇来华盛顿。
那天早上，在见到总统之前，他告诉我他不会接受这份工作。
总统见了他，道奇和我一起吃了午饭，那时他已经接受了这份工作。

The same thing was almost true with Paul Hoffman whose wife recommended against his taking the Marshall plan job. He was offered the job while we were on the way back from Japan in Hawaii. He was on my plane and we got off in Honolulu and there was a phone call from the White House for Paul Hoffman. They got on the phone with him and said that the Congress had just passed the Economic Cooperation Plan for Europe, and the President wanted to sign it the next day, and at the same time to announce the new administrator was Paul Hoffman. So whoever it was in the White House said, “We'd like your answer on the telephone, please.” Paul said, “Well, you have my answer on the telephone. It's no!” And then they got me on the phone and said, “How soon can you get this fellow to Washington.” We flew to Los Angeles. I had dinner with him, stayed with his family that night, and his wife said, “No Paul, you can't take it.” He called his associates in South Bend at Studebaker and they said, “No, you and we are working together to pull this company out of trouble.” So we went to Washington together the next day. On the plane he said, “You see I can't do it.” So I said, “Well, we’ll have lunch after you have seen the President.” At lunch he said, “Well, the President's asked me to reconsider, so I'm going to talk again with my family.” So while we were still having lunch at the Army-Navy Club they brought in a report from the ticker tape saying the President had just announced the appointment of Hoffman as Administrator of the European Cooperation Program.

保罗·霍夫曼也遭遇了类似的情况，他的妻子建议他不要接手马歇尔计划的工作。
我们从日本返回夏威夷时，有人给他提供了这份工作。
他和我同机，我们在檀香山下飞机后，白宫打电话给保罗·霍夫曼。
他们打电话给他说，国会刚刚通过了《欧洲经济合作计划》，总统希望第2天签署，并同时宣布新任行政长官是保罗·霍夫曼。
于是，白宫的人说：“我们希望你在电话里得到答复。
”保罗说：“嗯，我在电话里已经给你答复了。
答案是不行！”然后他们打电话给我，问我：“你多久能把这家伙派到华盛顿来？”我们飞到了洛杉矶。
我和他一起吃了晚饭，那天晚上还和他家人待在一起，他妻子说：“不行，保罗，你不能接。
”他打电话给南本德斯图贝克公司的同事，他们说：“不，你和我们要一起努力，把公司从困境中拯救出来。
”于是第2天我们一起去了华盛顿。
在飞机上，他说：“你知道我做不到。
”我说：“好吧，等你见了总统之后我们再一起吃午饭。
”午饭时，他说：“总统让我重新考虑，所以我要再和家人谈谈。
”我们还在陆海军俱乐部吃午饭的时候，他们拿来了一份新闻报道，说总统刚刚宣布任命霍夫曼为欧洲合作计划署署长。

HESS: What did he say?

赫斯：他说了什么？

DRAPER: He was shocked, but he took it, and he told me no later than two weeks ago that that was the best thing that ever happened to him in his life. That was the kind of thing the President could get away with, and did, and it was part of his strength. He didn't have to do quite the same with Dodge.

德雷珀：他很震惊，但他接受了，并在两周前告诉我，这是他一生中遇到的最好的事情。
总统可以轻易做出这种事，而且他也确实这么做了，这是他优势的一部分。
他不必对道奇采取同样的措施。

Dodge did take the job, although somewhat reluctantly. Joe Dodge went out there to Japan and in six or eight months he had done the job.

道奇确实接受了这份工作，尽管有些不情愿。
乔·道奇去了日本，六到八个月就完成了任务。

We adopted a new policy which was sent by cable to General MacArthur, which made it possible for the economy to be revised, but it had to involve the farmers, the farm prices, agricultural production, the industrial production, and raw materials. It required a loan from the Export – Import Bank to provide them with cotton, which worked out very quickly. And it required Dodge to take care of the price relationships to increase taxes, and to put that economy back on a paying, balanced basis. And from a tremendous governmental deficit situation when Dodge went over, within six months to nine months he had balanced the Japanese budget, or rather he forced the Japanese government to balance its budget, but under his instructions.

我们采取了一项新政策，并通过电报发送给麦克阿瑟将军，这项政策使得经济调整成为可能，但必须涉及农民、农产品价格、农业生产、工业生产和原材料。
这项政策要求从进出口银行贷款，为他们提供棉花，这很快就奏效了。
此外，这还要求道奇处理价格关系，提高税收，使经济恢复收支平衡。
道奇上任时，日本政府面临巨额赤字，但在六到九个月内，他平衡了日本的预算，或者更确切地说，他迫使日本政府平衡了预算，但这是在他指示下进行的。

HESS: General, will you tell me a little about your interest in population control?

赫斯：将军，您能否简单谈谈您对人口控制的兴趣？

DRAPER: Population control may be the wrong word. It's a population problem and a population explosion and the question is what to do about it.

德雷珀：“人口控制”这个词可能不太恰当。
这是一个人口问题，人口爆炸，问题在于如何解决。

I got interested in this question of population when President Eisenhower appointed me in 1958 as Chairman of his Committee on Foreign Aid, Military Aid and Economic Aid. We found, the committee of ten, that in most of the developing countries their rate of population growth was such that it was interfering seriously with their economic development, particularly with any improvement in their per capita income. The whole purpose of economic foreign aid was to improve the lot of the individual members of society, especially down at the bottom and to improve per capita income. So if the population increase was offsetting any gain in a particular economy, and dividing it into that many more pieces, the only way to help was to cut down on the growth rate of the population, on a voluntary basis.

1958年，艾森豪威尔总统任命我为对外援助、军事援助和经济援助委员会主席，从那时起，我对人口问题产生了兴趣。
我们发现，这个十人委员会发现，大多数发展中国家的人口增长率过高，严重影响了经济发展，尤其是人均收入的提高。
经济对外援助的全部目的在于改善社会成员的命运，尤其是底层民众的福祉，并提高人均收入。
因此，如果人口增长抵消了某个经济体的任何增长，并将其分割成更多部分，那么唯一的帮助方式就是自愿降低人口增长率。
最终

Eventually, we recommended to President Eisenhower that our country through its aid program give help to population programs of foreign governments, on their request. To our surprise he turned down that request, because it was an election year and he thought that Senator Kennedy was going to be running for President. With the Catholic Bishops attacking this particular recommendation, President Eisenhower feared that if he approved our recommendation and if Kennedy, as a Catholic, attacked it this might split the American people on a religious issue in a national political campaign; and he thought this would be bad for the American people. </color>

，我们向艾森豪威尔总统建议，应外国政府的请求，通过我国的援助项目为其人口项目提供帮助。
令我们惊讶的是，他拒绝了这项请求，因为当时正值选举年，他认为肯尼迪参议员即将竞选总统。
由于天主教主教们对这项建议提出批评，艾森豪威尔总统担心，如果他批准了我们的建议，而肯尼迪作为一名天主教徒又对其进行批评，这可能会在全国性政治竞选中在宗教问题上分裂美国人民；他认为这对美国人民不利。

Later on he changed his mind, after he was no longer President, and published articles saying that not only private organizations but governments, and particularly our own Government, had to take an interest in this problem, if it was to be solved which it has been doing since.

后来，在他卸任总统后，他改变了主意，发表文章指出，如果要解决这个问题，不仅私人组织，而且政府，尤其是我们自己的政府，都必须关注这个问题，而这个问题自那以后一直在得到解决。

It was President Kennedy, a Catholic, who really started that program, and then President Johnson expanded it, and President Nixon has gone even farther in sending the Congress a special message on population. A special law was passed a year or more ago which is to take care of our own population problem here. It proposes to give birth control information and services to the five million women that are estimated to be too poor to afford family planning facilities themselves.

真正启动这项计划的是天主教徒肯尼迪总统，后来约翰逊总统对其进行了扩展，尼克松总统则更进一步，向国会发出了关于人口问题的特别信息。
一年多以前，一项特别法律通过，旨在解决我们自己的人口问题。
它提议向估计有500万名过于贫困、无力承担计划生育设施费用的妇女提供节育信息和服务。

Anyway, during this period, after President Eisenhower had changed his mind and was favorable, I asked him whether he would head up an honorary Council for the Planned Parenthood movement. He still was dubious about this, I guess for political reasons. Finally I asked him whether if President Truman – and I had no idea what Harry Truman thought about this problem, I had never discussed it with him – if President Truman, as the only other living ex-President, were willing to be an honorary co-chairman with him of Planned Parenthood, would that make a difference, would he then be willing to accept. He said, “If Harry will, I will.” So I trotted off to Independence, Missouri, where

总之，在这段时间里，艾森豪威尔总统改变主意表示赞成后，我问他是否愿意担任计划生育运动的荣誉委员会主席。
他对此仍然心存疑虑，我猜是出于政治原因。
最后，我问他，如果杜鲁门总统——我不知道哈里·杜鲁门对这个问题的看法，我从未与他讨论过——作为唯一一位在世的前总统，杜鲁门总统愿意与他一起担任计划生育运动的荣誉联合主席，情况会不会有所不同，他会愿意接受吗？他说：“如果哈里愿意，我也会。
”于是我便去了密苏里州的独立城，

President Truman had already invited me to come sometime to see his Library. I gave him President Eisenhower's regards and best wishes, and told him that President Eisenhower would only take on this honorary chairmanship if he would also do so.

杜鲁门总统已经邀请我找个时间去参观他的图书馆。
我转达了艾森豪威尔总统的问候和良好祝愿，并告诉他，艾森豪威尔总统只有自己也愿意担任这个荣誉主席，才会接受。

He said, “Well, if President Eisenhower is willing to, I don't know why I shouldn't.” And he did. And the two of their names and their influence and their later statements, from time to time, were of tremendous help in raising the whole level of the Planned Parenthood and world population movement to a much higher level.

他说：“好吧，如果艾森豪威尔总统愿意，我不知道为什么不应该。
”然后他就这么做了。
他们两人的名气、影响力以及他们后来不时发表的声明，对将计划生育和世界人口运动的水平提升到更高的水平起到了巨大的帮助。

HESS: General, one of the important things you had to deal with at the time that you were Under Secretary of the Army was the Berlin blockade. What was your involvement in that, and when did you first think that a blockade was probable?

赫斯：将军，您担任陆军副部长期间必须处理的重要事情之一就是柏林封锁。
您在那件事中扮演了什么角色？您什么时候第1次认为封锁可能会发生？

DRAPER: We knew for some weeks that this situation was rising, that trouble was brewing. We were having constant arguments in the quadripartite council in Berlin. I was in Washington. I stayed up several nights all night long as we followed these negotiations, partly because of the difference in time. Instructions had to be given almost momentarily, sometimes by scramble telephone or by cable. And we watched the rising emotion and the rising level of argument with the realization that we were perhaps moving even toward war with Russia.

德雷珀：几周前我们就知道情况正在恶化，麻烦即将来临。
我们在柏林的四方会议上不断争论。
我当时在华盛顿。
为了跟踪这些谈判，我连续几个晚上没睡，部分原因是时差。
指示必须几乎随时发出，有时是通过紧急电话或电报。
我们眼看着情绪高涨，争论愈演愈烈，意识到我们甚至可能正走向与俄罗斯的战争。

When finally the revaluation of the currency, of the German mark, was decided on by the three powers in order to put the economy back on a money basis rather than a ration basis – because up to that time, people had pockets full of paper money but unless they had a ration ticket to buy an overcoat or to get food (unless it was through the black market), they had no way to buy. The purpose was to squeeze the juice out of the overvalued currency and put it down to its real value. The result turned out later to be the right thing to have done. The goods came out of hiding and the economy began to get back on its feet.

最终，三个大国决定对德国马克进行货币重估，以便将经济重新置于货币基础而非配给基础之上——因为在那之前，人们口袋里塞满了纸币，但除非他们有配给券来买大衣或购买食物（除非通过黑市），否则他们根本买不起。
这样做的目的是榨干被高估的货币，使其恢复到真实价值。
结果证明，我们当时的做法是正确的。
货物从藏匿处重新出现，经济开始复苏。
但

But at the moment, the Russians refused to go along. We invited them and they refused. They walked out of the council one night, broke up the meeting, and trouble was obviously ahead. </color>

当时，俄罗斯人拒绝配合。
我们邀请他们，但他们拒绝了。
一天晚上，他们离开了会议，扰乱了会议秩序，显然麻烦来了。

I had planned at that time to make an inspection visit in Berlin and in Vienna, and had set up a trip and had my plane waiting. I left early one morning, with General [Albert C.] Wedemeyer, my chief planning officer at that time. We took off without knowing that the blockade was already on. We had our cables with us, that had accumulated during the night, and after we had breakfast on the plane, we read our cables and learned that the blockade was on. We were on our way to London.

当时我计划去柏林和维也纳视察，并安排好了行程，飞机也已等候。
一天清晨，我和当时的首席计划官魏德迈将军（AlbertC.Wedemeyer）一起出发。
我们起飞时并不知道封锁已经开始。
我们带着夜间积累的电报，在飞机上吃完早餐后，我们阅读了电报，得知封锁已经开始。
我们启程前往伦敦。

On the way over we planned the airlift. General Wedemeyer had had charge of the airlift over the hump in India earlier during the war, so he had a pretty good idea of what the different types of planes would carry in the way of tonnage, and how often a plane could land at an airport, through actual experience. I had negotiated in Berlin with the Russians for the feeding of Berlin some years before, for the British and American sectors, and later these included the French, so I knew the tonnage of food necessary on a ration level to feed the two and a half million people in those sectors of the city.

在途中，我们计划了空运。
魏德迈将军在战争初期曾负责印度的驼峰空运，因此，通过实际经验，他对不同类型飞机的运载吨位以及飞机在机场的降落频率都非常了解。
几年前，我曾在柏林与俄国人就柏林英美控制区（后来还包括法军控制区）的粮食供应问题进行谈判，所以我知道按配给量计算，要养活柏林这些地区的250万居民，需要多少吨粮食。

We both knew the number of planes we had in Europe. They were DC-3s, the old DC-3, or C-47 in Army parlance, the workhorse of the war. We had about a hundred of them. They would each carry about two and a half tons of food on a trip, and you had to allow about a two minute leeway for a landing during the day, and a little more at night, quite a little more at night. So we figured whether or not it was a physical possibility to feed that many people with that many planes, if we had the pilots and the airfields, and all the necessary organization was set up. We came to the conclusion that it was a possibility but not a sure thing, and that it was worth trying.

我们都知道我们在欧洲拥有的飞机数量。
它们是DC-3，老式的DC-3，或者用陆军术语来说，是C-47，是战争时期的主力飞机。
我们大约有一百架这样的飞机。
每架飞机每次可以运载大约2.5吨的食物，白天需要留出大约2分钟的着陆时间，夜间则需要多一点，甚至更多。
所以我们计算了一下，如果我们有飞行员、有机场，并且所有必要的组织都已建立，那么用这么多的飞机来养活这么多人是否真的有可能。
我们得出的结论是，这是有可能的，但并非万无一失，值得一试。

So when we got to London, Lewis Douglas who was our Ambassador there, met us and we arranged through him and he went with us to see Bevin, who was the Foreign Minister still, in London. We told him our plan, and he said, “All right, we'll add twenty-five planes.” All they had that were available. “We're all for it,” he said. “You never can make it work; you never can feed two or three million people from the air, but we'll make a great psychological impression. The Russians are trying to starve the Germans and we're trying to feed them. I'd suggest you take milk powder and chocolate and things of that kind for the women and children and make it as much of a psychological show as you can, and it will give us a little more time for negotiations. But it will never succeed.” We loaded up that plane at our Embassy with about two tons of food, and I guess I signed for it. They've never come back to ask me to pay yet. Then we went on to Paris. We didn't know what the French government's attitude would be. We found them just as much for it as we were, or as were the British. They had no planes to offer, but they would be backing it, and they had an airfield in Berlin and that would be at our disposal. It was [Georges] Bidault and [Robert] Schumann (one Prime Minister and the other Foreign Minister) that I talked to. So we had their blessing.

所以，我们到了伦敦后，时任我们驻伦敦大使的刘易斯·道格拉斯来接我们。
我们通过他安排，他陪我们去见了当时仍担任外交大臣的贝文。
我们把计划告诉了他，他说：“好吧，我们增加25架飞机。
”他们所有飞机都已准备就绪。
“我们完全赞成，”他说，“这永远不可能奏效；你永远不可能从空中喂饱两三百万人，但我们会造成巨大的心理冲击。
俄国人正试图饿死德国人，而我们正试图喂饱他们。
我建议你们带上奶粉、巧克力之类的东西给妇女儿童，尽可能地制造一场心理战，这样我们就能多一点时间进行谈判。
但这永远不会成功。
”我们在大使馆把大约两吨食物装上了飞机，我想我签了名。
他们到现在都没回来找我付款。
然后我们去了巴黎。
我们不知道法国政府会是什么态度。
我们发现他们和我们一样，或者说和英国人一样，都支持我们。
他们没有飞机可以提供，但会提供支持，而且他们在柏林有一个机场，可以供我们使用。
我和[乔治]比多（GeorgesBidault）和[罗伯特]舒曼（RobertSchumann）（一位是总理，另一位是外交部长）谈过。
所以我们得到了他们的支持。

In the meantime, I had talked to General Clay on the scramble telephone and had given him our figures and our conclusions. He had been doing similar figuring and he'd come to the same conclusion, that it was worth trying.

与此同时，我通过加密电话和克莱将军谈过，并向他提供了我们的数据和结论。
他也做过类似的计算，也得出了同样的结论，认为值得一试。

So we got to Berlin the next day, and General Clay called in his people and we exchanged thoughts and ideas and figures and he called in his Air Force commander and the airlift started a day or two later.

所以我们第2天就到了柏林，克莱将军召集了他的人手，我们交换了想法、方案和数据，他又召集了他的空军指挥官，空运在一两天后就开始了。

Then I flew down to Vienna. In Berlin the war clouds were everywhere. It was a question of what hour or day the war might break out. We didn't know. We got to Vienna and it was just as peaceful as Washington is today. It was the Fourth of July and our commanding general there was giving the usual Fourth of July garden party, and the Russians came and were toasting the Fourth of July just as much as we were.

然后我飞往维也纳。
柏林到处都是战争的阴云。
战争爆发的时间是什么时候，或者哪天。
我们当时并不知道。
我们到了维也纳，那里一片宁静，就像今天的华盛顿一样。
那天是07月04日，我们的指挥官照例举行了07月04日的花园派对，俄国人也来了，和我们一样庆祝07月04日。

Anyway, the airlift got started that way, and we nearly lost, actually. We were very close to defeat.

总之，空运就是这样开始的，实际上我们差点就输了。
我们差点就被打败了。

After about two or three months we almost ran out of food. We had about ninety days' supply of coal, and about thirty days' supply of food when this started. We should have stocked up more before. We really didn't visualize that this blockade was going to happen. We should have taken action earlier and stocked food, but we hadn't, at least not very much. We had about thirty days' of food and some 90 days of coal. Se we didn't have to worry about the coal right away.

大约两三个月后，我们的食物几乎耗尽。
战争爆发时，我们大约有九十天的煤炭储备和三十天的食物储备。
我们之前就应该多储备一些。
我们真的没有想到会发生这种封锁。
我们应该早点采取行动，储备食物，但我们没有，至少储备得不多。
我们大约有三十天的食物储备和九十天的煤炭储备。
所以我们不必马上担心煤炭的问题。

This started in early July. I would guess that it was about the end of August, when we were really running downhill. We weren't keeping even. We got down to three or four or five days' stock of food. So we had to face a strategic decision in Washington. There was one way we could save this situation if we were willing to take the risk, and that was to take all the DC-4s that we had around the world, Army planes and private airline planes, and substitute them for the DC-3s. The DC-4 will carry ten tons where the DC-3 carries two and a half. But it meant stripping our Army in Japan, it meant stripping our Army in Europe, and the airlines in the United States, of the only really available and useful carriage for troops if we were going to war. It would have meant a very real difference whether we had those planes immediately available or had to find a way to get them together again.

事情始于07月初。
我猜大概是08月底，那时我们真的每况愈下。
我们根本无法维持平衡。
我们的食物储备只够维持三四五天。
所以我们必须在华盛顿做出一个战略决策。
如果我们愿意冒险，有一个办法可以挽救局面，那就是把我们在世界各地的所有DC-4飞机，包括军用飞机和私人航空公司的飞机，都撤出来，用它们来代替DC-3。
DC-4可以运载10吨，而DC-3只能运载2.5吨。
但这意味着我们驻扎在日本的军队、驻扎在欧洲的军队以及美国各航空公司，一旦开战，就失去了唯一真正可用、最有用的运兵工具。
如果我们能立即使用这些飞机，还是必须想办法重新调配它们，那将带来巨大的改变。

But the decision was finally made to substitute, and we quietly stripped everywhere of these planes, and took them away from the airlines and the Army and sent them to Europe, substituted them, and put the DC-3s back in their place. They of course couldn't do the job of troop carrying that the others were capable of doing. So immediately the level of food shipments by air went up. And by that time, the coal was also running out, and so some of these were then made coal wagons, the most expensive coal wagons the world ever saw. We tried dropping the coal in chutes, or as it was into big nets, or on the ground. By the time it got near the ground it was powder and blew away and it didn't work at all, so we had to land the planes and unload them just like the food. I rode one of those coal wagons one day from Berlin to Frankfurt and it was quite an experience. But it began to work. Everything worked fine. The stocks were built up, the stockpiles of both food and coal.

但最终还是决定用替代的办法。
我们悄悄地把这些飞机从各地撤走，从航空公司和陆军手中撤走，派往欧洲，用DC-3飞机替代它们，然后重新启用。
DC-3飞机当然无法像其他飞机那样完成运兵任务。
因此，空运粮食的需求量立刻飙升。
那时，煤炭也快用完了，于是其中一些被改装成了煤车，那是世界上最昂贵的煤车。
我们尝试过用溜槽、大网或地面投煤。
煤炭落地后就变成了粉末，被风吹走了，根本行不通，所以我们不得不让飞机降落，像卸粮食一样卸下它们。
有一天，我乘坐一辆这样的煤车从柏林到法兰克福，那真是一次难忘的经历。
但它开始发挥作用了。
一切都很顺利。
粮食和煤炭的储备都增加了。

Then in November we had an early winter, and early fog; the fog's bad in Berlin, anyway; but this year it was worse than they had ever seen, I guess, and it came down about the first of November and it just stuck. It meant that you had to go on GCA, on instruments entirely. In the meantime, the Russians were buzzing the planes. They didn't shoot any down, but they came right near us. It's a wonder there weren't any accidents, and so starting a war, because that would have probably done it.

11月，我们迎来了早冬，也早早地起了雾；柏林的雾本来就很严重；但今年的雾比以往任何一年都要严重，我想，大概是11月01日左右就来了，而且一直没散。
这意味着你必须完全依靠地面控制飞行，完全依靠仪表飞行。
与此同时，俄国人一直在轰炸我们的飞机。
他们没有击落任何一架，但它们却飞到了我们附近。
奇怪的是，没有发生任何事故，从而引发战争，因为那样的话，战争很可能就爆发了。

Anyway, this fog came down and it meant that you had to land every five or six or ten minutes instead of every two, and the stockpiles ran down again. It ran right through December and by the third or fourth or fifth of January we were down to two days again. And it looked like curtains. If that fog had stayed another three weeks we probably would have had to run up the white flag. We probably couldn't have gone on. You can't have people starving, and keep on with the occupation. But the weather lifted about the fifth of January, it was fine, and immediately we restored the situation. The Russians knew they were licked right away, but it was May before they finally gave up.

总之，大雾降临，意味着你不得不每隔五六分钟甚至十分钟就降落一次，而不是两分钟，物资储备又一次告罄。
大雾持续了整个12月，到了01月的三四五号，我们又只剩下两天的作战时间了。
眼看就要完蛋了。
如果大雾再持续三个星期，我们可能就不得不举起白旗投降了。
我们可能坚持不下去了。
总不能一边让人民挨饿，一边继续占领吧。
不过，01月5号左右天气转晴，放晴了，我们立刻就恢复了局面。
俄国人立刻意识到他们被打败了，但直到05月份他们才最终放弃。

In Berlin at that time – I went back and forth a number of times from Washington – at almost any point in Berlin, you could see three planes in the air, two on their way in and one or two on the way out, depending on where you were standing, and it was that continual bridge of planes that the Berliners (and the other Germans knew about it all over Germany), kept seeing day after day.

当时在柏林——我多次往返于华盛顿和柏林——几乎在柏林的任何一个地方，你都能看到空中有三架飞机，两架在进港，一两架在出港，这取决于你站在哪里，柏林人（以及全德国都知道的其他德国人）日复01日地看到这种连续不断的飞机桥。

There were forty of our pilots killed in accidents. They knew that, too.

我们有40名飞行员在事故中丧生。
他们也知道这一点。

HESS: A very visible sign of support.

赫斯：这是一种非常明显的支持信号。

DRAPER: That was what brought the Germans into our camp, in my opinion.

德雷珀：在我看来，这就是德国人加入我们阵营的原因。

HESS: During that period of time, were you ever in any meeting with President Truman where he might have expressed his views on the handling of the blockade?

赫斯：在那段时间，您是否曾与杜鲁门总统会面，让他表达对封锁处理方式的看法？

DRAPER: No, we knew perfectly well his views. They were very clear cut. I don't think I met personally with him during this period – well, I probably did as Under Secretary, but I don't recall – I undoubtedly did.

德雷珀：没有，我们非常了解他的观点。
他的立场非常明确。
我不认为我在这段时间里与他见过面——好吧，我担任副部长时可能见过，但我不记得了——毫无疑问我见过。

HESS: During the period of time that you served, the armed services were organized into the National Military Establishment.

赫斯：在您任职期间，武装部队被组织成国家军事机构。

DRAPER: Right.

德雷珀：：对。

HESS: That law came into being, it was the National Security Act of '47, passed on July 25th. What is your general evaluation of that particular setup, and why was it found necessary two years later to change it and set up a Department of Defense? What was deficient?

赫斯：那项法律诞生了，它是1947年的国家安全法，于07月25日通过。
您对这种特殊的组织结构有何评价？为什么两年后有必要对其进行修改并成立国防部？它存在哪些缺陷？

DRAPER: Was the first one by law or by regulation – whichever it was, it was intended to put the three departments into a coordinated whole. And probably (and I'm not too sure about this, it was a long time ago, and I was out of the Department before that second law, I guess, was passed), but the first step was taken in 1949.

德雷珀：：第1个组织结构是通过法律还是法规制定的——无论是哪种，它的目的都是将三个部门整合成一个协调的整体。
或许（我不太确定，那是很久以前的事了，我猜第2部法律通过之前我就离开了国防部），但第1步是在1949年迈出的。

HESS: That was when the Department of Defense was established, but it was 1947 when the National Military Establishment was formed.

赫斯：国防部在那年成立，但国家军事机构是在1947年成立的。

DRAPER: It was 1947, that's right. Well, that was put together as a first effort, and on the basis of a couple of years of experience I suppose that the law which fashioned it on a more permanent basis was passed. I don't think there were any great changes, were there?

德雷珀：：没错，是在1947年。
嗯，那是作为初步努力而制定的，基于几年的经验，我猜想，赋予其更永久性基础的法律已经通过了。
我认为当时没有什么重大变化，对吧？

HESS: I think about the only changes that I can recall, were that the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Army did not sit in on the Cabinet meetings. They weren't considered Cabinet level under the Department of Defense, whereas they sat in on Cabinet meetings during the days of the National Military Establishment.

赫斯：我记得唯一的变化是海军部长、空军部长和陆军部长不再列席内阁会议。
在国防部领导下，他们不被视为内阁级别，而在国家军事建制时期，他们可以列席内阁会议。

DRAPER: That's true. That's normal. It meant that the Cabinet was a little too bulky.

德雷珀：：没错。
这很正常。
这意味着内阁的规模有点太大。

HESS: That's right, and it gave the Secretary of Defense more authority under the present setup.

赫斯：没错，这在目前的设置下赋予了国防部长更多权力。

DRAPER: I think the whole thing has worked out just the way it should, a logical development, and most other countries have adopted much that same form of defense establishment, indicating that others think that we have the right method now.

德雷珀：：我认为整个事情进展得如预期般顺利，这是一个合乎逻辑的发展，大多数其他国家也采用了类似形式的国防建制，这表明其他国家认为我们现在的方法是正确的。

HESS: Earlier this morning I asked your opinion of Secretary Forrestal's view on unification, and as you know, the Navy expressed a good deal of fear about the effects of unification. They thought they would lose the Air Wing to the Air Force; they thought they would lose the Marines to the Army. Do you think the Army would have liked to have taken over the Marine Corps at this time?

赫斯：今天早上我问了你对福雷斯特尔部长关于统一的看法，如你所知，海军对统一的影响表示了很大的担忧。
他们认为航空联队会落入空军手中；他们以为海军陆战队会落入陆军之手。
你认为陆军当时会愿意接管海军陆战队吗？

DRAPER: I have no doubt it would have loved to have done it, but nobody ever took that as a practical possibility that I ever heard of.

德雷珀：：我毫不怀疑陆军很乐意这么做，但据我所知，没有人认为这有实际可能性。

HESS: Did you ever hear any of the generals discussing that subject?

赫斯：你听过哪位将军讨论过这个话题吗？

DRAPER: I guess I heard the Navy's fears about it, but I don't think we in the Army had any illusions.

德雷珀：：我想我听到了海军对此的担忧，但我认为我们陆军并不抱有任何幻想。

HESS: More on the Navy's side than on the Army's side.

赫斯：海军这边的担忧多于陆军。

DRAPER: And as far as Navy Air is concerned, that's certainly going strong still. In Vietnam you get planes off the ships right along, off the carriers. And I guess the Army with its little planes, has actually as many or more planes than the Air Force. Of course it doesn't have the fighting ships.

德雷珀：：就海军航空兵而言，这支部队肯定仍在强劲发展。
在越南，你可以直接从舰艇、航母上起飞飞机。
我猜陆军拥有小型飞机，但其飞机数量实际上与空军一样多，甚至更多。
当然，陆军没有作战舰艇。

HESS: Just a word or two about some of the gentlemen you served with. Kenneth Royall, of course, we've mentioned him several times.

赫斯：简单谈谈你曾与之共事的一些先生们。
当然是肯尼斯·罗亚尔，我们提到过他好几次了。

DRAPER: He passed away a year or so ago.

德雷珀：他大约一年前去世了。

HESS: Not too long ago. How effective was he?

赫斯：不久前。
他有多有效？

DRAPER: He was a wonderful leader. He had great self-confidence; he had great ability; he had great experience and background. He was the one that first integrated the blacks and whites in the Army; he was a southerner and he could do that better than a northerner could have done. He had real vision. He had the great confidence of President Truman, I know, and every impression I have and recollection is that he gave the country a splendid administration for the Department of the Army.

德雷珀：他是一位出色的领导者。
他非常自信；他能力非凡；他经验丰富，背景深厚。
他是第1个在军队中整合黑人和白人的人；他是南方人，但他比北方人做得更好。
他很有远见。
我知道，他深得杜鲁门总统的信任，我的所有印象和记忆都是，他为美国陆军部带来了辉煌的管理。

HESS: On the problem of integration of blacks into the armed forces: Did your duties touch upon that?

赫斯：关于黑人融入军队的问题：您的职责涉及这个问题吗？

DRAPER: Not particularly. I incidentally only know it was Secretary Royall's thinking, and he was the first one to take action in that direction. And I think it was his personal initiative.

德雷珀：没有特别的。
我只知道这是罗亚尔部长的想法，他是第1个朝这个方向采取行动的人。
我认为这是他个人的主动性。

HESS: John L. Sullivan was Secretary of the Navy at that time.

赫斯：约翰·L·沙利文当时是海军部长。

DRAPER: A splendid person, too. He's still living here in Washington. And John Kenney was his Under Secretary. John Kenney and I worked very closely together. And so I did with Mr. Sullivan.

德雷珀：他也是一个很棒的人。
他现在还住在华盛顿。
约翰·肯尼是他的副部长。
我和约翰·肯尼合作非常密切。
我和沙利文先生也是如此。

HESS: Stuart Symington was Secretary of the Air Force.

赫斯：斯图尔特·西明顿是空军部长。

DRAPER: Now he's in the Senate, and taking quite a different point of view than he did then about military matters, and about the war in Vietnam, particularly.

德雷珀：现在他在参议院，对军事问题，尤其是对越南战争的看法与当时截然不同。

HESS: Mr. Gordon Gray, who was later Secretary of the Army was Assistant Secretary at the time you were Under Secretary.

赫斯：后来担任陆军部长的戈登·格雷先生在您担任副部长期间担任助理部长。

DRAPER: He was Assistant Secretary and so was Tracy Voorhees, the one I mentioned before. There were two Assistant Secretaries. And Gordon Gray later became Secretary of the Army, both of them fine people. Gordon Gray was a young captain who came to the Department after I was Under Secretary, and Tracy Voorhees had charge of food problems for the Army, and then he became Assistant Secretary. We had a fine family of officials there, all working very closely together under Mr. Royall.

德雷珀：他是助理部长，我之前提到的特蕾西·沃希斯也是。
有两位助理部长。
戈登·格雷后来成为陆军部长，他们俩都是很优秀的人。
戈登·格雷是一位年轻的上尉，在我担任副部长之后来到国防部；特雷西·沃希斯负责陆军的食品问题，后来成为助理部长。
我们那里的官员队伍很优秀，在罗亚尔先生的领导下，他们都紧密合作。

HESS: What other problems did you have to deal with as Under Secretary? What other areas of the job have we not touched upon?

赫斯：作为副部长，您还要处理哪些问题？我们还有哪些工作领域没有涉及？

DRAPER: Well, there was the whole question of budget; there was the whole question of strength of the Army. I really had a full-time job running the several Army occupations. It included four (I said three before; it included Korea and Austria also). But whenever the Secretary, Mr. Royall, was on a trip or away, I was Acting Secretary and had to deal with the whole range of whatever came up at that time.

德雷珀：嗯，有整个预算问题；有整个陆军实力问题。
我的全职工作是负责几项陆军占领任务。
其中包括四项（我之前说的是三项；还包括韩国和奥地利）。
但每当部长罗亚尔先生出差或外出时，我就担任代理部长，必须处理当时出现的各种情况。

HESS: Did you see at that time that there was any likelihood of trouble in Korea as it erupted in 1950?

赫斯：1950年朝鲜战争爆发时，您当时是否预见到朝鲜半岛可能出现动乱？

DRAPER: No, no. I went to Korea, went out to the dividing line between North and South Korea and checked on our situation there, but at that time we were still there, we hadn't pulled out. So it changed completely after I had left when it was decided to pull our troops back to Japan. That, I suppose, acted as an invitation, or at least it didn't prevent the possibility, of an invasion from the North.

德雷珀：：没有，没有。
我去了朝鲜，去了南北朝鲜的分界线，查看了那里的情况，但当时我们还在那里，还没有撤军。
所以，我离开后，情况完全改变了，因为当时朝鲜决定撤军回日本。
我想，这相当于邀请朝鲜入侵，或者至少没有阻止朝鲜入侵的可能性。

HESS: Do you recall the views of the Department of the Army at the time the Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the talk, and drew the defense perimeter down the western area of the Pacific, leaving Korea out?

赫斯：您还记得当时陆军部的观点吗？当时国务卿迪安·艾奇逊发表了讲话，将防御圈划到了太平洋西部地区，而朝鲜半岛被排除在外。

DRAPER: No, I was already out of the Department, and I read about it in the newspapers just like you would have done, and thought it was unfortunate, but I had no particular knowledge or comment about it at that time.

德雷珀：不，我当时已经离开了国防部，我和你一样在报纸上读到了这件事，觉得很不幸，但当时我对此并没有什么特别的了解，也没有发表任何评论。

HESS: We earlier have mentioned your appointment as United States Special Representative in Europe in 1953, and you mentioned about . . .

赫斯：我们之前提到过1953年您被任命为美国驻欧洲特别代表，您提到…

DRAPER: '51 it was, '51 to '53.

德雷珀：是51年，从51年到53年。

HESS: . . . '51, and you mentioned about taking the trip to see General Eisenhower. Just what were your duties as Special Representative in Europe?

赫斯：…51年，您提到去拜访艾森豪威尔将军。
您作为欧洲特别代表的职责是什么？

DRAPER: NATO had been formed a short time – two or three years before that or less. The NATO Alliance was a direct result of the Korean war in its requirement, as Dean Acheson and the rest of us saw as the need, and the other countries as well, to band together to keep the Russians from moving to the Channel; it was just as simple as that.

德雷珀：北约成立时间不长——在那之前两三年甚至更短。
北约联盟是朝鲜战争的直接产物，正如迪安·艾奇逊和我们其他人以及其他国家所认为的，需要联合起来阻止苏联人进入英吉利海峡；就这么简单。

My duties as the U.S. member of the Council were to deal first with the defense aspects and help to build up the strength of NATO from all of the countries concerned, including our own; to embark on a program of ammunition production and arms production in Europe, which had practically disappeared from Europe; to provide the European countries with planes and ammunition and artillery to the extent necessary until their own production got underway. That was on the defense side.

作为理事会的美国成员，我的职责是首先处理防御方面的问题，并帮助所有有关国家（包括我们自己）增强北约的实力；启动一项在欧洲几乎已消失的弹药和武器生产计划；向欧洲国家提供必要的飞机、弹药和火炮，直到它们自行生产。
这是防御方面的。

On the mutual assistance side: The need was for economic assistance to permit them to carry this military burden, and to extend the recovery they were already beginning to make from the ravages of war.

互助方面的：需要经济援助，使它们能够承担军事负担，并延长它们已开始从战争蹂躏中恢复的时期。

On the political side, it was of vital importance to discuss not only European problems with our NATO allies, but worldwide problems, such as we had to deal with in the Pacific and with, of course, the Russians, and the Koreans, the United Nations' problems, because the United Nations was involved in the Korean war as well. So there were those three: The defense, the political and the economic. And Ambassador Livingston Merchant was my Ambassador on the political side; General Luke Finley was my deputy on the military side; and Paul Porter was my economic deputy. General [Frederick L.] Anderson was my overall general deputy.

政治方面的：至关重要的不仅是与我们的北约盟友讨论欧洲问题，还有全球问题，例如我们必须应对的太平洋问题，当然还有与俄罗斯、韩国以及联合国的问题，因为联合国也卷入了朝鲜战争。
所以，这包括三个方面：防御、政治和经济。
利文斯顿·默钱特大使是我的政治大使；卢克·芬利将军是我的军事副大使；保罗·波特是我的经济副大使。
弗雷德里克·L·安德森将军是我的总副手。

The responsibilities required me to deal with twenty countries that were in Europe, and also including Canada, also a member of NATO.

我的职责要求我与欧洲二十个国家打交道，其中也包括北约成员国加拿大。

HESS: Just briefly, what are your views of the current state of NATO?

赫斯：请简单介绍一下您对北约现状的看法。

DRAPER: I'm delighted that the President has now appointed a new Ambassador, the former Secretary of the Treasury, David Kennedy, and has again broadened out the duties and responsibilities of our NATO Ambassador.

德雷珀：我很高兴总统任命了一位新大使，即前财政部长戴维·肯尼迪，并再次扩大了我们北约大使的职责范围。

After I left the job was downgraded very considerably, and has been on a much lower level ever since. I'm glad to see it reviving. He's going to, in fact, have a little higher status than I had. He'll be a member of the Cabinet as well as Ambassador and he's a Roving Ambassador as well, so he will combine trade functions, which I had too, but on a broader scale throughout the world. He will need, I believe, equally strong deputies if he's going to cover this wide ground.

我离职后，这份工作级别大幅下降，至今一直很低。
我很高兴看到它重新焕发活力。
事实上，他的地位会比我之前略高一些。
他将成为内阁成员、大使和巡回大使，因此他将兼任贸易职能（我之前也曾担任过），但范围更广，遍及全球。
我相信，如果他要覆盖如此广泛的领域，他需要同样强大的副手。

The NATO Alliance has, in my judgment, prevented World War III. We have been losing strength on a comparative basis with the Russians in Europe and in the rest of the world. I noticed just today or yesterday that it's been reported that our aerial defenses are weak too, by the Armed Services sub-committee, but that's a tendency that is obvious from the fact that we've been involved in the Vietnam war. The Russians have gone merrily along to increase their missile strength. They're way ahead of us in missiles now. I'm told that we are building five nuclear Submarines a year and the Russians twenty. They've thrown a missile defense around Moscow. We have it only around some of our missile bases and none around Washington or around any of our other big cities, and I think the next big problem myself – this is a personal view – the next big problem that our President faces is to evaluate, and I'm not in any position to do that, whether or not the Russians are, as the Secretary of Defense has recently indicated, about to pass us strategically. If that is the judgment of those who know best, then we have to change direction on our defense budgets, and our research and development of the whole missile and defensive posture of this country. That involves NATO as well as the world. Obviously you are familiar with the fact that these recent discussions that have been going on in NATO have gotten a certain amount of agreement from the Germans to take over more of the costs and from the other NATO partners to take over some more of the defense costs, because of our big imbalance of trade.

在我看来，北约联盟阻止了第3次世界大战。
与俄罗斯相比，我们在欧洲和世界其他地区的实力一直在下降。
就在今天或昨天，我注意到武装部队小组委员会报告称，我们的防空力量也很薄弱，但从我们卷入越南战争这一事实来看，这种趋势显而易见。
俄罗斯人兴高采烈地增强了他们的导弹实力。
他们现在在导弹方面远远领先于我们。
我听说我们每年建造五艘核潜艇，俄罗斯每年建造二十艘。
他们在莫斯科周围部署了导弹防御系统。
我们只在一些导弹基地周围部署了导弹防御系统，在华盛顿或其他任何大城市周围都没有。
我认为，我个人认为，我们总统面临的下一个大问题是评估俄罗斯是否像国防部长最近指出的那样，即将在战略上超越我们，而我对此无权做出评估。
如果这是最了解情况的人的判断，那么我们必须改变国防预算的方向，以及我们国家导弹和防御态势的研发方向。
这不仅涉及北约，也涉及全世界。
显然，你们都知道，由于我们之间存在巨大的贸易不平衡，北约最近进行的这些讨论已经得到了德国同意承担更多费用，也得到了其他北约伙伴同意承担更多国防费用的一定程度的同意。

HESS: At the time that you were in Europe as Ambassador, near the end of the Truman administration, what do you recall about the success of the Marshall plan at this point?

赫斯：杜鲁门政府任期即将结束，您出任欧洲大使期间，对马歇尔计划的成功有何回忆？

DRAPER: Oh, tremendous. I suppose that we have never, as a nation, done anything that at comparatively small cost was of such great benefit to the world, to Europe, and incidentally and indirectly to ourselves. It was the groundwork for their recovery. They had to do the work themselves to recover from the war. We couldn't do that, but we gave them the resources to rebuild their economy, but the result of that has so greatly increased their ability to trade with us and to produce that between us we've risen to heights that we never would have done without that fillip that came just at the right time.

德雷珀：哦，太棒了。
我想，作为一个国家，我们从未做过任何事，以相对较小的代价，给世界、给欧洲，以及顺便间接地给我们自己带来如此巨大的利益。
马歇尔计划为他们的经济复苏奠定了基础。
他们必须自己动手才能从战争中恢复过来。
我们无法做到这一点，但我们给了他们重建经济的资源，而这极大地增强了他们与我们贸易往来的能力，也使我们两国之间的合作达到了前所未有的高度，如果没有那恰逢其时的刺激，我们永远无法达到这样的高度。

That was a great, imaginative, well-timed, and well-directed operation in the international field. One of the best this country's ever done.

那是一次伟大、富有想象力、时机恰当、方向正确的国际行动。
是我们国家有史以来最好的行动之一。

HESS: Were there any other major problems that you had to handle in Europe at this time?

赫斯：当时您在欧洲还有其他需要处理的重大问题吗？

DRAPER: The Marshall plan didn't come . . .

德雷珀：：马歇尔计划没有……

HESS: That's right.

赫斯：没错。

DRAPER: The Marshall plan was at the time I was in Germany, and the German picture was not directly involved in the Marshall plan except as a parallel operation, but we had to work very closely together, Mr. Harriman and Paul Hoffman and General Clay and myself, under the President's direction.

德雷珀：：马歇尔计划当时我在德国，德国事务并没有直接参与马歇尔计划，只是作为一项平行行动，但我们必须密切合作，哈里曼先生、保罗·霍夫曼、克莱将军和我，在总统的指导下。

HESS: What I had reference to was any major problems, any major duties, as Special Representative in Europe that we haven't mentioned.

赫斯：我指的是作为欧洲特别代表，我们没有提到的任何重大问题和重大职责。

DRAPER: No, I was dealing with the governments of all the Western European countries, and we were having sessions and meetings and problems continuously, but it was a time of building strength and a time of great interest on the part of all governments including our own. I got every cooperation from Washington. I had to come back to explain things and get directions and get help regularly, either I or General Anderson. It was one of the greatest experiences of my life, that two-year period.

德雷珀：不，我当时和所有西欧国家的政府打交道，我们不断地开会、会面，解决问题。
但那是一个我们积蓄力量的时期，也是包括我们自己在内的所有政府都高度关注的时期。
我得到了华盛顿的全力配合。
我不得不回来解释情况，寻求指导，并定期寻求帮助，要么是我，要么是安德森将军。
那两年是我一生中最宝贵的经历之一。

HESS: You held that position until June of '53.

赫斯：你一直担任那个职位到1953年06月。

DRAPER: That's right.

德雷珀：没错。

HESS: In your opinion, what were President Truman's major accomplishments during his career, and what were his major failings? What went right and what went wrong?

赫斯：你认为杜鲁门总统在其职业生涯中的主要成就是什么？他的主要失败是什么？哪些做对了，哪些做错了？

DRAPER: I would think that he was one of our greatest Presidents, My wife thinks he's the last great American. She's a Democrat.

德雷珀：我认为他是我们最伟大的总统之一。
我妻子认为他是最后一位伟大的美国人。
她是民主党人。

He really was great for one whose experience had been what it had been, haberdashery salesman, I guess originally, and then part of the machine in Missouri, the political machine, and then a Senator from Missouri. The ability that he displayed when he was faced with the responsibility of leading this country in war and then in peace, was unbelievable, and I think that historians are going to look back on President Truman as one of the greatest men we've ever had in that office. The right man at the right time, and one from whom the country could hardly have expected the great degree of high quality service and integrity that he displayed.

就他的经历而言，他确实很出色。
我猜他最初是服装销售员，后来成为密苏里州政治机器的一部分，最后成为密苏里州的参议员。
当他肩负起领导国家走过战时和战后重任时，他所展现的能力令人难以置信。
我认为，历史学家们会回顾杜鲁门总统，认为他是我们历史上最伟大的总统之一。
他是在正确的时间出现的正确人选，他展现出的高质量服务和正直的品质，是国家难以想象的。

His great accomplishments: He recognized, as President Roosevelt had not, very quickly, the Russian threat, thanks probably to Ambassador Harriman and others, but he not only recognized it but then began to do something about it. He had the courage, in the face of what many would have quailed under, to take on the assistance to Greece and Turkey and flaunt the Russians, and got away with it. He had the statesmanship to see the need, under Secretary Acheson's recommendations, and General Marshall's, for both the Marshall Plan itself and later the NATO Alliance, and those are two national efforts that were very successful. The NATO Alliance was initiated by him and is still in force, and is the keystone in our whole foreign policy.

他的伟大成就：他迅速察觉到俄罗斯的威胁，而罗斯福总统却未能如此迅速地察觉，这或许要归功于哈里曼大使等人。
他不仅察觉到了，还开始采取行动。
面对许多人可能畏缩的境地，他勇敢地承担了对希腊和土耳其的援助，藐视俄罗斯，并且最终成功。
他以政治家风度，在艾奇逊国务卿和马歇尔将军的建议下，看到了马歇尔计划以及后来北约联盟的必要性，这两项国家努力都取得了巨大成功。
北约联盟由他发起，至今仍在有效运作，是我们整个外交政策的基石。

If I were to be bold enough to suggest one of his mistakes, and there were very few, I would think it was the decision not to win the Korean war. It's my own belief that the risks that we would have had to take, and they were real, possibilities that China and/or Russia would come in, as China did, were risks that could have been taken if the planning had been different, if the planning and the authority given to General MacArthur had included the decision to win the war, which I'm afraid was not taken, and then if the planning had been along the lines necessary to accomplish that.

如果我要大胆指出他的一个错误（错误很少），我认为那就是未能打赢朝鲜战争的决定。
我个人认为，如果计划不同，如果麦克阿瑟将军获得的授权和计划中包含了赢得战争的决定（恐怕他并没有做出这个决定），如果计划是按照实现这一目标所必需的方式进行的，那么我们必须承担的风险（这些风险是真实存在的），这些风险是可以承担的。

I was, as a Reserve officer, a Reserve retired major general, in close touch with the General Staff in Washington during the Korean war. I was available if they needed me at any time, and I used to spend a good deal of voluntary time here, particularly with G-3, or operations. We weren't on a war footing basis. We were more so than we have been during the Vietnam war, but we were not on the kind of war footing basis that you go on if you're going to win a war. If you decide to go to war at all the only way, in my opinion, is to do everything you can to win it and as quickly as possible.

作为一名预备役军官，一名退役少将，我在朝鲜战争期间与华盛顿的总参谋部保持着密切联系。
如果他们随时需要我，我随时待命。
我过去在这里做过很多志愿工作，尤其是在G-3行动中。
我们当时并非处于战备状态。
虽然比越南战争期间更甚，但我们还没有达到那种为了赢得战争而必须的战备状态。
在我看来，如果你决定参战，唯一的办法就是尽一切努力尽快赢得战争。

Now, General MacArthur cannot be condoned however, for what was really his failure to obey orders later. I think his recommendations were correct, and the President should have perhaps accepted them, or more of them. I know that he was at times asking for four more divisions than he got, and things like that. The ammunition was running awful short at times, and we just didn't have it, and we weren't turning our industry throughout the country over to the wartime job, which we could have done, and had done during the World War.

然而，麦克阿瑟将军后来确实未能服从命令，因此他现在不能被宽恕。
我认为他的建议是正确的，总统或许应该采纳这些建议，甚至更多。
我知道他有时要求比实际得到的多四个师，诸如此类。
弹药有时严重短缺，我们根本用不上，而且我们也没有把全国各地的工业投入到战时工作中去，而我们本来可以这样做，而且在二战期间也确实这样做了。

So, I believe – and there can be differences of opinion – that the British and perhaps the Secretary of State and others, advised him that the risks were too great, and the President took those seriously and so we fought the Korean war with one hand behind our backs. He certainly did the right thing to treat General MacArthur the way he did when the chips were down. No President can have a commander in his Army defy his instructions. That's almost what General MacArthur did, and as much as I admire General MacArthur, and I do, because what I saw him do in Japan was tremendous, and what he did in the Korean war by insisting on that outflanking action . . .

所以，我相信——当然也可能存在意见分歧——英国人，或许还有国务卿和其他人，都建议他风险太大，而总统认真对待了这些建议，所以我们在朝鲜战争中是孤掌难鸣。
在关键时刻，他对待麦克阿瑟将军的方式无疑是正确的。
没有哪位总统会允许自己的军队指挥官违抗他的指示。
麦克阿瑟将军几乎就是这么做的，我非常钦佩麦克阿瑟将军，我确实钦佩，因为我看到他在日本的出色表现，以及他在朝鲜战争中坚持采取侧翼进攻……

HESS: The Inchon landing.

赫斯：仁川登陆。

DRAPER: Yes, and which Washington was very cold to and only acceded to because of his strong recommendations as I understand it, that was the thing that gave us a chance to win the war, but then we failed to go on.

德雷珀：是的，据我所知，华盛顿对此非常冷淡，只是因为他的强烈建议才同意的，正是这给了我们赢得战争的机会，但我们最终没能坚持下去。

It was too bad that General MacArthur went to the Chinese border. If he had stayed fifty miles or a hundred miles away we probably wouldn't have had the Chinese come in and we would have had a better ending to the whole thing, but we weren't really trying to carry it through.

麦克阿瑟将军去了中国边境，这太遗憾了。
如果他当时离我们五十英里或一百英里远，我们可能就不会让中国人进来，整个事情也会有一个更好的结局，但我们并没有真的想把它完成。

I'm afraid that that very fact, that we didn't win in the Korean war, led to the Vietnam war eventually, and to some of the many problems we've had since. But no one can rewrite history.

我担心，正是我们没能打赢朝鲜战争这一事实，最终导致了越南战争，以及此后我们遇到的诸多问题。
但没有人能够改写历史。

HESS: Once it's done, it's done.

赫斯：历史既已过去，就让它过去吧。

DRAPER: It's done. President Truman performed a service to this country that no one can exaggerate. It's very real and he should be very happy, he and Mrs. Truman, at the tremendous service that he was able to render to his country and to the world.

德雷珀：历史已经过去。
杜鲁门总统对这个国家的贡献无人能及。
这是实实在在的，他和杜鲁门夫人应该为自己为国家和世界做出的巨大贡献感到非常高兴。

HESS: General, do you have anything else to add on Mr. Truman or your service in the Truman administration?

赫斯：将军，关于杜鲁门先生或您在杜鲁门政府的任职，您还有什么要补充的吗？

DRAPER: I just have the greatest possible admiration and friendly feelings toward both President and Mrs. Truman. They were both always hospitable and courteous to me. The fact that I happened to be a Republican was never even mentioned. I don't know whether he even – I guess he knew it all right – but that had nothing to do with our relationship. There was nothing political about it. He gave me every support and backing; so did Secretary Royall. I enjoyed my service during his administration tremendously, and I have the greatest admiration. I hope you'll be good enough to give him my best regards and my best wishes for health for both of them.

德雷珀：我对杜鲁门总统和夫人怀有无比的钦佩和友好情谊。
他们俩对我都总是热情好客，彬彬有礼。
我恰好是共和党人，他们甚至从未提起过。
我不知道他是否——我想他肯定知道——但这与我们的关系无关。
这和政治无关。
他给了我全力支持和帮助；罗亚尔部长也是如此。
我非常享受在他执政期间的工作，并且非常钦佩他。
我希望您能代我向他致以最诚挚的问候，并祝他们两人身体健康。

HESS: We'll see that that is conveyed. Thank you very much, sir.

赫斯：我们会确保传达的。
非常感谢，先生。

DRAPER: Thank you, sir.

德雷珀：谢谢，先生。